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Abstract 
Dispositions have moved from being regarded with suspicion to playing a central 
role in metaphysics. Yet despite much recent work, there is little consensus on the 
semantics of dispositional terms used to make ascriptions (such as “x is fragile”) 
and the metaphysics of dispositional properties (such as fragility).  
 
This thesis proposes that key, competing theories of dispositions mistake and 
conflate how we identify, designate and talk about dispositions and dispositional 
terms for the nature of dispositions and the meaning of dispositional terms when 
they argue that:  
a) dispositions are extrinsic properties of their bearers (Boyle 1666) 
b) all properties are purely dispositional (Bird 2007)  
c) all properties are purely categorical (there are no dispositional properties) 
(Armstrong in AMP 1996) 
d) dispositional and categorical properties are separate and distinct 
properties (Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982).  
In so doing these theories make unwarranted and unsupported ontological 
conclusions about dispositions. 
 
The thesis traces the principal source of this confusion and conflation to a 
reliance on the counterfactual analysis of dispositions that wrongly encourages 
the conflation of a disposition (say fragility) with its manifestation (shattering). 
There is good reason to hold that the counterfactual analysis of dispositions is 
false — the truth of a counterfactual statement (such as “if x were dropped x 
would break”) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of a dispositional 
ascription (such as “x is fragile”).  
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Chapter one — introduction and chapter outline 
Introduction 
Dispositions and powers are central to our understanding of how the world is and 
what it is for an entity to possess a property. Despite their importance, 
dispositions have been viewed with deep suspicion. It was feared that dispositions 
introduce suspect concepts such as possibility and potentiality into the world and 
that to countenance their existence is to venture beyond what could be verified. 
These worries have largely been allayed in recent decades. Philosophers have 
developed a robust modal semantics in terms of possible worlds and we are no 
longer bound fast by verificationist concerns about ontology outstripping 
evidence. This has allowed dispositions and powers to take their place at the 
centre of metaphysics and our understanding of causation, laws of nature and 
modality. Despite this, there is little consensus on the correct way to understand 
dispositional properties and dispositional ascriptions and terms. Major, 
competing accounts of dispositions suffer serious objections.  
 
My contribution to the debate on dispositions is to trace the source of many of 
these problems to a range of confusions and conflations that stem from a faulty 
semantics of dispositions based around the counterfactual analysis of dispositions. 
The central claim of this thesis is that a number of key, competing theories of 
dispositions mistake and conflate how we fix the reference of dispositional terms 
for the nature of dispositions and the meaning of dispositional terms when they 
argue that:  
e) Dispositions are extrinsic properties of their bearers (Boyle 1666)  
f) Properties are purely dispositional (Bird 2007)  
g) Properties are purely categorical (there are no dispositional properties) 
(Armstrong in AMP 1996)  
h) Dispositional and categorical properties are separate and distinct 
properties (Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982)  
 
There is good reason to hold that the counterfactual analysis of dispositions is 
false — the truth of a counterfactual statement (such as “if x were dropped x 
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would break”) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of a dispositional 
ascription (such as “x is fragile”). This leads me to claim that counterfactuals are 
useful for fixing the reference of dispositional terms, but do not give the meaning 
of these terms. The counterfactual analysis of dispositions also wrongly 
encourages the conflation of a disposition (say fragility) with its manifestation 
(shattering). This in turn encourages the view that dispositions are conditional 
and somehow potential, when it is only the manifestation and manifestation 
conditions of a disposition that are conditional and potential.   
 
The central claims of this thesis rest upon a distinction between the way we talk 
about the world and how the world is. In particular, I argue that it is wrong to 
confuse the manner in which we fix the reference of dispositional terms for the 
meaning of those terms. Similarly, it is wrong to confuse the way in which we 
pick out and identify properties using dispositional and categorical language for 
the way these properties are. I conclude that the accounts of dispositions 
mentioned above employ a false semantics of powers to make unwarranted 
ontological claims about the nature of dispositions and properties.  
 
Chapter outline 
Chapter two — the counterfactual analysis of dispositions, 
independence and categorical dispositions  
In chapter two I introduce a number of concepts that are central to 
understanding dispositional properties and dispositional ascriptions and terms. I 
make three claims. My principal claim is that the counterfactual analysis of 
dispositions is false. I argue that dispositional ascriptions, such as “x is fragile”, 
cannot be analysed in terms of counterfactual statements such as “if x were struck 
x would break”. I note that finks, mimics and masks show the counterfactual 
analysis of dispositional ascriptions is false. They show that the truth of a 
counterfactual is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of a dispositional 
ascription: There are objects that would shatter upon being struck that are not 
fragile, and there are objects that are fragile that would not shatter upon being 
struck.  
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Secondly, I argue for the independence of a disposition and its manifestation. I 
show dispositions can exist in the absence of their manifestation. For example, 
the Ming vase on level two of the Morven Brown building is fragile even when it 
is not shattering. Indeed the vase need never shatter, yet it still remains fragile. As 
such, powers and dispositions are ontologically independent of their 
manifestation.  
 
Thirdly, I show that the independence of a disposition and its manifestation 
entails that dispositions are categorical, in the sense of being non-conditional 
properties of their bearers. To say that an object is fragile is to say that it 
possesses an actual property. The manifestation and manifestation conditions of a 
disposition may well be conditional, but the disposition itself is not conditional.  
 
Later in the thesis (chapter four), I show that misunderstanding these concepts 
and distinctions underpins numerous arguments and claims about the nature of 
dispositions and dispositional ascriptions and terms. 
 
Chapter three — the distinction between fixing the reference of a 
term and giving its meaning, and the claim that predicates and 
properties are not isomorphic 
In chapter three I argue for a general distinction between word making and 
world making. The chapter is divided into two sections. In section one, I 
introduce Kripke’s distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators to show 
how different terms can be used to pick out and talk about what is one and the 
same thing. I also use Kripke’s distinction between rigid and non-rigid 
designators to explore his contrast between fixing the reference of a term and 
giving its meaning. In the next chapter, I use this distinction to show that 
counterfactuals are useful for fixing the reference of dispositional terms but do 
not give their meaning.  
 
In section two of the chapter I discuss the relation between words and the world. 
I present an array of arguments to demonstrate that predicates and properties are 
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not isomorphic and conclude that we cannot argue from the satisfaction of a 
predicate to the existence of a corresponding property. This chapter acts as a 
bridge between chapter two, where I present a number of dispositional concepts, 
and chapter four, where I show that confusions between predicates and 
properties and reference fixing and meaning lead philosophers to make 
unwarranted ontological and semantic claims about the nature of dispositions 
and dispositional ascriptions.  
 
Following this I also argue that the manner in which entities are identified and 
picked out — be it by rigid or non-rigid designators — is not revelatory of the 
nature of those entities or the meaning of dispositional and property terms. I 
contend that the way something is picked out and designated is just that — a way 
of picking something out. To think otherwise is to assume the terms and phrases 
we use to pick out dispositions and properties are disguised descriptions.   
 
Chapter four — accounts of dispositions 
In chapter four I examine four accounts of the nature of dispositions and 
properties. I show how the misapplication of a faulty semantics of dispositions 
based on the counterfactual analysis of dispositions and a failure to distinguish 
between rigid and non-rigid designators underpins unwarranted ontological 
claims about dispositions and properties. I conclude that these accounts present 
arguments that are either invalid or unsound and so fail to establish the truth of 
their claims about the nature of dispositional properties and dispositional 
ascriptions and terms.   
 
4.1 Distinctness thesis 
In this chapter I examine Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s (1982) adaption of 
Kripke’s (1980) modal argument against the identity of mental states and brain 
states to defend the Distinctness Thesis — that a disposition or power and its 
causal basis are distinct properties. I show their argument is unsound.  
 
We see that on the counterfactual definition of dispositions put forward by Prior, 
Pargetter and Jackson, breaking (or breaking upon being dropped) is a rendered 
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a necessary property of fragility. Hence, breaking (or breaking upon being 
dropped) is not a contingent property of fragility and therefore cannot serve as an 
epistemic counterpart capable of explaining away our intuition that “fragility ≠ 
molecular bonding α”. From this Prior, Pargetter and Jackson conclude that a 
disposition and its causal basis are distinct properties.  
 
It is noted that Prior, Pargetter and Jackson are aware that mimics undermine 
their counterfactual analysis of dispositions and hence their argument for the 
distinctness thesis. I argue that Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s attempts to defend 
the counterfactual analysis of dispositions against mimics introduces a contingent 
feature of fragility and so undermines Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal 
argument for the Distinctness Thesis. Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s defence of 
the counterfactual analysis is also seen to entail, contrary to their intentions, the 
existence of relational and extrinsic dispositions.  
 
I conclude that at the heart of Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s problem is a 
confusion between how we pick out the reference of a disposition — using 
counterfactuals — and the disposition itself. They confuse language we use to talk 
about properties with the meaning of dispositional terms and the nature of 
dispostional properties and draw the unwarranted ontological conclusions that 
the categorical and the dispositional are two distinct properties. 
 
4.2 Pure powers and dispositional essentialism 
In this chapter I explore the pure powers view and dispositional essentialist 
accounts of properties. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one 
introduces the pure powers view — properties are solely or purely dispositional 
— and shows how it entails dispositional essentialism and the necessity of causal 
laws.  
In section two, I examine two arguments proffered by Bird (2007) for 
dispositional essentialism and the existence of pure powers. The first is an 
argument to the best explanation. Bird claims that to deny dispositional 
essentialism (and so adopt categoricalism) is to forego an adequate account of 
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properties and causal laws. I argue that Bird fails to show dispositional 
essentialism provides a superior account of properties and fails the test by which 
arguments to the best explanation are judged. I show the second argument is an a 
posteriori argument from science. The findings of particle physics suggests that 
fundamental particles are simple, pointlike and lacking in structure. This is 
thought to support dispositional essentialism’s claims that powers are purely 
dispositional and possess essences. I show that this line of reasoning commits the 
headless women fallacy and so should be rejected. It is also argued that the use of 
solely dispositional terms, such as “spin” and “charge”, to characterise and talk 
about the properties of fundamental particles entails that these properties are 
solely dispositional. I show that to draw such a conclusion is to confuse and 
conflate how we talk about the world for the nature of the world. The properties 
of fundamental particles are characterised using dispositional terms and 
discovered using dispositional means. However, I argue that it is wrong to 
conclude that these properties are therefore purely dispositional. I conclude that 
these arguments fail to support Bird’s claim that the properties of fundamental 
particles are pure powers with dispositional essences. 
Part three of this chapter presents criticism of the pure powers view. I examine 
three regress arguments that arise due to the relational nature of properties as 
pure powers. I argue that the individuation regress demonstrates the pure powers 
view is incoherent and so should be rejected.  
4.3 Categoricalism 
In chapter 4.3 I examine Armstrong’s claim that all properties are categorical. 
This is the claim that properties are solely categorical or qualitative and the 
denial that there are any irreducible dispositions and powers. The chapter is 
divided into three sections. In section one I introduce Armstrong’s categoricalist 
account of properties. He argues that powers are identical to and reducible to 
categorical properties. 
 
In section two I examine arguments for categoricalism. I note that Armstrong’s 
claim that all properties are categorical is motivated by his commitment to the 
truthmaker principle and the rejection of intentionality, which he finds in 
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dispositions. I show that Armstrong’s arguments for categoricalism are unsound. 
He confuses how we pick out the reference of dispositional terms, via 
counterfactuals, for the meaning of those terms and also conflates the 
manifestation of a disposition for the disposition itself when he claims that 
dispositions introduce intentionality into the world. 
 
In section three of this chapter, I look at problems and complications with 
categoricalist accounts of dispositions and ask whether they provide an adequate 
account of properties. These problems include a tension in Armstrong’s account 
of how categorical properties account for dispositions, claims that purely 
categorical properties are unknowable, and assertions that there are no purely 
categorical properties — that all properties involve dispositionality. I argue that 
these objections can be met be a proponent of categoricalism and that they 
provide no reason to reject categoriclaism. Nonetheless, I show Armstrong fails to 
provide any sound arguments for why we should accept that all properties are 
categorical.    
 
I conclude that categoricalism is right to claim that just because we make 
dispositional ascriptions and use a language of dispositional properties in talking 
about the world it does not follow that there are dispositional properties. 
Dispositional terms do not describe irreducible dispositional properties or states 
of affairs. Instead, I argue dispositional ascriptions are just ways of talking about 
and designating categorical properties. However, categoricalism makes the 
mistake of taking categorical ascriptions and concepts to mirror reality. I contend 
that categoricalism fails to apply the same skepticism about dispositional talk to 
categorical talk and is lead into making unwarranted ontological implications 
based on language, when it is claimed that all properties are purely categorical. 
 
4.4 Powers as extrinsic properties 
In this final chapter, I show that A.D. Smith (1977), Jennifer McKitrick (2003) 
and Robert Boyle (1666) conflate the manifestation and manifestation conditions 
of a disposition (which may well be extrinsic) with the disposition itself when they 
argue that dispositions are extrinsic properties of their bearers. I also show that 
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McKitrick is wrong to conclude that a key has two different powers, one intrinsic 
and one extrinsic, on the basis that she can designate a key’s power to open a 
door in two ways, one rigidly and one non-rigidly. I also construct an argument 
based on Molnar (2003) demonstrating that even if dispositions are extrinsic 
properties, they are nonetheless founded upon and reducible to intrinsic 
properties of their bearers. 
 
Ultimately, it is concluded that failures to distinguish between (a) how we fix the 
reference of dispositional terms and the meaning of those terms and (b) how we 
talk about the world and how the world is, lead these accounts discussed in 
chapter four to make unwarranted claims about the nature of dispositional 
properties and dispositional terms and ascriptions. Their arguments are invalid 
or unsound and give us no reason to accept their claims about dispositions. 
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Chapter two — Dispositional concepts 
2.1 The counterfactual analysis of dispositions 
o Problems posed by finks, mimics, masks and antidotes 
o Reformed Conditional Analysis 
§ RCA overcomes problems posed by finks 
§ RCA overcomes problems posed by mimics 
§ RCA cannot answer problems posed by masks and antidotes 
o Further attempts to save the conditional analysis — Choi’s defence of 
SCA 
§ Choi committed to extrinsic dispositional properties 
o Ultimate argument against conditional analysis — non-dyadic 
dispositions 
o Counterfactual are useful for fixing the reference of dispositional 
terms, but do not give the meaning of these terms 
2.2 Independence of disposition and manifestation 
o A disposition and its manifestation are ontologically distinct.  
2.3 Dispositions are categorical 
o The manifestation of a disposition is conditional, but the disposition 
itself is not conditional  
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Introduction 
In this chapter I introduce three dispositional concepts. Later in the thesis 
(chapter four) I argue that a range of claims about the nature of dispositional 
properties and ascriptions are motivated by a series of misunderstandings related 
to these concepts. My principal claim in this chapter is that the counterfactual 
analysis of dispositions is false. I argue that dispositional ascriptions, such as “x is 
fragile”, cannot be analysed in terms of counterfactual statements such as “if x 
were struck x would break”. Rather, counterfactuals are useful for picking out 
and fixing the reference of dispositional terms, but do not give the meaning of 
those terms. I also argue that a disposition is ontologically independent and 
distinct from its manifestation. For example, an object may be fragile 
independently of its breaking. Finally, I show that dispositions are categorical, 
non-conditional properties of their bearers. To say that an object is fragile is to 
say that it possesses an actual property now. The manifestation of a disposition 
may well be conditional, but the disposition itself is not conditional. 
 
2.1 The counterfactual analysis of dispositions 
Attempts have been made to analyse and define dispositions in terms of 
counterfactual conditionals. For example, here is Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s 
definition of fragility, using what Lewis calls the simple conditional analysis (SCA) 
(Lewis 1997:143):  
“But what makes fragility a disposition is that it is right to define ‘x is 
fragile’ as ‘If x were dropped at t, x would break at t + δ’.” (Prior, 
Pargetter and Jackson 1982:254) 
However, the existence of finks, mimics, masks and antidotes show that the truth 
of a counterfactual statement is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of a 
dispositional ascription.1 Dispositions cannot be defined and analysed in terms of 
counterfactual statements. 
                     
1 On the counterfactual analysis, counterfactuals are used to supply truth conditions for 
dispositional statements. However, as Isaac Levi (2003) argues, counterfactuals lack truth values 
and so are incapable of providing truth values for dispositional ascriptions. A number of other 
philosophers also argue that counterfactuals lack truth values. Alan Hajek (unpublished) holds 
that most counterfactuals are false. While John Mackie (1973) contends counterfactuals are 
condensed arguments, capable of being valid, but not true. 
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Problems posed by finks, mimics, masks and antidotes 
The mechanism of finkish dispositions is such that the stimulus conditions for the 
manifestation of a disposition are also the conditions for an entity or lose a 
disposition, and so ensure that the disposition is not manifested. That is, finkish 
dispositions are those that cease to exist upon the instantiation of the disposition’s 
characteristic stimulus. There are also reverse finks in which a stimulus 
conditions brings into existence a disposition. 
 
Martin (1994) introduces the electro-fink and reverse electro-fink examples. An 
electro-fink is a device connected to a (dead) wire that makes the wire live if it is 
touched by a conductor: 
 “Consider now the following case. The wire referred to in (A) is 
connected to a machine, an electro-fink, which can provide itself with 
reliable information as to exactly when a wire connected to it is touched 
by a conductor. When such contact occurs the electro-fink reacts 
(instantaneously, we are supposing) by making the wire live for the 
duration of the contact. In the absence of contact the wire is dead. For 
example, at t1, the wire is untouched by any conductor, at t2 a conductor 
touches it, at t3 it is untouched again. The wire is dead at t1, live at t2, and 
dead again at t3. In sum, the electro-fink ensures that the wire is live when 
and only when a conductor touches it.” (Martin 1994:2-3) 
Martin concludes that the electro-fink examples demonstrates that: 
“Consequently the conditional [If the wire is touched by a conductor then 
electrical current flows from the wire to the conductor] is not logically 
sufficient for the power ascription of which it is meant to be the 
analysans.” (Martin 1994:3) 
The electro-fink example shows that the truth a counterfactual statement is not 
sufficient for the truth a dispositional ascription. 
 
The electro-fink on reverse cycle makes a live wire dead when touched by a 
conductor: 
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“We turn a switch on our electro-fink so as to make it operate on a 
reverse cycle, as it were. So the wire is dead when and only when a 
conductor touches it. At all other times it is live.” (Martin 1994:3) 
George Molnar provides a real-world example of Martin’s reverse electro-fink in 
the form of a circuit breaker: 
“A non-imaginary example is an electrical safety cut-out switch which 
turns off the current in a wire (=the base) when an earthed conductor 
touches the wire, thus preventing anybody getting a shock from the wire 
(=the disposition). At time t, it is true the wire is live (=disposition) 
although the conditional ‘If one were to touch the wire at t one would get 
an electric shock’ is false, thanks to the safety switch.” (Molnar 2003:90) 
In these two examples, the wire is live, yet the counterfactual “If the wire is 
touched by a conductor then electrical current flows from the wire to the 
conductor” is false. We have a true dispositional ascription, yet false 
counterfactual. This shows that the truth of a counterfactual is not necessary for 
the truth of a dispositional ascription or the possession of a dispositional property. 
 
Masks and antidotes 
Masks and antidotes also show that counterfactuals are unsuited for analysing 
and defining dispositional terms and ascriptions. The mechanism of masks and 
antidotes is such that they prevent the manifestation of a disposition not by 
removing the disposition before it can manifest, as in the case of finks, but by 
blocking or disrupting the process that leads to a disposition’s manifestation. 
Johnston (1992) describes a situation in which a fragile cup has its disposition to 
shatter “masked” by packing foam. While Bird (1998) uses the term “antidote” to 
describe a situation in which a poisonous substance is ingested but fails to kill as 
an antidote has also been ingested: 
“Many dispositions have what I call antidotes. An object x is disposed to 
display response r under stimulus s. At time t it receives stimulus s and so 
in the normal course of things, at some later time t', x gives response r… 
An antidote to the above disposition would be something which, when 
applied before t', has the effect of breaking the causal chain leading to r, 
so that r does not in fact occur. Thus one can ingest a lethal dose of 
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poison, yet not die if a suitable antidote is administered soon enough. (For 
instance, the antidote to arsenic poisoning is dimercaprol, which, 
incidentally, is also known as British Anti-Lewisite.)” (Bird 1998:228) 
 
Toby Handfield (2009) provides a clear, everyday example of a mask/antidote: 
“My pot plant is disposed to dry out if left in the sun. The attempted 
analysis in terms of a counterfactual would be: 
Were this pot plant left in the sun, it would dry out 
As it happens, the pot plant is left in the sun, but I mask this disposition 
by diligently watering it.” (Handfield 2009:7) 
The dispositional ascription is true — the pot plant has the disposition to dry out. 
Yet the counterfactual — were this pot plant left in the sun, it would dry out — is 
false. The pot plant’s disposition to dry out is masked by Handfield’s diligent 
watering. This example of a masked disposition shows that the truth of a 
counterfactual is not necessary for the truth of a dispositional ascription.  
 
Mimics 
Mimics show that the truth of a counterfactual is not sufficient for the possession 
of a disposition or power and that dispositions cannot be analysed and defined in 
terms of counterfactual statements. Lewis’ Hater of Styrofoam provides an 
example: 
“When a Styrofoam dish is struck, it makes a distinctive sound. When the 
Hater of Styrofoam hears this sound, he comes and tears the dish apart 
by brute force. So, when the Hater is within earshot, styrofoam (sic.) 
dishes are disposed to end up broken if struck. … Are they [Styrofoam 
dishes] fragile? To say so would be at best a misleading truth, and at 
worst an outright falsehood.” (Lewis 1997:153) 
As Lewis notes, the Styrofoam dish is not fragile, but nonetheless, due to the 
actions of the Hater of Styrofoam, it mimics the actions of a fragile entity. The 
counterfactual “if this Styrofoam cup were struck, it would shatter” is true. Yet 
the dispositional ascription — that the Styrofoam cup is fragile — is false. True 
counterfactual, yet false dispositional ascription. This mimic shows that the truth 
of a counterfactual is not sufficient for the possession of a disposition or power. 
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Reformed Conditional Analysis 
In response to such finks, mimics, masks and antidotes, Lewis declares the simple 
conditional analysis of dispositions is “simple indeed — but false” (Lewis 
1997a:143). He proposes replacing it with the reformed conditional analysis 
RCA: 
“Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s iff, for 
some intrinsic property B that x has at t, for some time t' after t, if x were 
to undergo stimulus s at time t and retain property B until t', s and x’s 
having of B would jointly be an x-complete cause of x’s giving response r.” 
(Lewis 1997:157) 
 
The reformed conditional analysis overcomes problems posed by 
finks 
The RCA successfully overcomes problems posed by finks to the counterfactual 
analysis of dispositions. As noted above, finkish dispositions are those dispositions 
that cease to exist (or come into being) upon the instantiation of the disposition’s 
characteristic stimulus. For example, the fragility of a vase is finkish if the striking 
of the vase causes the vase to lose its fragility (and so not shatter). The problem 
posed by these finkish dispositions is that the dispositional ascription “the vase is 
fragile” is true, yet the counterfactual “if this vase were struck it would break” is 
false.  
 
The RCA successfully rules out finkish dispositions with the requirement that: 
if x were to undergo stimulus s at time t and retain property B until t'… 
Finkish dispositions are precisely those dispositions that do not retain property B 
until t'. The vase is not fragile according to RCA, because it fails to retain the 
causal basis B that would jointly be an x-complete cause of the vase’s shattering.  
 
The reformed conditional analysis overcomes problems posed by 
mimics 
The RCA also avoids problems posed by mimics to the counterfactual analysis of 
dispositions. The problem that mimicked dispositions pose to the counterfactual 
analysis is that, in the case of the Styrofoam dish, the dish is not fragile, yet the 
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counterfactual “if this Styrofoam dish were struck it would end up broken” is true 
(due to the actions of the Hater of Styrofoam). We have a false dispositional 
ascription, yet a true counterfactual.  
The RCA successfully rules out mimicked dispositions with the requirement that: 
x’s having of B [an intrinsic property that x has] would jointly be an x-
complete cause of x’s giving response r.” 
There is no intrinsic property B of the Styrofoam dish that would (with the 
striking of Styrofoam dish) be a jointly x-complete cause of the Styrofoam dish 
shattering. Rather, the cause of the Styrofoam dish ending up broken involves 
the actions of the Hater of Styrofoam, which is extrinsic to the Styrofoam dish, 
and so is ruled out by the RCA’s requirement that some intrinsic property B that 
the Styrofoam dish has is responsible for its ending up broken. 
 
The reformed conditional analysis cannot answer problems posed by 
masks and antidotes 
The RCA successfully deals with problems that finks and mimics pose to a 
counterfactual analysis of dispositions. However, the RCA cannot overcome 
problems posed by masks and antidotes. Consider Johnston’s cup packed in 
foam. The cup is fragile, yet the counterfactual “if this cup were struck it would 
shatter” is false. We have a true dispositional ascription, yet a false 
counterfactual. To overcome the problem that Johnston’s masked cup presents to 
the counterfactual analysis, the RCA would have to contain provisions and 
restrictions that in some manner ruled out the actions of the antidote, just as the 
RCA ruled out the actions of finks and mimics.  
 
On the RCA, change in the intrinsic properties of the bearer of the disposition 
rules out finks. But in this case, the case of mask and antidotes, there is no change 
in the intrinsic properties of the cup. The packing foam does not change the 
intrinsic properties of the cup, the bearer of the disposition. Bird notes that this is 
the very point of masks and antidotes (Bird 1998:228). Unlike finks, masked and 
antidote-d entities retain their disposition and its causal basis. This lack of change 
in the intrinsic properties of the cup means that the antecedent of the conditional:  
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if (for some intrinsic property B and time t') the cup were to undergo 
stimulus s at time t and retain property B until t' 
is satisfied. Yet the consequent: 
then s and the cup’s having of B would jointly be an x-complete cause of the 
cup’s giving response r  
is not satisfied. The counterfactual is thereby false. Yet the dispositional 
ascription is true. The RCA fails to save the counterfactual analysis from 
problems posed by masks and antidotes that show the truth of a counterfactual is 
not necessary for the truth of a dispositional ascription. 
 
Further attempts to save the conditional analysis — Choi’s defence 
of the simple conditional analysis 
Even with the modifications and restrictions contained in the RCA, conditional 
statements are shown to be not suitable for analysing and defining dispositions. 
As has been shown, the truth of a counterfactual conditional statement is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the truth of a statement making a dispositional 
ascription.  
 
Despite these counterexamples, Choi nonetheless defends the counterfactual 
analysis of dispositions by defending the SCA (Choi 2005, 2008). According to 
Choi, the SCA is not wrong. Rather it is our intuition about what is and is not 
fragile that is wrong. That is, in Choi thinks we are wrong about the dispositional 
ascriptions we make. Take the case of the fragile vase packed in protective foam. 
The problem for the SCA is that the counterfactual “if the vase were struck, then 
it would break” is false, yet the vase is supposedly fragile. That is, the problem for 
the counterfactual analysis is that we have a true dispositional ascription, yet a 
false counterfactual statement. Choi attempts to save the SCA not by 
strengthening the counterfactual but instead by denying that that the vase is 
fragile. Choi contends that a fragile vase loses its fragility when packed in 
protective foam. In other words, Choi attempts to save the counterfactual 
analysis by claiming, in this case, that we have a false dispositional ascription and 
a false counterfactual statement.  
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In the case of the Styrofoam dish, the problem for the SCA is that the 
counterfactual “if the dish were struck, then it would break” is true, yet the dish is 
not fragile. We have a false dispositional ascription and a true counterfactual 
statement. Choi overcomes this problem for the SCA by claiming the Styrofoam 
dish is fragile when in the presence of the Hater of Styrofoam. By so doing Choi 
aligns the truth values of the dispositional ascription and the counterfactual 
statement — both are now true. 
 
Choi committed to extrinsic dispositional properties 
Choi’s defence of the counterfactual analysis of dispositions commits him to the 
existence of extrinsic dispositions. In claiming the cup packed in foam is not 
fragile and the Styrofoam dish in the presence of the Hater of Styrofoam is 
fragile, Choi asserts that these objects gain and lose dispositions without any 
change in their intrinsic properties. The intrinsic properties of the cup remain 
unchanged before and after being enclosed in packing foam. Yet its disposition 
changes. According to Choi, the cup is fragile when not encased in protective 
packing and not fragile when so encased. Similarly, the intrinsic properties of the 
Styrofoam dish remain unchanged before and after being in the presence of the 
Hater of Styrofoam. Yet its dispositions change. The Styrofoam dish, according 
to Choi, is fragile when in the presence of the Hater of Styrofoam and not fragile 
when not in the presence of the Hater of Styrofoam. The salient point here is 
that these objects change their dispositions without any change in their intrinsic 
properties.    
 
The implication of objects changing dispositions without any change in their 
intrinsic properties is that Choi is committed to claiming that dispositions are 
extrinsic properties of their bearers. He claims in general that: 
“most ordinary dispositions are extrinsic dispositions.” (Choi 2008:171) 
In particular, he claims the disposition fragility is an extrinsic property of its 
bearer:  
“Fragility is not a nomically intrinsic disposition.” (Choi 2008:171) 
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It is easy to see that the non-fragility of the vase packed in foam is an extrinsic 
dispositional property, on both the duplicate and independence criteria of 
intrinsic.  
Duplicates def — F is an intrinsic property of a iff there is no exact 
duplicate of a that is not F. (Langton and Lewis 1998) 
Independence def — F is an intrinsic property of a iff a’s having F is 
independent of the existence or non-existence of any b that is distinct 
from a. (Molnar 2003) 
 
Let us look at the vase example. An exact duplicate of the vase may lack the 
protective foam packing and so be fragile. Hence, being non-fragile is not an 
intrinsic property of the vase on the duplicate criterion. The non-fragility of the 
vase is also not independent of the existence or non-existence of the protective 
packing foam, htat is distinct from the vase. Hence, the non-fragility of the vase is 
not an intrinsic property of the vase on the independence criterion for 
instrinsicality. 
Similarly, the fragility of the Styrofoam dish is also an extrinsic property of the 
Styrofoam dish on Choi’s account. An exact duplicate of the Styrofoam dish may 
lack the presence of the Hater of Styrofoam (or any other mimic) and so not 
shatter upon struck. Hence, being fragile is not an intrinsic property of the 
Styrofoam dish. It must therefore be an extrinsic property. The fragility of the 
Styrofoam dish is not independent of the existence or non-existence of the Hater 
of Styrofoam. Hence, the fragility of the Styrofoam dish is not an intrinsic 
property of the Styrofoam dish, and so must be extrinsic on the independence 
criterion.  
 
Ultimately, Choi’s defence of the counterfactual analysis entails or rests upon the 
claim that dispositions are extrinsic properties of their bearers. According to 
Choi, objects can gain and lose dispositions and powers without any change in 
the intrinsic properties of the bearer of the disposition. This may well be 
consistent with the SCA, and so save it from problems posed by finks, mimics, 
masks and antidotes. However, it is false. As I argue in chapter 4.4, dispositions 
are intrinsic properties of their bearers. Choi’s defence of the counterfactual 
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analysis and the SCA gets the nature of dispositional properties wrong. Just as we 
should reject claims that dispositional properties are extrinsic, so too we must 
reject Choi’s defence of the Simple Counterfactual Analysis of dispositions. 
 
Molnar aptly captures what the SCA gets wrong and what the RCA gets right 
when he presents the issue in terms of loss of instrinsicality: 
“An obvious problem with NCA2 is that the conditional does not seem to 
be saying anything about what it is, in the object, that makes the response 
follow from the stimulus. Suppose that every time a stimulus s occurs, the 
Diety, having so resolved, causes the object x to give the response r. How 
would that show that x has a power to manifest r? …NCA is suitable for 
an occasionalist metaphysics but not for the attribution of intrinsic 
dispositional properties to objects. Powers are instrinsic properties of their 
owners. Because it leaves this feature of powers out of the analysis, the 
definiens of NCA is not sufficient for the definiendum.” (Molnar 2003:84-
85) 
 
The SCA fails to capture the intrinsicality of dispositional properties and so fails 
to provide an adequate analysis of dispositions. Molnar teases out why the SCA is 
wrong — it commits one to the absurdity of an occasionalist metaphysics and its 
attendant account of causation. Lewis’ RCA is right to include a provision that a 
disposition is an intrinsic property of its bearer, and so represents a significant 
advance on the SCA. Nonetheless, as the case of masks and antidotes show, 
despite this improvement, the RCA still fails to provide an adequate analysis of 
dispositional ascriptions. 
 
The ultimate argument against the counterfactual analysis — non-
dyadic dispositions 
It has been shown that both the SCA and RCA fail to provide an adequate 
analysis and definition of dispositional ascriptions. This in itself does not rule out 
some form of conditional analysis being suitable for capturing dispositional 
                     
2 Molnar uses the term “naive conditional analysis” (NCA) for what Lewis calls the simple 
conditional analysis. 
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ascriptions. Perhaps all that is needed is further tweaking, strengthening and 
reforming of the conditional. However, this line of reasoning is misguided. A 
more fundamental problem befalls any conditional analysis of dispositions. As 
Maier (unpublished) and Molnar (2003:85-87) note, the formal nature of 
counterfactuals renders them unsuitable for analysing and defining dispositions. 
No tweaking, strengthening or reforming of the conditional can save the 
counterfactual analysis of dispositions. 
 
Counterfactuals statements are dyadic in form. Counterfactuals include both an 
antecedent (that includes the stimulus conditions) and a consequent (that includes 
the manifestation conditions) when analysing dispositions. For example, fragility 
is analysed as: 
If this glass were struck it would break 
And solubility is analysed as: 
If this sugar lump were placed it water it would dissolve 
The dyadic nature of counterfactuals, despite problems with finks, mimics, masks 
and antidotes, is at least be formally suited for analysing such dyadic disposition 
as fragility and solubility.3 However, not all dispositions are dyadic, there are also 
monadic dispositions. That is, there are dispositions that lack a stimulus 
condition. These dispositions are formally unsuitable for analysing in terms of 
dyadic counterfactuals.  
 
For example, Maier mentions the disposition of an uranium atom to decay. 
Maier notes that intuitively this is not a disposition to decay when certain 
conditions obtain, it is rather a disposition to decay simpliciter (Maier draft:2). 
Molnar also turns to particle decay to provide an example of a dyadic disposition 
lacking any stimulus conditions: 
                     
3 It is an open to question whether counterfactuals are formally adequate for capturing even 
supposedly dyadic dispositional ascriptions. Prior (1985:5-11) argues that “x is fragile” lacks a 
definite truth value on the grounds that the dispositional predicate “fragile” is incomplete. 
According to Prior, the complete predicate contains at least two argument places. The (more) 
complete predicate will typically include background conditions (say the temperature of the 
object) and the nature of the stimulus conditions (say the strength with which the object is struck). 
Prior leaves open the possibility that the dispositional predicate contains more than two argument 
places and so may not be suitable for capturing with a dyadic counterfactual. See chapter 4.3 for 
more discussion of Prior’s claim that the dispositional predicate is incomplete. 
 26 
“The muon has the capacity to decay into an electron, a neutrino, and an 
antineutrino. This power is exercised during the muon’s very short 
average life (22 x 10-6s), without there being anything external to 
stimulate or trigger the decay.” (Molnar 2003:85) 
These two examples show that counterfactuals are formally unsuited for 
analysing dispositions, as they cannot capture monadic dispositions that lack 
stimulus conditions. 
 
Molnar identifies another class of monadic dispositions that have unconditional 
manifestations: continuously manifesting powers. As an example, Molnar 
mentions rest mass (according to General Relativity): 
“Massive objects are spontaneously manifesting their gravitational power 
in continuous interaction with space-time.” (Molnar 2003:87) 
These dispositions are exercised for as long as they exist. When they cease to 
exercise they cease to exist. Most importantly, there are no stimulus conditions, 
no toggle to turn them on and off (Molnar 2003:87-87). Monadic dispositions 
cannot be analysed, defined or reduced to dyadic counterfactuals. As such, we 
must conclude that counterfactuals by their very form are unsuitable for 
analysing dispositions. 
 
In defence of the counterfactual analysis it might be claimed that these apparent 
cases of monadic dispositions actually possess internal stimulus or trigger and so 
are really dyadic dispositions in disguise. Molnar rules out such a reply for two 
reasons. Firstly, he notes that leptons are absolute simples and so incapable of 
possessing any such internal trigger for its decay. Secondly, any internal trigger 
for such a particle’s decay would itself require a trigger and thereby generate a 
regress, one that, as Molnar argues, is vicious: 
“Suppose it were found, empirically, that the apparently spontaneous 
disintegration of some complex object, for example, an unstable atomic 
nucleus, is triggered by some internal mechanism. Then the problem of 
spontaneous manifestation would be pushed further back, from the seeming 
spontaneity of the nuclide disintegration to the really spontaneous 
operation of the internal mechanism that triggers it.” (Molnar 2003:86)  
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Molnar convincingly demonstrates that this possible response fails. The existence 
of monadic dispositions shows that counterfactuals, whether they be simple, 
sophisticated, reformed or otherwise are unable to analyse or define dispositions.  
 
Counterfactuals are useful for fixing the reference of dispositional 
ascriptions  
The counterfactual analysis of dispositions has been shown to be false. Despite 
this, counterfactuals may still play some role in understanding dispositional 
ascriptions and properties. Lewis argues that counterfactuals are able to provide a 
rough-and-ready generalisation of dispositions: 
“Though wrong as an analysis, the simple conditional analysis remains true 
as a rough and ready generalization: fragile things that are struck do for the 
most part break, and those that are unstruck would for the most part break 
if they were struck.” (Lewis 1997:149) 
The ability of counterfactuals to provide a rough-and-ready generalisation leads 
Heil to suggest that counterfactuals are useful, yet defeasible, way for picking out 
and fixing the reference of dispositional terms (Heil 2003:195-96). 
 
Following these remark by Lewis and Heil, I argue (in chapters three and four) 
that counterfactuals are useful for picking out and fixing the reference of 
dispositional terms but do not the give the meaning of dispositional terms. It is a 
central claim of this thesis, developed in chapter three and argued for in detail in 
chapter four, that prominent accounts of dispositions make false or 
unsubstantiated claims about the nature of dispositions and dispositional 
ascriptions when they mistake the way in which we fix the reference of 
dispositional terms for the meaning of those terms. Despite the falsity of the 
counterfactual analysis it nonetheless has a strong influence on attempts to give 
an account of the semantics and metaphysics of dispositions.  
 
It is wrong to analysis dispositions in terms of conditionals and 
causation — dispositions are more basic 
One possible response to the falsity of the counterfactual analysis of dispositions is 
to view dispositions as more basic and reverse the order of explanation and 
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reduction. Maier does just this when he suggests that counterfactuals can be 
reduced to disposition: 
“the logical form of disposition ascriptions is somewhat more general than 
that of counterfactuals. This suggests a natural thought: that 
counterfactuals may be reduced to disposition ascriptions.” (Maier 
unpublished:2) 
Elsewhere Bird argues that dispositions are more basic than causation. Hence, we 
are wrong to seek a causal analysis of dispositions via counterfactuals. Instead, he 
makes dispositions basic and argues for an analysis of causation in terms of 
dispositions (Bird 2007:32). His position is discussed in chapter 4.2. 
 
2.2 Independence of disposition and manifestation 
This concludes my discussion of the counterfactual analysis of dispositions. I now 
turn to examine two dispositional concepts that are related to the counterfactual 
analysis. When not fully understood, these concepts are apt to lead one to 
confuse and conflate how we pick out and fix the reference of dispositional terms 
for the meaning of those terms and so lead one to mischaracterise the semantics 
and metaphysics of dispositions.    
 
The counterfactual analysis of dispositions makes explicit mention of a 
disposition’s stimulus and manifestation conditions and thereby encourages us to 
view a disposition’s stimulus and manifestation conditions as part of the 
dispositional ascription.4 This in turn encourages the false view that a disposition 
is in some manner ontologically dependent upon and connected to its 
manifestation.   
                     
4 While the counterfactual analysis of dispositions may encourage one to confuse and conflate a 
disposition and its manifestation, the counterfactual analysis is nonetheless compatible the 
independence of disposition and manifestation, as Molnar (2003:84) argues: 
“Can one analyse a power as a bridging relation conditionalized on the occurrence of a 
stimulus event [as the counterfactual analyse does]? …The thought behind it seems to be 
the following. Since an object can have a power without manifesting it, for the 
manifestation to occur something additional to, something over and above, the object’s 
having the power seems to be required. That something additional is an event that 
triggers or stimulates the occurrence of the manifestation. So the power can be analysed 
as that which would stand in the bridging relation to the manifestation if the stimulus 
occurred. If we add that the having of a power by its bearer is usually independent of the 
occurrence of the stimulus, then the analysis may be claimed to accommodate 
Independence.” (Molnar 2003:84) 
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However, such a view is mistaken. Powers and dispositions can exist in the 
absence of their manifestation. For example, the salt sitting in my cupboard is 
soluble right now, even when it is not dissolving. The salt’s disposition of 
solubility exists independently of its manifestation. Token independence of a 
disposition and its manifestation seems obvious and undeniable. The Ming vase 
on level two of the Morven Brown building is fragile right now, even when it is 
not shattering. Indeed, the vase need never shatter, yet it still remains fragile. 
Type independence of a disposition and its manifestation also holds. A world in 
which salt (as a type) never came in contact with water (or any other liquid) and 
so never dissolved could still be a world in which salt is soluble. It is only a 
contingent matter that in this world salt has been immersed in water and so 
dissolved. 
 
Why would anyone confuse and conflate a disposition with its manifestation? 
Mumford contends that empiricist, verificationist and anti-realist assumptions 
that refuse to separate evidence from ontology are at fault (Mumford 1998:ch3). 
Verificationist principles entail that a disposition just is its observable events, 
namely its manifestation. The manifestation of disposition is the most obvious 
sign an object possesses a certain disposition. As such, we can use the 
manifestation as a way to identify and re-identify objects that possess certain 
dispositions. There is nothing wrong with doing so. However, it is wrong to 
confuse and conflate the manifestation of a disposition with the disposition itself. 
It is wrong to confuse and conflate breaking with fragility. Armstrong describes 
this mistaken conflation of disposition and manifestation as a propensity to: 
“…project into the disposed things a ghostly image of the manifestation of 
the disposition, even when it is not manifested.” (Armstrong, Martin, 
Place 1996:93)  
 
Independence demonstrates that a disposition and its manifestation are not the 
same thing. To confuse and conflate the two can lead to the mischaracterisation 
of the nature of dispositions. For example, in chapter 4.4 I argue that confusing 
and conflating the manifestation or manifestation conditions, which are extrinsic 
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to the bearer of a disposition, for the disposition itself underpins a range of 
arguments that dispositions are extrinsic properties of their bearers. 
 
2.3 Dispositions are non-conditional 
I now turn to the third dispositional concept that I wish to discus: The fact that 
dispositions are non-conditional.5 When we make a dispositional ascription we 
are making a claim about how something is right now. To say that a vase is 
fragile is to ascribe an actual property to the vase, one that the vase possesses 
right now. It is only the manifestation of a disposition that is conditional and 
potential. Dispositions and powers are actual, categorical and unconditional, only 
their manifestation is conditional and potential.  
 
To claim that dispositions are non-categorical and conditional is to confuse and 
conflate a disposition and its manifestation. The manifestation is conditional. The 
breaking of the fragile vase is conditional on the vase being struck. The dissolving 
of the sugar is conditional on it being placed in water. However, the 
manifestation is not the disposition. As was just argued, a disposition and its 
manifestation are independent and distinct. Once we are aware of this, the 
temptation to view dispositions as conditional melts away. 
 
I do not claim that anyone explictly asserts that dispositions are conditional. 
Rather, I go on to argue that certain accounts of dispositions are lead astray by 
the counterfactual analysis to conflate a disposition and its manifestation and so 
implicitly hold that dispositions are conditional. For example, I argue in chapter 
4.3 that the conditional nature of manifestations has been used to falsely claim 
that dispositions themselves are mere potencies and so somehow suspect as they 
go beyond the actual into the realm of the merely possible.  
 
Conclusion 
                     
5 Dispositional properties are often contrasted with categorical properties. The debate on 
dispositions uses the term “categorical” in two ways. “Categorical” is used to mean non-
conditional as well as structural. Structural properties include size and shape. An example of a 
structural property is being three-sided. On the non-conditional reading, dispositions are 
categorical properties. They are not categorical on the structural reading of categorical. 
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The principal claim of this chapter is that the counterfactual analysis of 
dispositions is false. Dispositional ascriptions, such as “x is fragile”, cannot be 
analysed in terms of counterfactual statements such as “if x were struck x would 
break”. I also showed that a disposition is ontologically independent and distinct 
from its manifestation. An object may be fragile independently of its breaking. 
Finally, I showed that dispositions are categorical, non-conditional properties of 
their bearers. To say that an object is fragile is to say that it possesses an actual 
property now. The manifestation of a disposition may well be conditional, but 
the disposition itself is not conditional. 
My aim in discussing these concepts is to lay the foundation for my argument 
that accounts of dispositions make false and unwarranted claims about the nature 
of dispositional properties and dispositional ascriptions. Mistakes and 
misunderstandings concerning the counterfactual analysis, independence and 
that dispositions are not conditional underpin and motivate a range of claims 
about dispositions I show, in chapter four, to be unsupported and false. I now 
turn to the next chapter where, following Kripke, I argue for a distinction 
between fixing the reference of a term and giving the meaning of that term and 
for a distinction between predicates and properties.   
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Chapter 3.1 — The distinction between fixing the reference of a term 
and giving its meaning 
3.1.1 Modal differences in the way names and definite descriptions 
designate the same entity 
Names are rigid designate. Definite descriptions may be non-rigid designators. 
• Challenge to the distinction between names and definite 
descriptions — the “actually” operator 
o The “actually” operator can be used to rigidify definite 
descriptions  
o the “actually” operator fails to capture the semantics of definite 
descriptions. 
• Names not the only rigid designators 
o Kripke extends his account of rigid designators beyond names to 
natural kinds terms such as “gold”, species terms such as “tigers” 
and natural phenomena terms such as “heat” 
• Are dispositional terms rigid designators? 
o Prior’s arguments that dispositional terms are rigid 
o Lewis’ argument against rigid designators. 
 
3.1.2 Distinction between fixing the reference of a term and giving its 
meaning 
• How we fix the reference of a term 
o We can use a contingent, accidental property of Benjamin 
Franklin, namely that he invented bifocals, to fix the reference of 
“Benjamin Franklin”. 
• To fix the reference of a term is not to give its meaning 
o “Benjamin Franklin” does not mean “The inventor of bifocals”. 
Non-rigid designators are not synonyms for and do not give the 
meaning of the names and natural kind terms that they pick out 
the reference of. 
 33 
• Linguistic division of labour — can we overcome the 
distinction between reference fixing and giving the meaning of 
a term? 
o Experts, such as scientists can tell us what falls under the extension 
of a term. However, they do not fix the extension of a term and 
they cannot tell us the meaning of a term. 
• Designators are not revelatory or informative 
o Designators, be they rigid or non-rigid, are just that — ways of 
designating an entity. They are not informative, revelatory or 
definitive. 
3.1.3 Problems arise when we conflate and mistake the manner we 
fix the reference of a term with its meaning 
• Confusing and conflating the way heat feels to us with the 
nature of heat  
o Example of heat — to mistake the manner in which we fix the 
reference of “heat” with the meaning of “heat” leads us to 
mischaractise the nature of heat and to mistakenly hold that 
theoretical identity statements, such as “heat = molecular motion” 
are contingent. 
• What happens when we confuse and conflate the way we fix the 
reference of a dispositional term or ascriptions with its 
meaning 
o For example, we can use the manifestation of a disposition to fix 
the reference of a disposition. However, to confuse the 
manifestation — which is conditional and extrinsic — with the 
disposition itself leads to us to mistakenly hold that dispositions are 
conditional and extrinsic properties. 
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Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with language, meaning and the world. It is divided 
into two sections. In section one, I introduce Kripke’s distinction between rigid 
and non-rigid designators. I use Kripke’s distinction between rigid and non-rigid 
designators to explore his contrast between fixing the reference of a term and 
giving its meaning. There will be little novel or new in my account of Kripke. 
Rather, I hope that what is novel and new is my application of his ideas to shed 
light on that nature of dispositional properties and ascriptions. Following this, in 
section two I discuss the relation between words and the world. I argue that 
predicates and properties are not isomorphic and that we cannot argue from the 
satisfaction of a predicate to the existence of a corresponding property.  
 
This chapter acts as a bridge between chapter two, where I presented a number 
of dispositional concepts, and chapter four, where I show that confusions 
(identified in this chapter) between predicates and properties and reference fixing 
and meaning lead philosophers to make unwarranted ontological and semantic 
conclusions about the nature of dispositions and dispositional ascriptions.  
 
3.1.1. Modal differences in the way names and definite descriptions 
designate the same entity 
Kripke notes that names and definite descriptions provide us with two ways of 
designating the one and the same thing. We can use proper names such as 
“Gough Whitlam” and “Sydney” to designate Gough Whitlam and Sydney, 
respectively. We can also use definite descriptions, such as “the twenty-first prime 
minister of Australia” and “the most-populous city in Australia” to designate 
those same things — Gough Whitlam and Sydney, respectively.  
 
However, Kripke notes there is a difference, a modal difference, in the way in 
which names and definite descriptions designate. Names rigidly designate; the 
name “Gough Whitlam” designates, or picks out, the same thing — Gough 
Whitlam — in all possible worlds. While definite descriptions may non-rigidly 
designate. The definite description “the twenty-first prime minister of Australia” 
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may designate or pick out different objects in different worlds. In the actual 
world, it designates Gough Whitlam. However, someone else may have been the 
twenty-first prime minister of Australia. Gough Whitlam may have died from a 
tiger snake bite as a child and so never contested the 1972 Australian election, or 
Billy McMahon may have been wildly popular with the voting public and 
retained power for the Australian Liberal Party.  
 
Kripke’s distinction has great intuitive appeal. We understand and regularly 
make statements of the type “Gough Whitlam may have lost the 1972 election 
and not been the twenty first prime minister of Australia” but not “Gough 
Whitlam may have not been Gough Whitlam”. The modal distinction between 
rigid and non-rigid designators is able to account for this difference. 
 
The distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators has implications for 
transworld identity and identity statements. As the above remark hints, one 
implication of this is that rigid designators are necessary — they hold in all 
possible worlds. “Gough Whitlam” designates Gough Whitlam in all possible 
worlds. There is no world in which Gough Whitlam is not Gough Whitlam. 
While non-rigid designators such as “the twenty first prime minister of Australia” 
may designate different objects in different worlds and as such being the twenty-
first prime minister of Australia is a contingent property of the object it designates 
— true in some worlds, false in some worlds. Gough Whitlam is the twenty-first 
prime minister of Australia in this world, but there is at least one world in which 
Gough Whitlam is not the twenty-first prime minister of Australia. 
 
A challenge to the modal distinction between names and definite 
descriptions — the “actually” operator 
This modal distinction between names and definite descriptions has been 
challenged. The definite descriptions “the twenty-first prime minister of 
Australia” may very well pick out different people in different worlds and so be 
non-rigid. However, “the actual twenty-first prime minister of Australia” is 
Gough Whitlam. It designates the same person in every possible world and so is a 
rigid designator. In general, adding the “actually” operator to a non-rigid definite 
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description “the F” turns it into a rigid designator (“the actual F”). That is, the 
“actually” operator renders definite descriptions rigid, just like names. As such, 
the “actually” operator undercuts the supposed modal differences, based on 
rigidity, between names and definite descriptions and so undercuts the claim that 
names are not definite descriptions. 
 
While the “actually” operator may remove the modal difference between names 
and definite descriptions, it does so at the expense of creating a further, serious 
modal problem — it introduces necessity where there is none. If we rigidify the 
definite description “the twenty-first prime minister of Australia” by adding the 
“actually” operator to make “the actual twenty-first prime minister of Australia”, 
then it is true in all possible worlds that “Gough Whitlam is the actual twenty-
first prime minister of Australia”. Which is just to say, it is necessary that Gough 
Whitlam is the actual twenty-first prime minister of Australia. But that is false. It 
is a contingent matter that Gough Whitlam won the 1972 Australian federal 
election. Using the “actually” operator to make a definite description rigid simply 
fails to capture the semantics of definite descriptions. It makes necessary what is 
contingent. As such, we should reject such rigidified definite descriptions and 
with it any challenge it supposedly presents to the modal distinction between 
names and definite descriptions. 
 
Names not the only rigid designators 
So far, I have used Kripke’s account of names and definite descriptions to 
elucidate the distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators. Kripke extends 
his account of rigid designators beyond names to natural kinds terms such as 
“gold” and “atomic number 79”, species terms such as “tigers” and natural 
phenomena terms such as “heat”, “lightning” and “pain”. He holds that these 
terms pick out and designate the same thing in all possible worlds.  
 
Just as we can designate names in a number of different ways so too we can 
designate natural kinds and natural phenomena in a number of different ways. 
For example, both the rigid designator “tiger” and the non-rigid designator 
“large carnivorous quadrupedal, tawny in colour with blackish transverse stripes 
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and white belly” designate the natural kind tigers. “Tiger” picks out the same 
kind — tigers — in all possible worlds, while the non-rigid designator uses a set of 
contingent feature of tigers to pick out tigers in this world, but does not pick out 
tigers in every world.  
 
Are dispositional terms rigid designators? 
Can Kripke’s account of names as rigid designators be extended to property 
terms, such as dispositional terms “fragility” and “negative charge”? Prior 
certainly think so. She takes it for granted that property terms are rigid 
designators when she contends that: 
“But to treat dispositional predicates as non-rigid designators is to 
surrender any claim on their being property names.” (Prior 1985:76) 
Prior provides two arguments in support of her claim that properties terms are 
rigid designators. Her first argument rests upon Kripke’s claim that possible 
worlds are not given qualitatively, but specified:  
“The first is the argument that the similarities picked out by dispositional 
predicates seem every bit as good as those similarities picked out by 
‘establishment’ property predicates. Take ‘redness’ or ‘being red’. As 
Kripke has pointed out we do not ask: ‘How do we know that this quality 
(in another possible world) is that of redness?’ It is simply assumed that we 
can make transworld property identifications.  But then the similarities 
picked out by dispositional predicates are every bit as good as those 
picked out by predicates like ‘redness’.” (Prior 1985:77) 
Here is Kripke’s statement of that position: 
“So, we do not begin with worlds (which are somehow supposed to be 
real, and whose qualities, but not whose objects, are perceptible to us), 
and then ask about criteria of transworld identification; on the contrary, 
we begin with the objects, which we have, and can identify, in the actual 
world. We can then ask whether certain things might have been true of 
the objects.” (Kripke 1980: 53) 
That is, when we say “Nixon might have lost the election” we specify we are 
talking about that man. We do not have a list of qualitative properties, such as 
being jowly, owning a dog named “checkers” etc. and then look at other worlds 
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and find who satisfies those properties, declare that person to be Nixon and then 
see if he lost the election. The point here is that possible worlds are not 
qualitatively determined. They are specified. 
 
However, the fact that possible worlds are specified and not given qualitatively 
does not in itself tell us what terms are or are not rigid designators. Kripke’s point 
may be viewed as conditional. It shows that if something is a rigid designator, 
then its identity across worlds is specified and not determined qualitatively. But 
that is not to show that properties, such as “redness” or “fragile”, are rigid 
designators. A separate argument is needed to establish that claim. 
 
Prior’s second argument that property terms are rigid designators rests upon the 
claim that rigid property terms are necessary for the transworld identity of 
individuals: 
“If we treat property predicates as non-rigid designators, we lose the 
ability to identify individuals across possible worlds.” (Prior 1985:77) 
Prior’s reasoning here ignores the point made in the previous argument — that 
possible worlds are specified, not giving qualitatively. Consider the individual 
Ranger Bob. We can use a description such as “the guy over there wearing khaki 
shorts” to fix the reference of “Ranger Bob” as Ranger Bob in this world. But 
once we have fixed the reference of Ranger Bob, he can lose these qualities that 
were used to fix his reference. Ranger Bob can be still be Ranger Bob, even in 
worlds where he lacks the property of being a wearer of khaki shorts. We do not 
need “khaki” or “shorts” to pick out the same property in other worlds in order 
to be able to make meaningful statements about Ranger Bob in other worlds. 
The point here is that the individual Ranger Bob can have transworld identity 
independently of any properties used to fix his reference in this world. Hence, 
Prior is wrong to argue that property terms are rigid designators on the grounds 
that rigid property terms are necessary for the transworld identity of individuals. 
Prior’s two arguments fail to support her claim that property terms are rigid 
designators. 
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3.1.2 The distinction between fixing the reference of a term and 
giving its meaning 
I have introduced the distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators with 
the intent of explicating the distinction between fixing the reference of a term and 
giving its meaning. This distinction is central to my claim, set out in chapter four, 
that arguments in favour of leading theories of dispositions are unsound or 
invalid as they mistake the way in which we fix the reference of a term for the 
meaning of that term. 
 
How we fix the reference of a term 
One significant implication of Kripke’s distinction between rigid and non-rigid 
designators is that we can, and often do, use contingent, accidental properties of 
an entity that are non-rigid designators to fix and pick out the reference of a 
term. That is, we often use contingent, accidental properties of an entity to 
designate and determine what it is we are talking about. Kripke provides an 
example of reference fixing: 
“… although ‘heat’ is a rigid designator, the reference of that designator 
was determined by an accidental property of the referent, namely the 
property of producing in us the sensation S [the sensation of heat].” 
(Kripke 1980:152) 
We use the sensation of heat, the way heat feels to us, which is an accidental and 
contingent feature of heat, to fix and pick out the reference of “heat” (a rigid 
designator). Similarly, we can use “the teacher of Alexander”, a non-rigid 
designator, to fix and pick out the reference of Aristotle, just as we can use “the 
fastest shearer in Australia” to fix and pick out the reference of Jackie Howe.  
 
Kripke’s insights on reference fixing via accidental, contingent features of an 
entity have bearing on dispositions. I argued in chapter two that the 
manifestation of a disposition is independent of the disposition itself, and as such 
the manifestation is an accidental and contingent property of a disposition, one 
that it need not have in every possible world. A world in which no vase is 
dropped or struck and so never breaks can still be a world in which vases are 
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fragile. I also argued in chapter one that the conditional or counterfactual 
analysis of dispositions is false. The truth of a dispositional ascription, such as “x 
is fragile”, is independent of the truth of any corresponding conditional or 
counterfactual, such as “if x had been struck, then x would have broken”. The 
truth of such conditionals and counterfactuals is at best an accidental and 
contingent property of a dispositional ascription.  
 
Despite certain properties being accidental and contingent features of dispositions 
and dispositional ascriptions, we can, and do, use them to fix and pick out the 
reference of dispositional terms and identify dispositional properties. The 
manifestation of dispositions and the truth of certain counterfactuals and 
conditionals provide what Heil describes as “a defeasible, rough-and-ready way 
to pick out dispositions” (Heil 2003:195-96). There is no great mystery as to why 
we use such accidental and contingent properties to fix the reference of 
dispositional terms and identify dispositional properties — they are often the 
most obvious and easily observable external signs that an object possesses a 
disposition. When we want to determine if a tennis ball is fit for play and 
possesses the power of elasticity, we simply throw it against the ground and see if 
it manifests the disposition of elasticity to our liking when it bounces back.  
 
To fix the reference of a term is not to give its meaning 
In exploring the distinction between fixing the reference of a term and giving its 
meaning I will examine how rigid and non-rigid designators are related to each 
other. This is a question of how non-rigid descriptions (such as “the teacher of 
Alexander”) are associated with rigidly-designating names (such as “Aristotle”) 
when they designate one and the same thing, namely Aristotle. I show that 
descriptions and other non-rigid designators can fix the reference of names and 
natural kind terms. However, such non-rigid designators are not synonyms for 
and do not give the meaning of the rigidly designating names and natural kind 
terms that they pick out the reference of.  
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Kripke is at pains to stress that “to fix the reference is not to give a synonym” 
(Kripke 1980:15). He wishes to cleave a sharp distinction between fixing the 
reference of a term and giving the meaning of that term: 
“One should bear in mind the contrast between the… perhaps contingent 
properties carried by a term, given by the way its reference was fixed, and 
the analytic (and hence necessary) properties a term may carry, given by 
its meaning. For species, as for proper names, the way the reference of a 
term is fixed should not be regarded as a synonym for the term.” (Kripke 
1980:135) 
Elsewhere Kripke notes that in some cases: 
“A referent is determined by a description, by some uniquely identifying 
property, what the property is doing in many cases of designation is not 
giving a synonym, giving something for which the name is an 
abbreviation; it is, rather, fixing the reference. It fixes the reference by 
some contingent marks of the object. The name denoting that object is 
then used to refer to that object, even in referring to counterfactual 
situations where the object doesn’t have the properties in question.” 
(Kripke 1980:106-107) 
 
We can use non-rigid designators to fix the reference of a term — be they proper 
name terms (such as “Aristotle” and “Benjamin Franklin”), natural kinds terms 
(such as “gold” and “tigers”) or natural phenomena terms (such as “heat” and 
“lightning”). However, these reference fixing, non-rigid designators do not give 
the meaning of these terms.  
 
The mechanism of reference fixing runs as follows — a description, say “the 
teacher of Alexander”, is used to fix the reference of the term “Aristotle” by 
identifying the referent Aristotle as the thing that satisfies the description in the 
actual world. The term “Aristotle” then refers to that same thing — Aristotle — 
in all worlds, regardless of whether or not the description “the teacher of 
Alexander” is true of Aristotle in those other worlds.  
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The modal distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators explains why 
reference-fixing descriptions and phrases do not give meaning of the terms they 
fix the reference of. “Aristotle”, a rigid designator, designates the same entity in 
all possible worlds. While “the teacher of Alexander”, a non-rigid designator does 
not designate the same entity in every world. In this world, “the teacher of 
Alexander” may well designate Aristotle, but in some worlds it designates 
someone other than Aristotle. As such, there is a world in which “Aristotle” 
designates Aristotle but “the teacher of Alexander” does not designate Aristotle. 
This shows that “Aristotle” does not mean “the teacher of Alexander”.  
 
To put this point another way, Aristotle can lose any accidental, contingent 
properties, such as those used to fix his reference, and still be Aristotle. Hence, 
“the teacher of Alexander” cannot mean the same thing as “Aristotle”. Just 
because two designators “Aristotle” and “the teacher of Alexander” designate 
one and the same thing in this world, and just because we can use “the teacher of 
Alexander” to pick out and fix the reference of “Aristotle”, it does not follow that 
these two terms mean the same thing. 
 
There are two points I wish to stress here. One, we can use a contingent property 
of Aristotle — that he taught Alexander — to determine what the name 
“Aristotle” refers to. Two, the description we used to fix the reference of the term 
“Aristotle” is not definitive of “Aristotle”. That is, “Aristotle” and “the teacher of 
Alexander” are not synonyms. The two terms “Aristotle” and “the teacher of 
Alexander” both designate Aristotle, but do not mean the same thing. There is a 
counterfactual situation in which “the teacher of Alexander” is not Aristotle, but 
no situation in which “Aristotle” is not Aristotle. Hence “Aristotle” cannot mean 
“the teacher of Alexander”.  
 
Similar modal arguments show that the distinction between reference fixing and 
meaning also applies to natural kind terms (such as “tiger” and “gold”) and 
natural phenomena terms (such as “heat” and “lightning”). We can use the non-
rigid designator “large carnivorous quadrupedal, tawny in colour with blackish 
tranverse stripes and white belly” to fix the reference of the natural kind term 
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“tiger”. However, what makes a tiger a tiger is the possession of a certain DNA, 
not having four legs, stripes and a white belly. Being a large carnivorous 
quadrupedal, tawny in colour with blackish tranverse stripes and white belly is a 
contingent property of tigers. These are merely surface features of tigers. There 
are possible worlds in which a tiger has three legs and no stripes. That is, there 
are possible world in which entities have the DNA of tigers, but are not large 
carnivorous quadrupedal, tawny in colour with blackish tranverse stripes and 
white belly.  Indeed we do not need to contemplate possible worlds to see this. 
There are, or were, three-legged tigers in the actual world.6 It follows that if 
something can be a tiger and not be four legged, then “tiger” does not mean 
“large carnivorous quadrupedal, tawny in colour with blackish tranverse stripes 
and white belly”. In this world, “large carnivorous quadrupedal, tawny in colour 
with blackish tranverse stripes and white belly” and “tiger” may refer to the same 
entity, namely the natural kind tiger. However, in different counterfactual 
situations or different possible worlds, they would pick out different entities. 
Hence, “large carnivorous quadrupedal, tawny in colour with blackish tranverse 
stripes and white belly” and “tiger” cannot mean the same thing. 
 
These cases show that the relationship between non-rigidly designating terms, 
such as descriptions, and rigidly designating terms, such as names, is such that 
even when they designate one and the same thing, they nonetheless do not mean 
the same thing. One point I want to take from this is that ways in which we 
designate entities and fix the reference of terms is not revelatory and informative. 
The phrase “large carnivorous quadrupedal, tawny in colour with blackish 
tranverse stripes and white belly” and “tiger” both designate tigers. And the 
former phrase can be used to fix the reference of tigers. However, this reveals 
nothing about the nature of tigers. Nor does not tell us what makes a tiger a tiger.    
 
I wish to apply this point to dispositional terms and properties and argue that the 
manner in which we fix the reference of dispositional terms does not give the 
meaning of dispositional terms. Similarly, the manner in which we identify 
                     
6 In 2007, a camera trap set inside an Indonesian national park photographed a three-legged 
Sumatran tiger. It is believed the tiger lost the lower half of its right front leg when escaping a 
snare. 
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dispositional properties does not tell us what is it that makes, say, a fragile object 
fragile.  
 
How do we pick out and fix the reference of dispositional terms? We can use 
both the counterfactual, non-rigid designator “if x had been struck, then x would 
have broken” and the rigid designator “fragile” to pick out and designate the one 
and the same property, namely fragility. In chapter two, I argued that the 
counterfactual analysis of dispositions is false. The truth of a counterfactual is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of a dispositional ascription. As such, 
“x is fragile” cannot be defined as, and does not mean, “if x had been struck, then 
x would have broken”. Despite these failings, such counterfactuals may 
nonetheless prove useful as a defeasible, rough-and-ready way to pick out the 
reference of dispositional terms (Heil 2003:195-96). We can use the 
counterfactual “if x had been struck, then x would have broken” as a rough-and-
ready way to pick out the reference the reference of “fragile”.  
 
Similarly, the manifestation of a disposition, despite being ontologically separate 
and distinct from the disposition itself, is useful for identifying dispositional 
properties. Despite the fact that breaking is a contingent, surface feature of fragile 
objects, we can nonetheless use such behaviour as a defeasible, rough-and-ready 
way to identify fragile objects. But we should be aware that breaking is not what 
fragility is. If as argued in chapter two, if a vase is fragile independently of its 
breaking, then breaking is a contingent feature or fragility. Dispositional 
manifestations — such as breaking, dissolving and repelling other liked charged 
particles are merely contingent surface features and signs of the properties of 
fragility, solubility and negative charge, respectively. As such, to identify 
dispositions via their manifestation does not reveal the nature of those 
dispositions. The manner in which we pick out and fix the reference of 
dispositional terms and identify dispositional properties is not revelatory and 
informative of the meaning of dispositional terms and the nature of dispositional 
properties.  
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Linguistic division of labour — overcoming distinction between 
reference fixing and giving the meaning of a term. 
One possible response to Kripke’s claim that to fix the reference of a term is not 
to give its meaning is to turn to experts. It might be argued that experts in the 
area to which a term belongs, such as scientists with knowledge of say DNA or 
atomic structure, have some special linguistic competence such that the manner 
in which they fix the reference of a terms would give the meaning of that term. 
We would then defer to experts in determining the meaning of such terms, in 
what Putnam has dubbed the “linguistic division of labour” (Putnam 1975). In so 
doing, we would bridge the gap that Kripke draws between fixing the reference 
of a term and giving its meaning. 
For example, the reference of the term “tiger” is fixed as a certain DNA by 
zoologists with knowledge of the DNA of tigers. The reference of the term “gold” 
is fixed as “atomic number 79” by geologists and those with expertise in atomic 
structure. The reference of the term “salt” is fixed as “NaCl” by chemists. On 
this account of the linguistic division of labour, I may continue to rely upon the 
contingent, surface features of gold, such as it colour and sheen to determine 
whether the grains in my gold pan are gold or not. However, when I use the term 
“gold” what I mean is determined by geologists. “Gold” means “substance with 
atomic number 79” and not anything along the lines of “yellow, lustrous metal”. 
On such a picture of reference fixing, there is, pace Kripke, no distinction between 
the way in which the reference of a term is fixed and the meaning of that term 
because the reference of the term is fixed using essential properties that make the 
thing referred to what it is. 
 
However, such a response will not bridge the semantic gap between fixing the 
reference of a term and giving its meaning. Kripke (1988) admits that, in the case 
of natural kind terms, experts such as scientists do have a special ability to 
determine what things are what: 
“It is of course true that the experts have a special capacity that we don’t 
have for telling whether something is or is not gold. That is among other 
things what makes them experts.” (Kripke 1988:244) 
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Experts are useful for determining whether something is a tiger, gold or salt. That 
is, scientists can tell us whether an entity falls under the extension of the term 
“tiger”, “gold” or “salt”.  
 
However, as Kripke notes, it does not follow that experts have any special 
semantic authority or role. To determine whether something is gold is not to 
determine the meaning of “gold”. Kripke makes this point when he points out 
that: 
“The experts provide no help as far as actually determining the extension 
of the term. They only help us find out after a while which things actually 
fall into the extension of the term…The presence of the experts in is no 
way crucial to the term having a determinate extension” (Kripke 
1988:244) 
To back up his point, Kripke uses an example from Putman. He notes that in the 
time of the Ancient Greeks “gold” had the same extension as it does now, despite 
the complete lack of experts on the atomic nature of gold in Ancient Greece 
(Kripke 1988:244). The point here is that no one, experts or otherwise, fixes the 
extension and thus meaning of natural kind terms such as “tiger”, “gold” and 
“salt”. Experts, such as scientists, can tell us what falls under the extension of a 
term. However, they do not fix the extension of a term and they cannot tell us the 
meaning of a term. 
 
Designators are not revelatory or informative 
It may seem strange that we fix the reference of a term using non-rigidly 
designating descriptions that are not synonyms of that term and that do not give 
its meaning. Why use accidental, contingent properties of an entity to identify it? 
Why not use rigid designators to fix the reference and an entity via its necessary 
and essential properties? In answer to the first question, such contingent 
properties are often surface features that are more apparent and accessible to us 
than the necessary and essential properties of an entity. In answer to the second 
question, rigid designators are no more revelatory than non-rigid designators, 
and so there is no reason to favour them over non-rigid designators in fixing the 
reference of a term. 
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Consider gold. Gold is the element with the atomic number 79. An entity is gold 
if and only if it has atomic number 79. However, in most cases we identify and 
re-identify gold by its lustrous colour and sheen, by its density and malleability 
(say, by biting it). These contingent properties are useful for identifying and re-
identifying gold because they are properties of gold that are accessible and 
apparent to us, even if they are not what the gold actually is and even if “gold” 
does not mean something like “dense, lustrous, malleable yellow metal”. The 
atomic number possessed by gold may well be a necessary, essential property of 
gold, however determining atomic structure is a highly technical and complicated 
process that most people would have no idea how to perform. Despite its 
necessity, the atomic number is an opaque and often inaccessible property of 
gold. 
 
The way we characterise dispositions and properties, object, species and natural 
kinds is influenced, shaped and distorted by what these entities present to us in an 
easily accessible way and also by our interests. The interests of a hapless 
bushwalker confronted by a snake may be different from those of a philosopher 
or biologist. The contingent but outward markings, aggressiveness and 
venonmousness of a snake are very relevant to the hapless bushwalker even if 
they are not what makes, say, the eastern brown snake what it is. The essential 
properties of an eastern brown snake, namely its DNA, may be more important 
to the scientist and philosopher. 
 
It might be thought that rigid designators, because they pick out the same entity 
in all worlds, are more informative and revelatory than non-rigid designators that 
may pick out and designate different entities in different possible worlds. 
However, this is not the case, rigid designators are not any more revelatory than 
non-rigid designators. The ability to use rigid designators, to understand 
sentences and utterances containing rigid designators does not give us knowledge 
about the object that it designates. We can use “gold” to rigidly designate gold 
without knowing that gold has the atomic number 79. We can use and 
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understand both the terms “gold” and “atomic number 79” without knowing 
that they designate one and same substance. 
 
We can tell a similar epistemic story for the non-rigid designators “the morning 
star” and “the evening star”. We can use “the morning star” to non-rigidly 
designate Venus without knowing that Venus is the morning star. We can use 
and understand both the non-rigid terms “the morning star” and “the evening 
star” without knowing that they designate one and the same entity — Venus. Just 
as it was an a posteriori discovery that gold has the atomic number 79, so too it was 
an a posteriori discovery that the morning star is Venus. In these respects, rigid 
designators are no more informative or revelatory than non-rigid designators. 
 
As a result, there is no reason for bias against using non-rigid designators to pick 
out the reference of terms, nor any reason to prefer rigid designators. The way an 
entity is designated and referred to — be it rigidly or non-rigidly — is just that, a 
way of designating and referring to something. Whether a name, description or 
term designates the same or different entities in different worlds it nonetheless is 
still merely a designator and does not reveal the meaning of the referring term or 
the nature of the entity referred to.  
 
Historically, the fact that names as rigid designators are not revelatory has lead to 
confusion and misunderstanding. For example, the non-revelatory nature of rigid 
designators lead Quine to mistakenly declare that identity statements between 
names are not necessary. Quine rightly noted that is was an empirical, a posteriori 
discovery that “Everest” and “Gaurianker” both name and designate the one and 
the same object — Mount Everest. It is an a posteriori discovery because the 
rigidly-designating terms “Everest” and “Gaurianker” are not revelatory. 
Semantic competence with these terms does not enable one to know a priori that 
they designate and refer to one and the same object. However Quine wrongly 
concluded that because it was an empirical, a posteriori discovery that “Everest is 
Gaurianker” is true it must therefore be a contingent truth. The non-revelatory 
nature of names, coupled with Quine’s mistaken belief that the a posteriori is 
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contingent, lead him to wrongly declare that identity statements between names 
are not necessary.  
 
What is the significance of this for dispositions and powers? Determining whether 
or not dispositional terms, ascriptions and related counterfactuals statements are 
rigid or non-rigid designators does not offer a way of gaining knowledge, insight 
or understanding of dispositional terms or the nature of dispositions. One 
implication is that the quest to understand the nature of dispositions and 
dispositional terms is not simply a quest to determine if they are rigid or non-rigid 
designators. The way a disposition or power is designated and referred to, be it 
rigidly or non-rigidly, is just that, a way of designating and referring to 
dispositions and powers. Whether a name, description, term or counterfactual 
designates and refers to the same or different dispositions in different worlds 
makes no difference here. It is still merely designating a disposition or power and 
does not reveal the meaning of a dispositional term or the nature of the 
dispositional property referred to. What is important is that we recognise the 
distinction between fixing the reference of a term and giving its meaning and do 
not confuse and conflate the two. I now turn to look at what goes wrong when we 
do confuse and conflate fixing the reference of a term and giving its meaning.  
 
3.1.3. Problems arise when we conflate and mistake the manner we 
fix the reference of a term with its meaning 
We have seen that to fix the reference of a term is not to give its meaning. We 
may use contingent surface features of, say, gold, such as its yellowness, to 
identify the substance gold and to fix the reference of the term “gold”, but, as 
Kripke notes, the contingent, surface features associated with and used to identify 
and fix the reference of a term should not be considered as definitive of that term. 
Kripke provided two reasons why this is so. One, the contingent surface features 
of a kind, such as the yellowness of gold, may not actually be features of the kind 
in question — it may be false that gold is actually yellow. Kripke argues that 
peculiar properties of the atmosphere may cause an optical illusion that makes 
gold appear to be yellow, when in fact it is blue (Kripke 1980:118). Secondly, 
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even if gold is yellow, it is not definitive of the kind gold. There may be a 
substance that has all the identifying marks we attribute to gold, such as 
yellowness etc., but is not gold. Fool’s gold is often cited as just such an example.7 
 
Confusing and conflating the way heat feels to us with the nature of 
heat  
Problems arise when we confuse and conflate contingent surface features by 
which we identify entities with the entity itself. For example, take the case of heat. 
We identify heat and fix the reference of the term “heat” by the sensation that 
heat causes in us. That is, we identify heat and fix the reference of the term 
“heat” by the fact that it is whatever in this world that affects our senses in a 
certain way. However, the sensation of heat, the way heat feels to us, is a 
contingent, surface feature of heat. A world in which humans are insensitive to 
heat would not be a world in which heat did not exist. As such, the term “heat” 
does not mean “whatever causes the sensation of heat” and heat is not whatever 
causes the sensation of heat.   
 
What are the consequences of confusing and conflating contingent surface 
features by which we identify entities with the entity itself? Most obviously, in the 
case of heat, to do so is to mischaracterise the nature of heat and the meaning of 
“heat”. It is to take “heat” to mean “whatever causes the sensation of heat” and it 
is to take heat to be whatever causes the sensation of heat. But the consequences 
do not stop there. It leads us to misunderstand the modality of identity 
statements. Consider the identity statement “heat is the motion of molecules”. It 
is, if true, necessarily true. But it is contingent matter that heat feels the way it 
does to us. It is a contingent matter that heat causes the sensation of heat in us. 
Heat may have caused humans to hear a ringing in their ears or produced no 
effect at all on our nervous system. So conflating heat with the sensation of heat, 
a contingent property of heat, leads us to mistakenly hold that “heat is the motion 
of molecules” is a contingent identity statement. It is a contingent matter that the 
                     
7 I find this a bad example. One would have to be astonishingly foolish to confuse the two 
substances. Nonetheless, Kripke’s point stands — there may be some substance with all the 
surface, identifying features of gold that is not gold. 
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motion of molecules causes us to have the sensation of heat, but it is not a 
contingent matter that heat is the motion of molecules.   
 
What happens when we confuse and conflate the way we fix the 
reference of a dispositional term or ascriptions with its meaning 
How do these issues play out for dispositional properties and dispositional terms? 
Here is one example. In chapter two I argued that dispositions are categorical 
properties, in the sense that dispositional properties are not conditional properties 
(“categorical” just means non conditional). To say a vase is fragile is to say that it 
is actually fragile right now. What is conditional is the manifestation of the 
disposition. In the case of fragility, breaking or shattering is conditional upon 
being struck or dropped. But the disposition itself is not conditional. To hold that 
dispositions are conditional and not categorical properties is to mistake the 
manifestation of a disposition — which may be useful for identifying dispositions 
and fixing the reference of dispositional terms — for the disposition itself. The 
independence of a disposition and its manifestation, argued for in chapter two 
shows that it is wrong to take the manifestation as part of the disposition and 
wrong to argue from the conditional nature of the manifestation to the 
conditional nature of the disposition.  
For another example, consider the claim that dispositions are extrinsic properties 
of their bearers. Arguments that dispositions are extrinsic properties, looked at in 
chapter 4.4, rest upon the claim that the manifestation of a disposition is an 
extrinsic property of the disposed object. However, to conclude the disposition 
itself is extrinsic is to confuse the manifestation for the disposition. This is to 
confuse the manner in which we identify dispositions and fix the reference of 
dispositional terms, via a disposition’s manifestation, for the nature of the 
disposition itself.  
 
These are just two examples of arguments making substantial ontological claims 
about the nature of dispositional properties that conflate the manner in which a 
dispositional property is identified and picked out — via its manifestation in these 
cases — with the nature of the dispositional property itself. The issue is explored 
more fully in chapter four. Here I have merely introduced the distinction 
 52 
between how we talk about the world and how the world is and shown that a 
failure to appreciate the distinction leads us to mischaracterise and 
misunderstand dispositional properties and dispositional ascriptions. By paying 
careful attention to the distinction between the manner in which the reference of 
dispositional terms are fixed and their meaning I hope to dissolve a number of 
misconceptions, and shed light upon nature of dispositional ascriptions and 
dispositions.    
 
It is worth asking why we would make such confusions. The contingent and 
accidental surface features that we use to fix the reference of a term, that we use 
to identify and re-identify an object, species or substance may well be considered 
so important that we are apt to take them to be essential and necessary 
properties. The colour and lustre of gold is considered such an important and 
defining property of gold that we are apt to conflate the colour and lustre of gold 
with gold itself. For Kripke, Hitler’s evilness is considered such a key property 
that it is hard not to take it as definitive: 
“When I hear the name ‘Hitler’, I do get an illusory ‘gut feeling’ that it’s 
sort of analytic that the man was evil.” (Kripke 1980:75) 
In another example, Kripke argues that the sensation of heat is regarded as such 
a central feature of heat that we are apt to taker it to be heat itself: 
“At any rate, we identify heat and are able to sense it by the fact it 
produce in us a sensation of heat. It might here be so important to the 
concept [of heat] that its reference is fixed in this way, that if someone 
also detects heat by some sort of instrument, but is unable to feel it, we 
might want to say, if we like, that the concept of heat is not the same even 
though the referent is the same.” (Kripke 1980:131) 
 
As important as these properties may appear to be, they are nonetheless not 
necessary or essential: 
“To me Aristotle’s most important properties consist in his philosophical 
work, and Hitler’s in his murderous political role; both, as I have said, 
might have lacked these properties altogether. Surely there was no logical 
fate hanging over either Aristotle or Hitler which made it in any sense 
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inevitable that they should have possessed the properties we regard as 
important to them; they could have had careers completely different from 
their actual ones. Important properties of an object need not be 
essential… and an object could have had properties very different from its 
most striking actual properties we use to identify it.” (Kripke 1980:77) 
Similarly, in the case of dispositions, the manifestation of disposition is seen as so 
important and striking a property that we are apt to mistakenly take it to be 
definitive of dispositional terms and a necessary or essential property of 
dispositional properties.  
 
Conclusion 
I have used the distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators to explicate 
and motivate a distinction between fixing the reference of a term and giving its 
meaning. This is a distinction between how we refer to things and how things 
are, which is part of a more general distinction between word making and world 
making. 
I have shown that we can fix the reference of and designate the one and the same 
entity in different ways using both rigid and non-rigid designators. I also followed 
Kripke to argue that the manner in which we fix the reference of dispositional 
terms does not give the meaning of those terms. We can fix the reference of 
dispositional terms, such as “fragile”, by determining its extension using 
counterfactual phrases, such as “if x were struck, then x would shatter”. What 
things are fragile? Those things that would break upon struck. But once we have 
fixed the reference, we then use the term “fragile” rigidly.  
The salient point here is that once we have fixed the reference of the term 
“fragile” using, say, the counterfactual analysis, fragile things need not satisfy the 
counterfactual analysis. The existence of finks, mimics and masks shows that 
fragile things need not break upon being struck. The truth of the counterfactual 
statement “if x were struck, then x would break” is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the truth of a dispositional ascription “x is fragile”. The reason this is 
relevant is because in chapter four I use the distinction between fixing the 
reference of dispositional terms and giving their meaning to show that arguments 
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that make substantial claims about the nature of dispositions are invalid or 
unsound.  
In the next section of this chapter I continue to press the distinction word making 
and world making when I argue that predicates and properties are not 
isomorphic. I conclude that the existence of a dispositional predicate does not 
entail the existence of a corresponding dispositional property.  
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Chapter 3.2 — The predicate property distinction 
3.2.1 The nature of properties 
• Two ways to be a realist about properties 
o To be realist about a domain is to hold that properties 
corresponds to the predicates used to talk about that domain 
o The domain in question is mind-independent 
• Properties and sameness — what it means to admit properties 
o Universals — sameness as strict identity 
o Tropes — sameness as exact similarity   
• Universals versus tropes 
o Tropes as substitutes for universals 
 
3.2.2 Predicate property distinction 
Predicates and properties are not correlated one-to-one. The satisfaction 
of a predicate is no guide to what properties there are.  
• General arguments that predicates and properties are not 
isomorphic: 
o There are unknown properties to which no predicates correspond 
o “Is a game” applies to objects by virtue of a family resemblance 
among the objects, not in virtue of having the same property 
o Co-denoting non-synonymous predicates that apply to the same 
object by virtue of a single trope/property of that object. 
o Predicates can be generated out of other predicates and sentences, up 
to many order of infinity. But they do not seem to correspond to an 
equal number of tropes or properties 
o There are infinite real numbers. Yet in principle no language capable 
of human use possesses an infinite number of expressions 
o Paradoxical predicates 
• Specific argument that dispositional predicates and properties 
are not isomorphic 
o Categorical predicates that denote dispositional properties 
o Dispositional predicates that denote categorical properties 
3.3.3 What properties exist? 
If the predicates we use and the concepts we hold are no guide to the 
existence properties, then how do we decide what properties exist?  
o Science and laws our best guide 
§ Armstrong and Mellor — science and laws are our best guide. 
§ Epistemic humility 
o Sparse, as opposed to an abundant theory of properties 
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Introduction  
In this section I explore the relation between predicates and properties. I argue 
that predicates and properties are not isomorphic (they are not correlated one-to-
one) and that what properties exist is not determined by the predicates that truly 
apply to objects. That is, the satisfaction of a predicate is no guide to what 
properties exist. The claims made here are more general statements of some of 
the remarks made in the previous section — that the manner in which talk about 
dispositions and fix the reference of dispositional terms is not to be confused with 
the nature of dispositional properties and meaning of dispositional terms and 
ascriptions.  
 
This bifurcation between dispositional and categorical predicates and ascriptions 
on the one hand, and properties, on the other hand, will be returned to 
throughout the thesis to explain how accounts of dispositions go astray. 
Specifically, I charge that the distinctness thesis, categoricalism, the pure powers 
view and the claim that there are extrinsic powers all mistake how we talk about 
and fix the reference of properties (using dispositional and categorical ascriptions) 
for the way properties are and the meaning of dispositional ascriptions. 
 
3.2.1 The Nature of properties 
Property realism 
Before examining the relationship between predicates and properties, I will say a 
few words about what it means to be a realist about properties. This thesis 
assumes property realism — that properties exist. If you are a nominalist and 
anti-realist about properties, then I will not seek to convince you otherwise.8 
                     
8 Armstrong (1978aA and 1989 sec.1-3) argues extensively and convincingly against nominalism 
and anti-realism about properties.  
Molnar provides a pithy argument against nominalism and for property realism, based on casual 
explanation. According to the nominalist, a is F if a belongs to the extension of “F”. This may well 
provide a truthmaker for the claim that “a is F”. However, Molnar notes that the nominalist then 
faces a Euthyphro question: 
“Do some things freeze when cooled to zero degrees because they satisfy the predicate 
‘freezes when cooled to zero degrees’, or do these things satisfy the predicate ‘freezes 
when cooled to zero degrees’ because they in fact freeze when cooled to zero degrees? 
Once formulated the question looks easy to answer. Surely a belongs to the extension ‘F’ 
because of some property or properties it has, and not conversely.” (Molnar 2003:23-24) 
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Rather, my aim is to give an account of dispositional ascriptions and properties, 
not to argue for the existence of properties themselves. 
 
Heil distinguishes between two types of realism. One conception holds that to be 
realist about a domain (say, value) is to hold that properties correspond to the 
predicates used to talk about that domain: 
“On this conception, a realist about value must suppose that normative 
predicates designate genuine properties (or…are analyzable into 
predicates that themselves designate genuine properties).” (Heil 2003:23) 
Heil elaborates: 
“We can ask, are you a realist about states of mind, or colour, or 
consciousness? You are, it would seem, only if you think that possessing a 
particular state of mind, or being red, or feeling pain is a matter of 
something’s possessing a genuine property answering to the predicate in 
question. These properties will be shared by every object to which the 
predicate applies.” (Heil 2003:24) 
The very point of this section is to specifically reject such an account of the 
relation between predicates and properties.9 I argue that predicates and 
properties do not correspond one-to one. There are predicates to which no 
property corresponds. As such, I reject this definition of realism.  
 
The second concept of realism that Heil identifies contends that to be realist 
about a domain is to hold that the domain in question is mind-independent. On 
this account, to be a realist about, say, colour is to contend that colour is mind 
independent. I am a realist about properties in this second sense. I hold that 
properties are (for the large part) mind-independent entities, while predicates are 
language-dependent entities that express concepts, which are mental entities. 
 
Properties and sameness 
                     
9 I do not assert that Heil holds such an account of the relation between predicates and 
properties. Heil explicitly rejects the claim that predicates and properties are correlated one-to-
one. Rather, I merely use Heil to introduce such a view. 
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Oliver (1996:20) notes that one condition that any account of properties must 
preserve is that: 
“…different particulars can have the very same property.” (Oliver 
1996:20)  
For example, say particular a has property F and particular b has property F (and 
a and b are distinct) then both a and b possess the same property. There are two 
main contenders for an account of properties: 
1. Properties as universals  
2. Properties as tropes 
Their chief difference between these two views lies in how they account for the 
sameness of properties in different particulars.  
 
I briefly sketch these two theories of properties with the aim of providing an 
explicit account of what it means to say that two or more particulars have the 
same property. The notion of sameness of property plays a central role in my 
argument that predicates and properties are not isomorphic. As such, it is 
important to be clear on what sameness of property amounts to. It should be 
noted that my account of dispositions is largely independent of the truth of any 
particular theory of properties.  
 
Universals — sameness as strict identity 
For universals theory, sameness of property means strict identity. Here is 
Armstrong’s characterisation of properties as universals: 
“The Realist about universals will take these properties seriously (or will 
at least take certain selected properties seriously). The realist will say that 
these properties are really there in the world, as constituents of things, 
and will take their sameness, where two different things have the same 
property, to be a matter of strict identity. Two different things have the 
same constituent: horseness or whatever.” (Armstrong 1989:7)  
Properties as universals can be wholly present in more than one place at the same 
time. Universals are wholly present in their instances. As such, more than one 
thing can have the same, identical property qua universal. If a is F and b is F (and 
a and b are distinct), then a and b instantiate an identical property. In terms of F-
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ness, a and b are identical. For example, if being a lemon is a property, then 
exactly the same property of lemon-ness is wholly present in each and every 
lemon. As a result, all lemons are identical in respect of being lemons. To 
reiterate, according to universals theory to have the same property is to have 
identical properties. It is in this respect that sameness of property represents 
identical properties. 
 
Tropes — sameness as exact similarity 
Trope theory accepts properties as particular, non-repeatable property 
instances.10 Tropes have singular occurrences, in contrast to universals that are 
able to occur multiple times. It follows that sameness of properties qua tropes 
cannot amount to strict identity, as it does for properties qua universals. This is 
because they are non-repeatable property instances. Property instances cannot be 
present in more than one particular. At best, tropes are perfect duplicates and 
exactly similar, but they cannot be identical. These property instances or tropes 
are the same in that they form classes of exactly similar property instances. To be 
the same trope is to be member of the one class and to be a member of a class is 
to be exactly similar.  
 
For example, consider electrons. They have the property of being negatively 
charged. According at trope theory, each electron instantiates or possesses its 
own particular, non-repeatable property instance of negative charge. These 
tropes or property instances of negative charge are perect duplicates. They are 
exactly similar. However, unlike universals, they are not identical. Rather, these 
instances of negative charge are members of a class of exactly similar property 
instances. To say that objects, such as electrons share or possess the same 
property, such as negative charge, is to say that these objects instantiate or 
possess different property instances that are members of the same class. That is, 
properties, such as negative charge and lemon-ness are classes of exactly similar 
tropes. To be a member of this class is what it is to be the property of negative 
                     
10 For trope theory see Stout (1930); Williams (1953), (1966); Seargent (1985); Simons (1994); Heil 
(2003); Bacon (1995); Campbell (1990); Mertz (1996) and Molnar (2003). 
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charge or lemon-ness, and to be a member of the class is to be a perfect duplicate 
and exactly similar.  
 
Universals versus tropes  
Trope theory countenances resemblance (or class membership) as a primitive and 
unanalysable concept (see Armstrong, Martin, Place 1996:98 and Molnar: 
2003:24). It is far from ideal to have such primitive concepts reside at the heart of 
a theory. Nonetheless, Molnar, a trope theorist, is undeterred, charging rival 
theories with positing even more obscure primitive concepts: 
This [primitive resemblance] seems admissible since the concept of trope-
resemblance is intuitively much clearer than the primitives of the 
alternative theories.” (Molnar 2003:24) 
Molnar charges universals theory with relying upon the primitive concept of 
type-instantiation and nominalism with relying upon the primitive concept of 
object resemblance. 
 
Attempts to account for (or dismiss, in the case of nominalism) the problem of 
one over many admit unanalysable, primitive concepts at their heart. But is 
Molnar right to claim that trope resemblance is less obscure? Degree of obscurity 
seems itself rather obscure. 
 
Fortunately, I do not need to adjudicate between universals and trope theory. My 
argument that properties and predicates are not isomorphic does not turn on 
whether properties are universals or sets of exactly resembling property instances. 
Also, it appears there may be little to choose between the two theories. 
Armstrong, the chief proponent in modern times of a universals theory of 
properties, contends that equivalence classes of exactly resembling tropes can be 
substituted for universals and vice versa. He views trope theory as a genuine 
contenders for an ontology of properties: 
“So tropes can fill in for universals. Wherever the Universals theory 
postulates a universal, the Trope theory can substitute an equivalence 
class of exactly resembling tropes. Equally, of course, wherever the trope 
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theory postulates an equivalence class of exactly resembling tropes, the 
Universals theory can substitute a universal.” (Armstrong 1989:122-23) 
Armstrong goes so far as to suggest that differences between universals and trope 
theories are merely differences in styles of ontological bookkeeping:⁠ 
“Provided you abandon uninstantiated universals (good riddance, I say), 
and provided Universals theorists and Trope theorists coordinate their 
views on just what properties and relations the world contains, it is easy to 
pass back and forth between the theories…. You get a construction that 
will do almost all the work that universals do, without having to postulate 
them. Paradise on the cheap!” (Armstrong 1989:122)  
 
Heil, a proponent of tropes, agrees with Armstrong. Heil holds that modes 
(tropes) can do the work of universals: 
“My contention is that similarity among modes can do the job universals 
are conventionally postulated to do.” (Heil 2003:12) 
While Molnar, also a proponent of trope theory, expresses similar sentiments, but 
with universals subordinated to tropes: 
“The fact that the particular property instances fall into natural groups 
(types) is to be explained by the exact resemblance of the tropes to one 
another. Universals are kosher if, but only if, we think of them, in a 
deflationary way, as just being equivalence classes of exactly resembling 
tropes.” (Molnar 2003:24) 
 
Oliver is not convinced that paradise can be had on the cheap. He accuses 
Armstrong of “losing his metaphysical nerve” when Armstrong supposedly 
admits that these two theories of properties are merely “systematically different 
ways of saying the same thing” (Oliver 1996:12). Oliver claims that trope theory 
and universals theory may well be equivalent in the sense of equally well playing 
the same roles. However, he questions whether this entails that differences 
between the two systems are only apparent: 
“It may be that the equivalent systems cannot be distinguished with 
respect to their ability to play a certain role, but if we can say something 
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about the different natures of the elements of the equivalent systems, then 
this difference is hard to explain away.” (Oliver 1996:13) 
I think Oliver’s criticism is misguided. Armstrong does not assert that the two 
theories are “systematically different ways of saying the same thing”. Rather, 
Armstrong’s claim is that with trope theory: 
 “You get a construction that will do almost all the work that universals 
do.” (Armstrong 1989:122)   
For Armstrong, a trope theory is merely a viable option to universals theory, it is 
a “close second”: 
“[The resemblance version of the trope theory] is a close second to the 
first choice, which is a realism about universals…. As race commentators 
in Australia say, daylight is third…” (Armstrong 1989:119) 
 
As mentioned, little in my account hangs on whether we accept a trope theory or 
universals theory of properties or whether the two theories are equivalent. The 
important point is to understand what each theory is committed to, particularly 
with respect to the notion of sameness of properties. In discussing arguments 
against predicate property isomorphism in the next section, I use sameness of 
property in the sense of strict identity. However, the trope theorist’s 
characterisation of sameness in terms of exactly similar property instances can be 
substituted without effecting any of the arguments presented.    
 
3.3.2 Predicate property distinction — arguments that predicates 
and properties are not correlated one-to-one 
We use predicates, which are language-dependent entities to express concepts, 
which are mental entities. Properties are (for the most part) language- and mind-
independent features of the world. Given this bifurcation between predicates and 
properties, it would seem highly surprising if not downright improbable that 
predicates and properties are correlated one-to-one. There are a host of 
arguments to support this intuition.  
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Molnar (2003:25-28) lists six reasons to hold that predicates and properties are 
not isomorphic:11 
1. There are unknown properties to which no predicates correspond 
2. The predicate “is a game” applies to objects by virtue of a family 
resemblance among the objects, not in virtue of having the same property 
3. There are co-denoting non-synonymous predicates that apply to the same 
object by virtue of a single trope/property of that object. 
4. Predicates can be generated out of other predicates and sentences, up to 
many order of infinity. But they do not seem to correspond to an equal 
number of tropes or properties 
5. There are infinite real numbers. Yet in principle no language capable of 
human use possesses an infinite number of expressions 
6. Paradoxical predicates. 
I will use these six reasons as a starting point to argue against predicate property 
isomorphism. These serve as reasons for rejecting two weaker theses:  
1. the thesis that there is one property for every predicate  
2. the thesis that there is one predicate for every property 
 
There are unknown properties to which no predicates correspond 
The first reason Molnar gives for rejecting predicate property isomorphism 
comes from Armstrong (1978:12-14), who uses the limited reach of human 
knowledge to claim there are omnitemporally unknown properties to which no 
predicates correspond. It would be the height of human vanity to suppose that all 
properties across all time are known to us and to assume we had a predicate for 
each of them. 
 “Is a game” 
Wittgenstein (1988), in discussing the nature of language, famously employs 
games to illustrate his notion of family resemblance. The predicate “is a game” 
applies to a range of entities, but there is no single, common property shared by 
                     
11 For further arguments against predicate property isomorphism see also Mellor (1997); 
Armstrong (1978), (1989a), (1989b); Heil (2003:22-30) and Bird (2007:ch3). 
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all games. Rather there is a family resemblance among the entities that we call 
games12.  
Molnar notes that predicates such as “is a game”: 
“…apply to many objects by virtue of a family resemblance among the 
objects and not by virtue of each of them having one member of a set of 
exactly resembling tropes.” (Molnar 2003:26). 
From this Molnar concludes that predicates and properties are not isomorphic. 
Armstrong also thinks that predicates that apply to objects due to a family 
resemblance show that predicates and properties do not “line up in any simple 
way” (Armstrong 1989:85). Armstrong characterizes Wittgenstein as an 
“antimetaphysician” who sought to dissolve rather than solve the problem of 
universals:  
“He [Wittgenstein] seems to have thought that what he said about family 
resemblance was (among other things) a step towards getting rid of the 
problem [of universals]. But I think that the real moral of what he said is 
only that predicates and universals do not line up in any simple way.” 
(Armstrong 1989:85) 
Wittgenstein convincingly argues that there is no universal or property of 
gamehood. However, we clearly have a predicate “is a game”. It follows that 
predicates and properties cannot be isomorphic. What predicates exist is no 
guide to what properties exist. 
The predicate “is jade” provides a clear and striking example that predicates and 
properties are not correlated one-to-one. Just as the one predicate “is a game” 
applies to a range of different objects that do not share a common property in 
virtue of which they are games, so too the predicate “is jade” applies to a range of 
                     
12 Heil explains family resemblance between properties and our willingness to apply a single 
predicate to a diverse range of objects in terms of “less-than perfect-similarity”. Heil notes that: 
“By virtue of possessing similar-but-not-precisely-similar properties, red objects possess 
similar-but not-precisely-similar ‘causal powers’ or dispositionalities, and so behave 
(colourwise) in similar-but-not-precisely-similar ways. It is not surprising, then, that we 
see red objects as similar and find it natural to group them under a single predicate.” 
(Heil 2003:27-28)  
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minerals, namely jadeite and nephrite, that do not share a common property in 
virtue of which they are jade.  
 
“Is jade” truly applies to two different minerals; jadeite and nephrite. However, 
“is jade” does not apply to jadeite and nephrite in virtue of these entities 
possessing any common property. Rather there is a family resemblance among 
jadeite and nephrite objects. This resemblance lead people at one point to 
mistakenly conclude that jadeite and nephrite were one and the same mineral. 
Science has shown this to be wrong. Jadeite and nephrite are two distinct 
minerals, not one. Nonetheless, we can still truly apply the predicate “is jade” to 
both jadeite and nephrite because the satisfaction of a single predicate does not 
require a corresponding single property in virtue of which it applies. This shows 
that what properties there are is not determined or fixed by what predicates 
apply to objects. To deny this is to deny that jadeite and nephrite are distinct 
minerals. That is plainly false and untenable. 
 
The same point can be made about the dispositional predicates of everyday 
macroscopic objects, such as “is fragile”, “is soluble” and “is toxic”. Many 
different entities are toxic. There are chemical toxicants, such as lead, mercury 
and chlorine gas. Biological toxicants include bacteria and viruses. While physical 
toxicants include coal dust and asbestos fibres. The range of toxic substances is 
extremely diverse. The predicate “is toxic” truly applies to all these diverse 
entities in virtue of them possessing certain properties, but it does not apply in 
virtue of them possessing a single common property. In other words, there is no 
single, common property of toxicity shared by toxic substances corresponding to 
the predicate “is toxic”. This shows there is no one-to-one correspondence 
between the predicate “is toxic” and a property of toxicity. The property of 
toxicity shows that what properties there are is not determined or fixed by what 
predicates truly apply to objects. 
 
The examples of games, jade and toxicity make it clear that predicates and 
properties are not correlated one-to-one. One attempt to avoid this conclusion 
claims that such properties have a unity as higher-level functional properties. In 
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the parlance of functionalism, it is said that properties such as games, jade and 
toxicity are multiply realised by a diverse range of properties. Nonetheless, they 
share a single common higher-level functional property, and so predicates and 
properties can be correlated one-to-one at the functional level. I argue this tactic 
fails. 13   
 
One glaring problem with the functional response here is that jade is not a 
functional property. We can certainly describe jade as being multiply realised by 
two chemically distinct materials: jadite and nephrite. However, multiple 
realisability does not entail functionalism. Jade, unlike, say a thermostat or a 
possum trap, is not individuated by the causal role it plays. What makes 
something jade is that it has the chemical composition of jadeite or nephrite, not 
the role it plays. 
 
What about the toxicity? Toxicity is multiply realised and we can certainly give a 
functional description of toxicity in terms of its causal role — its role in harming 
an organism. But what reason do we have for thinking to be toxic is a higher-
level functional property and not merely a functional description? As the case of 
jade makes clear, multiple realisation of a property does not entail functionalism. 
So the fact that toxicity is multiply realised by lead, viruses and coal dust etc. is 
not sufficient for toxicity to be a functional property.  
 
We can meaningfully use the predicate “is toxic” and truly apply it to objects 
without the need to invoke functional properties and countenance higher levels of 
reality. As John Heil notes: 
“Everyday talk of levels — levels of descriptions, levels of explanation — 
is unobjectionable. We can describe sociology and psychology as higher-
level sciences, chemistry as lower-level sciences. Trouble arises when 
philosophers introduce levels of reality corresponding to levels thought of 
in this way.” (Heil 203:73) 
                     
13 There are a number of well-known problems with functionalism. There is the problem of 
causal relevance — how could items at higher levels feature in casual transactions? These are also 
problems with inter-level relations — what is it for these higher-level items to depend on and be 
determined by the items at lower levels? 
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One should not posit the existence of entities without good reason. To cast 
toxicity as a higher-level functional property, as opposed to merely a higher-level 
of description or explanation, and so countenance hierarchical levels of reality is 
unnecessary. If toxicity is multiply realised by objects that do not share a 
common property in virtue of which they are toxic, as the functionalist readily 
admits, then what reason do we have to hold that there is a common property in 
virtue of which toxic objects are toxic? Is that we employ a single predicate “is 
toxic”? It seems perverse to insist in the face of multiple realisation that there is a 
common property in virtue of which toxic objects are toxic.  
 
The functionalist fails to find the sought after common property at the level of 
being where multiple realisation occurs. To save their intuition that there is 
common property, they turn to functionalism and add a supposed higher level of 
being and posit a unity for toxicity, pain, fragility etc. at this higher level. 
 
The only reason I can see for insisting, in the face of multiple realisation, that 
there is a common property in virtue of which toxic objects are toxic is if one 
assumes that to every predicate there is a corresponding property. But what 
reason is there for holding such a view of properties and predication? As I have 
shown, multiple realisation is no reason. The example of jade shows that multiple 
realisation does not entail functionalism. I showed multiple realisation argues for 
the opposite conclusion. Multiple realisation is the admission that there is no 
single common property. 
 
Co-denoting, non-synonymous predicates 
Frege famously distinguished between the sense and reference of terms in order 
to account for how there can be non-trivial true identity statements (Frege 1980). 
The sense reference distinction shows that different (that is, non-synonymous) 
terms or phrases, such as “the morning” and “the evening star”, can designate 
the same thing, namely — Venus (Frege 1980). 
 
Similarly, there are co-denoting non-synonymous predicates that apply to the 
same object by virtue of a single property of that object. As Molnar (2003:26) 
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notes, Campbell (1980:25) provides an example of two non-synonymous 
predicates — “is the shape of a ball-bearing” and “is spherical” — that may truly 
apply to one and the same property. This shows that the satisfaction of separate 
and distinct predicates need not entail there are two corresponding separate and 
distinct properties. It shows the satisfaction of a predicate is not a sufficient 
condition for the existence of a corresponding property. It also demonstrates that 
there can be more than one way to designate or pick out the same entity. This 
point was stressed in the previous section’s discussion of Kripke. 
 
Predicates can be generated out of other predicates and sentences, 
up to many order of infinity.  
Molnar holds that the previous point about co-denoting non-synonymous 
predicates can be generalised to present a “very objectionable feature of 
isomorphism” (Molnar 2003:26). Molnar claims that: 
“Predicates can be generated out of other predicates and out of sentences, 
in accordance with accepted formation rules, up to many orders of 
infinity (at least one infinite set for corresponding to each generative 
operation, such as disjunction, double negation, sentence abstraction, 
etc.” (Molnar 2003:26) 
The problem here, according to Molnar, is that:  
“The expressions so obtained are mostly non-synonymous, but they do 
not seem to correspond to an equal number of tropes.” (Molnar 2003:26) 
Molnar’s objection is that we can generate many orders of infinite non-
synonymous predicates, without, it seems, an equal number of corresponding 
properties. Hence, predicates and properties are not isomorphic.  
 
It may well seem reasonable to assume that there are not many orders of infinite 
properties. However, Molnar’s first objection to isomorphism contends there are 
“omintemporally unknown properties” (Molnar 2003:25). Could these 
“omintemporally unknown properties” amount to many orders of infinity? 
Moreover, Molnar fifth criticism of isomorphism, one that we have not yet 
looked at, explicitly argues there “an uncountable infinity of properties” (Molnar 
2003:26). 
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I am not so sure the problem Molnar identifies here is solely a matter of numbers 
and a question of whether or not there are an infinite number of properties to 
match the infinite number of predicates we can generate. Despite these 
misgivings, I think that Molnar is right to take issue with our ability to so easily 
and endlessly generate predicates — the problem is that we can generate 
predicates in accordance with formation rules with total disregard for whether 
there is any reason to think there is a corresponding property. We can build the 
most elaborate castles in the air using predicates, completely unconstrained by 
how the world is, completely oblivious to what properties there are. The issue is 
not with the amount of predicates generated, but with the unconstrained, 
arbitrary manner in which they are created. If predicates can be generated 
without regard for how the world is, independently of any thought for what 
properties there are or may be, then there is very good reason to hold that 
properties and predicates are not isomorphic. 
 
Disjunctive and negative universals (properties) 
The existence of negative and disjunctive predicates also shows that predicates 
and properties are not isomorphic. There are disjunctive predicates — such as “is 
a wallaby or is a kangaroo” and negative predicates — such as “is not a 
potoroo”. We can generate disjunctive and negative predicates in accordance 
with formation rules. However, Armstrong convincingly argues there are no 
disjunctive or negative properties. If Armstrong is correct, then there are 
predicates to which no properties correspond. This shows predicates and 
properties cannot be isomorphic. 
 
Armstrong argues that a disjunction of properties is not itself a disjunctive 
property. By a disjunctive property Armstrong means a disjunction of universals. 
The same point can be couched in terms of tropes. I will use the more neutral 
term “property” where appropriate. Armstrong provides two arguments for 
rejecting disjunctive properties.  
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The first argument rests upon the fact that disjunctive properties are not 
identical. Armstrong ask us to consider two objects: 
“One has charge C but lacks mass M. The other lacks charge C but has 
mass M. So they have the disjunctive property having charge C or having 
mass M. But surely that does not show that, in any serious sense, they 
thereby have something identical? The whole point of a universal 
[property] is that is should be identical in its different instances.” 
(Armstrong 1989:82) 
If having charge C or mass M is a property, then all objects that possess charge C 
or having mass M property must possess identical properties (on universals 
theory) or exact duplicates (on trope theory). However, as Armstrong 
demonstrates, they clearly do not. One object may possess charge C, another 
object may possess mass M. Which is to say they do not possess the same 
property. 
 
The second reason to deny that a disjunction of properties is itself a property is 
related to causation. The Eleatic stranger in Plato’s Sophist declares: 
“I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things, that they are nothing 
but power.” (Plato 1935:247d–e) 
Armstrong adopts what is known as the Eleatic Principle to contend that casual 
power is the mark of being. 14 This leads him to argue: 
“There is some very close link between universals and causality. The link 
is of this nature. If a thing instantiates a certain universal, then, in virtue 
of that, it has the power to act in a certain way. For instance if a thing has 
a certain mass, then it has the power to act upon the scalepan of a 
balance, or upon scales in a certain way. Furthermore, different universals 
bestow different powers.” (Armstrong 1989:82)  
Armstrong applies this point to dismiss disjunctive properties: 
“Now suppose a thing has charge C but lacks mass M. In virtue of charge 
C, it has certain powers to act. For instance, it repels things with like 
charge. Possession of the disjunctive property C or M adds nothing to its 
                     
14 The Eleatic stranger in Plato’s Sophist contends that casual power is the mark of being (Plato 
1935:247d–e). Kim (1993:202) refers to the principle as “Alexander’s Dictum”. 
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powers. This suggests that while C may be a genuine universal, C or M is 
not.” (Armstrong 1989:83) 
The lack of disjunctive properties demonstrates for Armstrong that “there is no 
automatic passage from predicates (linguistic entities) to universals” (Armstrong 
1989:84). There are disjunctive predicates, yet there are no disjunctive 
properties. Hence, the satisfaction of a predicate is not sufficient for the existence 
of a corresponding property. Armstrong concludes: 
“The expression ‘having charge C or mass M’ is a perfectly good 
predicate. It could apply to, or be true of, innumerable objects. But as we 
have seen, this does not mean that there is a property corresponding to 
this predicate.” (Armstrong 1989:84-85) 
 
Armstrong also argues there are no negative properties, despite there being 
negative predicates, such as “is not hot” or “is not mass M”. He contends that the 
lack or absence of a property is not itself a property. For example, a horse is not a 
donkey. This is because horses lack the property of donkeyness, not because 
horses possess the property of not-donkeyness. It seems that we can account for 
negative predicates and the truth of statements such as “a horse is not a donkey” 
without the need for negative properties. As such, we have no reason to posit 
their existence. Negative properties appear to be unnecessary and an ontological 
extravaganze. “Positive” properties are all that are required.  
 
In arguing that there are no negative properties, Armstrong makes recourse to 
identity and causation. In the first case, Armstrong denies that objects possessing 
a supposedly negative property, such as lacking charge C, thereby possess 
anything identical and so concludes that negative properties are not genuine 
properties: 
“Is there really something in common, something identical, in everything 
that lacks charge C? Of course, there might be some universal property 
that just happened to be coextensive with lacking charge C. But that lack 
does not seem to be a factor found in each thing that lacks charge C.” 
(Armstrong 1989:83) 
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Causal considerations also count against the existence of negative properties for 
Armstrong. He notes that: 
“It is a strange idea that lacks or absences do any causing. It is natural to 
say that a thing acts in virtue of positive factors alone.” (Armstrong 
1989:83) 
Armstrong notes that our language may suggest otherwise. For example, he 
points out that we say things like “lack of water caused his death” (Armstrong 
1989:83). However, Armstrong does not think such language is a reliable guide to 
the causal factors at play here and so should not be considered a counterexample.  
 
Infinite real numbers  
Molnar’s fifth reason against predicate property isomorphism adapts an 
argument by M.C. Bradley (1979:12-13). It requires that we accept the use of the 
real number system in physics. Molnar gives an example that leads to the 
existence of “an uncountable infinity of properties”: 
“a particle passing through each of the points  of a real line segment will 
have non-denumerably many properties.” (Molnar 2003:26) 
This presents a problem according to Molnar: there is not the time to generate 
an uncountable infinity of expressions and predicates to denote non-denumerably 
many properties, and so predicates cannot be matched to properties. Predicates 
and properties cannot be isomorphic in this case. 
Another example of uncountably many properties can be found in classical field 
theory. This example comes from Chris Swoyer (Swoyer 1996:144). He points 
out that each value of a physical magnitude is a determinate property. In classical 
field theories such properties as gravitational potentials vary continuously as we 
move away from the source of the field and so yields uncountably many 
properties. Once again, we cannot generate the required corresponding 
predicates. Hence, there are properties to which no predicates correspond. 
Paradoxical predicates 
Lastly, Molnar points to paradoxical predicates to which no property 
corresponds (Molnar 2003:26). He provides and example: 
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“Is a property to which no property corresponds.” 
This predicate corresponds to a property only if it does not. It follows that the 
predicate does not correspond to any property.  
 
Specific argument that dispositional predicates and properties are 
not correlated one-to-one 
The arguments presented above provide ample reason to conclude that there is 
not a property for every predicate and there is not a predicate for every property. 
These are general argument against predicate property isomorphism. Specific 
arguments can also be found against any one-to-one correspondence between 
dispositional predicates and properties. Argument one above suggests that there 
are not only omnitemporally unknown properties, but also omnitemporally 
unknown power predicates.  
 
The fourth argument above can be applied to dispositions to claim that we can 
generate new dispositional predicates at will with no regard for whether there is 
any corresponding property. Molnar cites Quine as noting that the “dispositional 
idiom” involves: 
 “the general technique of applying the suffix ‘-ile’ or ‘-able’ to verb 
stems…” (Quine 1973:11 see also Quine 1960:223-24) 
The adding of these suffixes generates a dispositional ascription and suggests we 
can do so at will. For example, we can generate many dispositional ascriptions for 
just the one song, say “Green Onions” by Booker T and the MGs. The song can 
be likeable, listenable, diggable, danceable, playable, copy-able, transposable, 
laudable, recognizable, hearable, analyzable, debatable, objectionable, 
ponderable, identifiable and so on. A copy of the record itself is purchaseable, 
returnable, saleable, discountable, collectible, transferable, recordable, 
broabcasteable, playable, throwable, breakable, bendable, stackable, recylable, 
carryable, findable, stealable, bootleggable, biteable, packable, sortable and so 
on. This seems to be merely a word making game based on how certain suffixes 
are used in English. Perhaps one could stand their ground and claim there are 
properties for every application of the “able” or “ile” suffix. 
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However, there seems to be clear cases where our ability to generate predicates is 
no guide to what properties there are. We can use categorical predicates to pick 
out and refer to dispositional properties and dispositional predicates to pick out 
and refer to categorical properties. Alexander Bird provides examples of such 
cases:  
“A non-dispositional predicate may refer to an essentially dispositional 
property: ‘…has that property which is my favourite natural property’ is a 
non-dispositional predicate that denotes electrical charge…” (Bird 2007: 
44) 
The non-dispositional predicate “…has that property which is my favourite 
natural property” picks out and refers to the dispositional property of electrical 
charge.  
Bird also provided an example of a dispositional predicate denoting a categorical 
property: 
“Likewise, if Armstrong is correct all properties are categorical. But a 
dispositional predicate may denote such a property [a categorical 
property]; the dispositional predicate denotes the categorical property in 
virtue of the dispositional role it happens, contingently, to play in this 
world.” (Bird 2007: 44-45) 
The fact that we can use dispositional language to pick out and refer to 
categorical properties and categorical language to pick out and refer to 
dispositional properties provides a clear illustration that the manner in which we 
employ dispositional ascriptions is no guide to the nature of the properties 
referred to.  
 
The arguments of this section show that the satisfaction of a predicate is no guide 
to what properties exist. This section has argued that for a given predicate there 
may well be none, one or many properties in virtue of which the predicate 
applies. While for a given property there may be one, none or many predicates 
that apply in virtue of that property. 
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This bifurcation between dispositional and categorical predicates and ascriptions 
on the one hand and properties on the other hand will be returned to throughout 
the thesis to explain how accounts of dispositions go astray. Specifically, I charge 
that the Distinctness Thesis, Categoricalism, the Pure Powers view and the claim 
that there are extrinsic powers all mistake how we talk about and fix the 
reference of properties (using dispositional and categorical ascriptions) for the 
way properties are. 
 
I hope it obvious that my remarks on the relation between predicates and 
properties and dispositional predicates and ascriptions and properties specifically 
have parallels with my remarks in the previous section on Kripke’s distinction 
between fixing the reference of a term and giving its meaning. Just as Kripke 
warned us not to confuse and conflate the manner in which we fix the reference 
of a term with the meaning of that term, so too we must not confuse and conflate 
the predicates and ascriptions we use to refer to properties with the nature of 
those properties. This concludes my discussion of the predicate property 
distinction. However, before moving to the next chapter, I will address the 
question of what properties exist. 
 
3.2.3 What properties exist? Science and laws our best guide 
So far, I have worked to draw a distinction between language and ontology. I 
have said quite a bit about how language fails to inform us about what properties 
exist and how the world is. If our predicates and ascriptions are not a reliable 
guide to what properties exist, then what is? If the predicates we use and the 
concepts we hold are no guide to the existence of corresponding properties, then 
how do we decide what properties exist? Armstrong addresses this issue: 
“…I do not think there is an infallible way of deciding what are the true 
universals [properties]. It seems clear that we must not look to semantic 
considerations. Those who argue to particular universals from semantic 
data, from predicates to a universal corresponding to that predicate, 
argue in a very optimistic and unempirical manner. I call them a priori 
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realists. Better, I think, is a posteriori realism. The best guide that we have 
to just what universals there are is total science.” (Armstrong 1989:87) 
Armstrong believes there is reason to think that physics is the fundamental 
science. And if this is correct, then: 
“such properties as mass, spin, charge, extension, duration, space-time 
interval, and other envisaged by physics may be the true monadic 
universals.” (Armstrong 1989:87)   
However, he stresses that “any identification of universals remains rather 
speculative”. (Armstrong 1989:87) 
 
Mellor expresses similar views, giving science and laws the job of revealing what 
properties exist. For Mellor, those predicates that feature in law statements are 
those that correspond to properties: 
“And this gives us reason to think that the simple predicates we use in out 
law statements — e.g. those ascribing masses, temperatures, energies, 
chemical and biological kinds, mental states and kinds of sensations — 
correspond to properties.” (Mellor 1997:266)  
As such, statements of laws are a guide as to what properties exist. However, like 
Armstrong, Mellor expresses a degree of epistemic humility about our knowledge 
of properties. We may be wrong about what properties exist for two reasons. 
One, the laws we hold may turn out to be wrong. Two, the discovery of new laws 
may show that predicates we thought were simple are actually complex. 
 
Sparse, as opposed to an abundant theory of properties 
Molnar thinks one lesson to be drawn from the fact that predicates and 
properties are not isomorphic is that we should adopt what David Lewis (1999:8-
55) calls a sparse, as opposed to an abundant theory of properties (Molnar 
2003:27). Lewis uses Armstrong’s account of universals to illustrate a sparse 
theory of properties. Armstrong’s theory of universals is a sparse theory of 
properties in that there are only those universals which ground similarity and the 
causal powers of those particulars which instantiate them: 
“A distinctive feature of Armstrong’s theory is that universals [properties] 
are sparse. There are the universals there must be to ground the objective 
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resemblance and the causal powers of things, and there is no reason to 
believe in any more.” (Lewis 1999:12) 
It is important to note that the distinction between sparse and abundant 
properties is not simply one of the absolute numbers of properties. A sparse 
theory of properties could include uncountable many properties, such as in the 
two examples mentioned in argument six against isomorphism.  
 
Lewis goes on to introduce an abundant theory of properties: 
“Any class of things, be it ever so gerrymandered and miscellaneous and 
indescribable in thought and language, be it ever so superfluous in 
characterizing the world, is nevertheless a property. So there are 
properties in immense abundance.” (Lewis 1999:12) 
Lewis elaborates on this noting abundant properties role or lack of role in 
resemblance and causation: 
“Because properties are so abundant, they are indiscriminating. Any two 
things share infinitely many properties, and fail to share infinitely many 
others. That is so whether the two things are perfect duplicates or utterly 
dissimilar. Thus properties do nothing to capture the facts of 
resemblance. That is work more suited to the sparse universals. Likewise, 
properties do nothng to capture the causal powers of things. Almost all 
properties are causally irrelevant, and there is nothing to make the 
causally relevant ones stand out from the crowd. Properties carve reality 
at the joints — and everywhere else as well.” (Lewis 1999:13) 
On this characterization by Lewis, it is clear that the arguments given above 
against predicate property isomorphism argue for a sparse theory of properties in 
some form.  
 
We can see that there are numerous and convincing reasons to conclude that 
predicates and properties are not correlated one-to-one and that what properties 
exist is not determined by the predicates that truly apply to entities. The 
relevance of this is that the manner in which talk about dispositions and the 
predicates we apply in discussing dispositions is often not a reliable guide to what 
dispositions exist and their nature. In the next chapter, I look at four accounts of 
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the nature of dispositions and apply what has been discussed so far about the 
relation between language and the world and about reference fixing and 
meaning to show that arguments presented in support of these accounts fail to 
establish the truth of their conclusions and give us no reason to accept that 
dispositions are as these accounts claim them to be. 
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Chapter 4.1 — The distinctness thesis 
Distinctness thesis: a disposition or power (say fragility) is distinct 
from its causal bases (say, molecular bonding α). 
 
4.1.1 Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal argument for the 
distinctness thesis 
• Introduction  
• Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s argument for the distinctness thesis 
o Kripke’s modal argument 
o Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s adaption of Kripke’s modal 
argument 
• Finks and mimics show that the counterfactual definition of dispositions is 
false 
• Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s attempt to overcome finks and mimics 
o The reply to the Evil Demon mimic entails the existence of a 
contingent, epistemic counterpart for fragility 
o The reply to the Evil Demon mimic entails extrinsic causal basis 
• Conclusion — Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal argument for 
distinctness thesis is unsound 
 
4.1.2 Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s multiple realisation arguments 
for the distinctness thesis and Rives’ defence 
• Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s multiple realisation argument for the 
distinctness thesis  
• Mumford argues token-token identity of dispositions and bases is 
compatible with the multiple realisation of dispositional types and does 
not entail the distinctness thesis 
• Rives’ argument that dispositional tokens are multiply realised 
o Rive’s argument that tokens are multiply realised rests upon two 
premises: 
o Token of being fragile would survives changes to atoms a1-an 
o The causal basis of being fragile — molecular bonding α — would 
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not survive changes to atoms a1-an 
• Being fragile is tied to V — argument one that that being fragile would 
survive changes to atoms a1-an 
o Problem: Begs the question 
• The Causal Theory of Properties — argument two that being fragile 
would survive changes to atoms a1-an 
o Problem: Dispositions are causally impotent and cannot enter into 
causal relations. 
• Rives’ argument that the causal basis of the token of being fragile would not 
survive changes to atoms a1-an  
o Problem: Causal Theory of Properties entails, contrary to Rive’s 
claim, that the causal basis of being fragile would survive changes 
to atoms a1-an 
• Conclusion — Rives’ argument that dispositional tokens are multiply 
realised is unsound 
 
4.1.3 Why we should reject multiply realization arguments for the 
distinctness thesis 
• Empirical considerations appear to support the claim that dispostions 
are multiply realised 
• Multiply realised entities such as pain are as diverse and disparate as 
the disjunct of their realising properties 
• Arguments that there are no disjunctive properties 
• Dispositional properties are species and structure-specific 
• Conclusion — Prior, Pargetter and Jackson and Rives have failed to 
provide adequate grounds for the distinctness thesis. 
Conclusion  
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4.1.1 Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal argument for the 
distinctness thesis 
Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s (1982) two 
arguments in defence of the distinctness thesis — the claim that a disposition or 
power (say, fragility) and its causal basis (say, molecular bonding α) are distinct 
and separate properties.15 The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one 
introduces Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s (1982) modal argument for the 
distinctness thesis. It is an adaption of Kripke’s (1980:146ff.) modal argument 
against the identity of mental states and brain states. I show Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson’s argument is unsound. I identify the source of Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson’s error in their false, counterfactual analysis of dispositions. Section two 
examines Bradley Rives’ (2005) defence of Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s (1982) 
multiple realisation argument for the distinctness thesis. Rives argues that 
dispositional tokens (not just types) are multiply realised by different causal basis 
tokens and so, by transitivity of identity, a disposition and its causal basis must be 
distinct. I show his argument is unsound — he fails to establish the truth of two of 
key premises. Section three draws on Kim (1992) to criticise the very project of 
multiple realisation arguments to argue that properties are distinct.  
 
I conclude that Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s arguments that a disposition and 
its causal basis are distinct is underpinned by their commitment to a faulty 
semantics of dispositions in the form of the counterfactual analysis of dispositions. 
At the heart of their problem is that counterfactuals are useful for picking out and 
fixing the reference of dispositional terms, but fail to give the meaning of those 
dispositional terms. Prior, Pargetter and Jackson confuse the language we use to 
talk about properties with the meaning of those property terms and the property 
itself and in doing so make unwarranted ontological conclusions that a 
                     
15 The example of a causal basis given here is what is generally considered to be categorical or 
qualitative property. However, the distinctness thesis is neutral on the question of whether the 
causal basis is a dispositional or categorical property. Yet Prior, Pargetter and Jackson (1982) also 
hold the impotence thesis (that is, dispositions are not causes of their manifestations). It follows 
that the causal basis cannot be dispositional, as this would render it causally inefficacious and so 
incapable of playing the role of a causal basis. 
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disposition and its causal basis are two distinct properties. Furthermore, Prior, 
Pargetter and Jackson’s attempts to defend the counterfactual analysis of 
dispositions only serves to: (a) undermine Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal 
argument for the distinctness thesis and (b) entails, contrary to Prior, Pargetter 
and Jackson’s intentions, the existence of relational and extrinsic dispositions. 
 
Kripke’s modal argument 
In the third lecture of Naming and Necessity Kripke (1980) extends his treatment of 
names as rigid designators to natural kinds terms (such as “gold”), species names 
(such as “tigers”) and terms for natural phenomena (such as “heat” and “light”) 
to argue that “pain = c-fibres firing” is necessarily false while “heat = mean 
molecular kinetic energy” is necessarily true (Kripke 1980:146-55). As noted in 
chapter three, Kripke argues that identity statements involving rigid designators, 
such as “pain = c-fibres firing” and “heat = mean molecular kinetic energy” are 
necessary — necessarily true if true, and necessarily false if false.  In both the 
cases of pain and heat we have an intuition that the supposed identity does not 
hold and is contingent. It seems we can imagine pain without c-fibres firing and 
heat without mean kinetic energy. A crucial move in Kripke’s argument that 
“pain = c-fibres firing” is necessarily false revolves around whether our intuitions 
here are reliable. Kripke spends much of Naming and Necessity arguing that our 
modal intuitions are unreliable, so we need to tread carefully.  
 
Kripke’s modal argument is well known and will not be presented in detail. 
Rather, I will concentrate on the role that contingent features and epistemic 
counterparts play in the argument, as this is relevant to my criticism of Prior, 
Pargetter and Jackson’s argument for the distinctness thesis. Our intuition that 
heat may occur without mean molecular kinetic energy is unreliable. Why? 
Because, as Kripke agues, heat possesses a contingent feature — the way heat 
feels us to, the sensation heat causes in us — that serves as an epistemic 
counterpart of heat and is capable of explaining away our intuition of 
contingency (Kripke 1980: 128-131). The significant point here is that we confuse 
the sensation of heat with heat itself. In (mistakenly) imagining a world where 
heat occurs without mean molecular kinetic energy, we are (really) imagining a 
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world where the phenomenon associated with heat — say a certain prickly 
feeling of the skin — occurs without mean molecular kinetic energy. This 
contingent feature of heat — how heat feels to us — accounts for our intuition 
that heat may occur in the absence of molecular kinetic energy without having to 
admit that heat and molecular kinetic energy are contingently related.  
  
Kripke argues that things are different for the identity statement “pain = c-fibres 
firing”. Our intuition here that there is a possible world where pain occurs 
without c-fibres firing cannot be explained away in the manner of heat and mean 
molecular kinetic energy. Why? It is because we feel pain if and only if we are in 
pain. Pain, unlike heat, lacks a contingent feature — a way pain feels to us but is 
not pain — able to serve as an epistemic counterpart of pain and account for our 
intuition that pain may occur without c-fibres firing. Without this contingent 
feature, our intuition that pain may occur without c-fibres firing cannot be 
explained away, and as such we have no reason to doubt our intuition that pain 
is not identical to c-fibres firing.  
 
The point I wish to stress here is that Kripke’s modal argument that two entities 
are distinct works in some cases but not in others.  His modal argument that two 
entities are distinct works in cases where there is no contingent feature capable of 
serving as an epistemic counterpart to explain away our intuition that the identity 
in question does not hold. If there is a contingent feature capable of serving as an 
epistemic counterpart and explaining away our intuition that the identity in 
question does not hold, then Kripke’s modal argument that two entities are 
distinct fails. 
 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s adaption of Kripke’s modal argument 
I now turn to Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s (1982) adaption of Kripke’s modal 
argument:  
“[I]f ‘fragility (being fragile) = having α (say)’ is true, it is necessarily so, 
and if false, necessarily so… But there are worlds where fragile objects do 
not have α, for it is contingent as to what the causal basis of a disposition 
is. Hence there are worlds where ‘fragility = having α’ is false for the 
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decisive reason that the extension of fragility and being α differ in that 
world; and therefore by rigidity it is false in all worlds, including the 
actual world.” (Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982:253-54) 
The question as to whether we should accept Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s 
conclusion that “fragility = having α” is false in all worlds and that a disposition 
and its causal basis are distinct properties turns on whether dispositions, such as 
fragility, are like heat (and possess a contingent feature capable of explaining 
away our intuition that heat can occur without mean molecular kinetic energy) or 
like pain and lacking any such contingent feature. 16  
 
We find Prior, Pargetter and Jackson explicitly contrasting heat with fragility 
when they argue that external signs are not definitive of heat but are definitive of 
fragility: 
“Be this the right or the wrong view for heat (and water et al.), it is the 
wrong view for fragility (and elasticity et al.).  
“The cornerstone of the Kripke-Putnam view is that it is wrong to define 
“x is hot” as “x is such that…” where the dots are filled with some 
favoured specification of the external signs of heat. For it is not disputed 
that in some possible worlds it is objects with calorific fluid and not mean 
kinetic energy which display these external signs of heat.  
                     
16 Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s argument rests on the claim that dispositional terms such as 
“fragility” and property terms such as “α” are rigid designators. I do not challenge this claim, but 
note that Prior’s (1985) argument for the rigidity of such terms is unconvincing. Prior argues that 
if property predicates (which include dispositional predicates) are non-rigid, then there could be 
no transworld identity of individuals:  
“If we treat property predicates as non-rigid designators, we lose the ability to identify 
individuals across possible worlds” (Prior 1985:77) 
Her argument rests upon a mistaken account of individuals and transworld identity. We do not 
identify individuals in other world by their properties, as Prior claims. Names, objects and 
individuals are not introduced be description, by their “property predicates”, as Prior suggests. 
Rather, in counterfactual situations we stipulate the object we are talking about. As Kripke notes: 
“(1) Generally, things aren’t ‘found out’ about a counterfactual situation, they are 
stipulated; (2) possible worlds need not be given purely qualitatively, as if we were 
looking at them through a telescope.” (Kripke 1980:50) 
Elsewhere he further elaborates on this point: 
“I can refer to the table before me, and ask what might have happened to it under 
certain circumstances; I can also refer to its molecules. If, on the other hand, it is 
demanded that I describe each counterfactual situation purely qualitatively, then I can 
only ask whether a table, of such and such a color, and so on, would have certain 
properties; whether the table in question would be this table, table T, is indeed moot, 
since all reference to objects, as opposed to qualities, has disappeared.” (Kripke 1980: 
52) 
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“But what makes fragility a disposition is that it is right to define ‘x is 
fragile’ as ‘If x were dropped at t, x would break at t + δ’. And it is not 
disputed that a causal basis of an object which is such that if it is dropped 
it breaks, may vary from world to world.” (Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 
1982:254) 
Heat possesses “external signs of heat” that are not definitive of “heat”. As such, 
these non-definitive, contingent signs of heat may be possessed by objects that are 
not hot without undermining the claim that “heat = mean molecular kinetic 
energy” is true in all possible worlds. However, the signs of fragility — breaking 
upon being dropped — are definitive of “fragility” and so are necessary features 
of fragile objects. If there are objects that would break upon being dropped yet 
lack the causal basis α, then it follows that “fragility = having α” is false in all 
possible worlds. In defining “fragility” counterfactually, Prior Pargetter and 
Jackson deny that fragility possesses a contingent feature capable of accounting 
for our intuition that “fragility = having α” is false.  
 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal argument for the distinctness thesis is valid. 
However, it is unsound. Their premise that dispositions, such as fragility, are 
defined in terms of counterfactual statements is false. That is, Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson are wrong when they claim: 
“But what makes fragility a disposition is that it is right to define ‘x is 
fragile’ as ‘If x were dropped at t, x would break at t + δ’.” (Prior, 
Pargetter and Jackson 1982:254) 
 
Finks, masks, antidotes and mimics show the counterfactual 
analysis of dispositions is false 
As pointed out in chapter two, the simple conditional analysis of dispositions in 
terms of counterfactuals, as propounded by Prior, Pargetter and Jackson, is 
“simple indeed — but false” (Lewis 1997a:143). C.B. Martin’s (1994) electro-fink 
and reverse electro-fink examples illustrate that the counterfactual analysis of 
dispositions is. George Molnar provides a real-world example of a Martinian 
reverse-electro fink: 
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“A non-imaginary example is an electrical safety cut-out switch which 
turns off the current in a wire (=the base) when an earthed conductor 
touches the wire, thus preventing anybody getting a shock from the wire 
(=the disposition). At time t, it is true the wire is live (=disposition) 
although the conditional ‘If one were to touch the wire at t one would get 
an electric shock’ is false, thanks to the safety switch.”(Molnar 2003:90) 
The wire is live, yet the counterfactual “if one were to touch the wire at t one 
would get an electric shock” is false. We have a true dispositional ascription, yet 
false counterfactual. This shows that the truth of a counterfactual is not necessary 
for the truth of a dispositional ascription such as “x is live”. 
 
Mimics show that the truth of a counterfactual is not sufficient for the truth of a 
dispositional ascription. Lewis’ Hater of Styrofoam provides a whimsical 
example: 
“When a styrofoam dish is struck, it makes a distinctive sound. When the 
Hater of Styrofoam hears this sound, he comes and tears the dish apart 
by brute force. So, when the Hater is within earshot, styrofoam dishes are 
disposed to end up broken if struck. … Are they [Styrofoam dishes] 
fragile? To say so would be at best a misleading truth, and at worst an 
outright falsehood.” (Lewis 1997:153) 
The counterfactual “if this Styrofoam cup were struck, it would shatter” is true. 
Yet the dispositional ascription — that the Styrofoam cup is fragile — is false. 
We have a true counterfactual, yet false dispositional ascription. This shows that 
the truth of a counterfactual is not sufficient for the possession of a disposition or 
power. 
 
Finks and mimics (as well as mask and antidotes) demonstrate that the 
counterfactual analysis of dispositions is false — the truth of a counterfactual is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the possession of a disposition. Contrary Prior, 
Pargetter and Jackson’s claims, dispositions, such as fragility, cannot be defined in 
terms of counterfactual statements such as “If x were dropped at t, x would break 
at t + δ”. The falsity of the counterfactual analysis of dispositions shows that 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal argument for the distinctness thesis is 
 87 
unsound. Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal argument gives us no reason to 
accept their conclusion that a disposition and its causal basis are distinct. 
 
The falsity of the counterfactual analysis of dispositions means that breaking 
upon being dropped is not a necessary feature of fragile objects. There are fragile 
objects that may fail to break upon being struck.  For example, a glass figurine is 
fragile. But will not shatter when struck if packed in foam and double-boxed. 
There are also non-fragile objects that would break upon being struck. For 
example, a tennis ball dipped in liquid nitrogen would shatter upon being 
dropped. Similarly a steel beam is not fragile, but would shatter upon being 
struck with a massive force. This shows that the property of breaking upon being 
struck is a contingent, accidental feature of fragile objects. This contingent 
feature of fragility provides us with an epistemic counterpart of fragility able to 
explain away our (false) intuition that a dispositions, say, fragility may occur 
without its causal basis, say, molecular bonding α, without having to admit a 
disposition and its causal basis are distinct. With this Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson’s argument for the distinctness thesis collapses. 
 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal argument for the distinctness thesis rests 
upon a faulty semantics of dispositional terms and ascriptions. The counterfactual 
“If x were dropped at t, x would break at t + δ” may well point to a very 
important and significant feature of fragile objects — that they tend to break 
upon being dropped —  that is useful for fixing the reference of dispositional 
terms such as “fragility”. But it is not what the term “fragility” means and it is not 
what fragility is. We can use such counterfactuals to identify fragile objects and to 
pick out and fix the reference of dispositional terms. However, to confuse and 
conflate how we fix the reference of dispositional terms for the meaning of those 
terms leads use to make unwarranted and false ontological claims about the 
nature of dispositions. This is precisely the mistake that Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson make when they define dispositions counterfactually and then argue that 
a disposition and its causal basis are distinct properties.  
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Prior, Pargetter and Jackson, in defining dispositions counterfactually, mistakenly 
confuse and conflate the “external signs” of a disposition — namely, a fragile 
object’s breaking upon being dropped — with the disposition itself. In doing so, 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson make the very mistake that they charge Kripke and 
Putman with warning against: 
“The cornerstone of the Kripke-Putnam view is that it is wrong to define 
‘x is hot’ as ‘x is such that…’ where the dots are filled with some favoured 
specification of the external signs of heat.” (Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 
1982:254) 
 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s attempt to overcome finks and 
mimics 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson are not blind to finked and mimicked dispositions 
and the problems they pose for the counterfactual definition of fragility. Here is 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s own Evil Demon mimic: 
“Suppose we have a cup made of toughened glass. It is not fragile. Now 
suppose the Evil Demon take a dislike to the glass and sets himself to 
ensure that it will be shattered by a lightning bolt should it be knocked 
over at any time. Then it is true of the cup at any t that should it be 
knocked, it would break at t + δ. But it isn’t fragile.”(Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson 1982:252) 
Thanks to the dastardly machinations of the Evil Demon, the counterfactual is 
true — the glass would shatter if knocked, yet the dispositional ascription is false 
— the toughened glass is not fragile. True counterfactual, yet false dispositional 
ascription. But how can this be? According to Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s 
counterfactual definition of dispositions the glass must be fragile.  
 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson respond to this apparent contradiction by denying 
that the counterfactual is true. That is, they deny that the glass disliked by the 
Evil Demon would really break. This seems rather improbable, given that Prior, 
Pargetter and Jackson accept that if the glass is knocked, then it would shatter 
(after being hit by a lightning bolt delivered by the Evil Demon). To resolve the 
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apparent contradiction, Prior, Pargetter and Jackson draw a distinction between 
“ways of breaking and ways of breaking”:  
“What we need to say instead is that there are ways of breaking and ways 
of breaking, and being struck by lightning is not part of the pair definitive 
of fragility. The cup has a dispositional property all right…— but not that 
properly described as fragility.” (Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982:252) 
 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson elaborate on their concept of “the pair definitive of 
fragility”:  
“For each disposition we can specify a pair of antecedent circumstances 
and manifestations which together determine the disposition under 
discussion. In the case of fragility, the pair is (roughly) <knocking, 
breaking>, in the case of water solubility the pair is <putting in water, 
dissolving>…” (Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982:251) 
 
The reply to the Evil Demon mimic entails the existence of an 
epistemic counterpart of fragility 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson appear to have introduced a second definition of 
dispositions, based upon the “pair definitive of fragility”, namely <knocking, 
breaking> for fragility and <putting in water, dissolving> for solubility. As the 
toughened glass example makes clear, the counterfactual definition of fragility 
and the pair definitive of fragility definition are not equivalent — their extensions 
differ. On the counterfactual definition the glass is fragile — it would shatter if 
knocked. Yet according to the “pair definite of fragility” definition the glass is not 
fragile. Regardless of the merits of Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s distinction 
between ways of breaking and ways of breaking, the result — two non-equivalent 
definitions of fragility — is clearly undesirably for Prior, Pargetter and Jackson.  
 
The distinction between “ways of breaking and ways of breaking” causes another 
problem for Prior, Pargetter and Jackson. According to Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson, the glass disliked by the Evil Demon has every appearance of breaking 
(it shatters or would shatter when knocked), yet is not an instance of breaking. 
With this, Prior, Pargetter and Jackson admit it is possible for something to have 
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every appearance of being fragile — namely, shattering or shattering upon being 
knocked — yet not be an instance of fragility. The distinction between ways of 
breaking and ways of breaking gives rise to an accidental, contingent feature of 
fragility and as such provides an epistemic counterpart of fragility. This renders 
their modal argument for the distinctness Thesis unsound.  
 
The reply to the Evil Demon mimic entails extrinsic causal basis 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s defense of the counterfactual definition of 
dispositions presents a further problem. Their distinction between ways of 
breaking entails the existence of extrinsic, relational dispositions. Regardless of 
how well-founded Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s distinction is between ways of 
breaking and ways of breaking, and regardless of what type of supposed breaking 
occurs in the Evil Demon example, Prior, Pargetter and Jackson admit there is a 
disposition at play here:  
“The cup has a dispositional property all right…— but not that properly 
described as fragility.” (Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982:252) 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson further claim that it is a necessary truth that 
dispositions possess a causal basis. They describe the causal basis as the “such 
that” responsible for the disposition’s manifestation, given appropriate stimulus 
conditions: 
“If dispositions must have causal bases, then any object with disposition 
must have a property — the basis — responsible for it being such that if 
…, then …. The property is that ‘such that.’ ”(Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson 1982:252) 
In the Evil Demon example, being disliked by the Evil Demon is a “such that” 
and part of casual basis of the glass’ disposition: 
“x does have a ‘such that.’ It is disliked by the Evil Demon and that is a 
highly relevant ‘such that’ in the circumstances.” (Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson 1982:252) 
The problem here is that “being disliked by the Evil Demon” is both a relational 
and extrinsic property (on both the duplicate and independence criteria of 
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intrinsic). ⁠17 This is a problem for Prior, Pargetter and Jackson as they hold that a 
disposition’s causal basis is intrinsic: 
“We have however pointed to one way of arguing for a view of this kind 
[that the causal basis is categorical or intrinsic], namely by arguing that 
only categorical or intrinsic properties can form non-redundant parts of 
causally sufficient operative conditions.”(Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 
1982:253) 
Contrary to these explicit clams, Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s treatment of the 
Evil Demon example commits Prior, Pargetter and Jackson to the existence of 
extrinsic and relational dispositions and casual bases. The faulty semantics of the 
counterfactual analysis and definition of dispositions leads Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson to contradiction a major plank of their account of dispositions. 
 
Conclusion — Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal argument for 
the distinctness thesis is unsound 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal argument for the distinctness thesis is faced 
with a dilemma. The first horn of the dilemma arises from their counterfactual 
definition of dispositions. This counterfactual definition serves Prior, Pargetter 
and Jackson well in their argument for the distinctness thesis in that it rules out a 
contingent feature of fragility capable of explaining away our intuition that a 
dispositions and its causal basis are distinct. However, finks, masks and mimics 
show that their “simple” counterfactual definition of dispositions is false. On this 
first horn their argument for the distinctness thesis is unsound. The second horn 
of the dilemma arises from attempts to meet these objections to the 
counterfactual analysis by drawing a distinction between ways of breaking and 
ways of breaking. Unfortunately, this distinction between ways of breaking 
introduces an accidental, contingent feature of fragility and as such provides an 
epistemic counterpart of fragility. This renders their modal argument for the 
distinctness thesis unsound.  On both horns the modal argument for the 
distinctness thesis is unsound. Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal argument fails 
to provide any reason to accept their claim that a disposition and its causal basis 
                     
17 These two criteria for intrinsicality are discussed at length in chapter 4.4. See also 
Humberstone (1996).  
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are distinct. At the heart of Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s problems lies a faulty 
semantics of dispositions in the form of their counterfactual definition of 
dispositions. Attempts to avoid counterexamples to the counterfactual definition 
and save the definition only serves to produce more problems. 
 
4.1.2 Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s multiple realisation argument 
for the distinctness thesis and Rives’ defence 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson prosecute a second argument for the distinctness 
thesis, based on the claim that dispositions are multiply realised by different 
causal bases. This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, I introduce 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s multiple realisation argument. Mumford (2008) 
demonstrates that the multiple realisation of dispositional types, as argued for by 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson, is compatible with the token-token identity of 
dispositional property-instances and causal bases property-instances. In the 
second part, I examine Bradley Rives’ (2005) defence of Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson’s (1982) multiple realisation argument that a disposition or power and its 
causal basis are distinct against Mumford’s token-token response. Rives argues 
that dispositional tokens are multiply realised by different causal basis tokens (not 
merely types) and so, by transitivity of identity, must be distinct. I show his 
argument is unsound. It fails to establish the truth of two key premises. I conclude 
that Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s multiple realisation argument provides no 
reason to accept their claim that a disposition and its causal basis are distinct.  
 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s multiple realisation argument for the distinctness 
thesis is familiar in form from the philosophy of mind (see Putnam 1967). Prior, 
Pargetter and Jackson note that: 
“It is empirically plausible that certain dispositions have different causal 
bases in different objects.”(Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982:253) 
For example, the causal basis of being fragile in glass panes may be, say, molecular 
bonding α. While the causal basis of being fragile in shellac records may be, say, 
crystalline structure β. This leads Prior, Pargetter and Jackson to conclude:  
“We cannot say that both being fragile = having molecular bonding α, 
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and that being fragile = having crystalline structure β; because by 
transitivity we would be lead to the manifestly false conclusion that having 
molecular bonding α = having crystalline structure β.” (Prior, Pargetter 
and Jackson 1982:253) 
 
Mumford’s token-token response 
Stephen Mumford, in an argument also familiar in form from the philosophy of 
mind (see Fodor 1974), appeals to token-token identity to argue against the 
distinctness thesis (Mumford 2008:157-162). Mumford shows that the multiple 
realisation of dispositional types identified by Prior, Pargetter and Jackson is 
compatible with the token-token identity of dispositional property-instances and 
causal bases property-instances: 
“Being D [a dispositional predicate term] need not be the same, in every 
case, as being C [a causal basis predicate term] as long as each instance of 
the disposition is identical to some instance of a categorical [causal] 
base.”(Mumford 2008:159) 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s claim that a dispositional type, such as fragility, is 
multiply realised by different causal bases does not preclude that particular 
tokens of being fragile are identical with particular causal basis tokens. 
 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson assume that if a disposition is identical with its 
causal basis in one instance, then it must be identical in all instances. Mumford 
rejects this assumption. Viewed this way, the dispute here is about whether 
properties (and relations) are, as Prior, Pargetter and Jackson claim, universals 
and so identical across different instances or, as Mumford claims, properties are 
tropes and so non-repeatable particulars that are not identical across different 
particulars. I will not engage with this debate here. There is vast literature on the 
matter.18 However, I pointed out in chapter 3.2, Armstrong (1989), the chief 
contemporary proponent of a universals theory of properties, suggests that 
differences between universals and trope theories are merely differences in styles 
of ontological bookkeeping. Leaving this issue aside, I turn to Rives’ defense of 
                     
18 For a discussion of tropes and universals see Armstrong (1978, 1989, 1997), Bacon (1995) and 
Campbell (1981).  
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the distinctness thesis. 
 
Rives’ argument that dispositional tokens are multiply realised 
Rives (2005) defends the distinctness thesis against Mumford’s token-token 
response by arguing that dispositional tokens are multiply realised. I conclude 
that his argument is unsound.  
 
In arguing that dispositional tokens are multiply realised, Rives asks us to 
consider a vase V. He claims that:  
i. V  
ii. V’s token of being fragile  
iii. The causal relations V enters into 
would all would survive changes to atoms a1-an (some of V’s constituent atoms). At 
the same time, Rives’ claim that: 
The causal basis of being fragile — having molecular bonding α 
would not survive these changes. Rives’ claims about vase V can be represented 
as follows: 
Before changes to atoms a1-an After changes to atoms a1-an 
A. Vase V    = Vase V  
B. Causal relations of V  = Causal relations of V 
C. Token of being fragile  =  Token of being fragile (disposition) 
D. Molecular bonding α  ≠ Molecular bonding β (causal basis) 
 
Rives sets out to describe a case in which the same dispositional token of being 
fragile is multiply realised by two different causal bases tokens — having molecular 
bonding α and having molecular bonding β. After changes to atoms a1-an, the same 
token of being fragile possesses a different causal basis. His argument is valid. If the 
token of being fragile remains the same while its causal basis changes, then it 
follows that being fragile is multiple realised. However, Rives’ argument is not 
sound. In particular, Rives’s argument fails to establish the truth of two key 
premises:  
i. the token of being fragile would survive changes to atoms a1-an  
ii. that molecular bonding α would not survive changes to atoms a1-an. 
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Being fragile is tied to V — argument one that that being fragile 
would survive changes to atoms a1-an 
Rives offers two arguments that the token of being fragile would survive changes to 
atoms a1-an. The first rests on the claim that being fragile is tied to V. The second 
relies upon the Causal Theory of Properties.  
 
Rives’ argues that the token of being fragile would survive changes to atoms a1-an on 
the grounds that being fragile is tied to V and V would survive changes to a1-an: 
“We have assumed that V would survive the replacement of [atoms] a1-an 
with exactly similar atoms, and since the existence of the instance of being 
fragile is tied to V, we have assumed that the instance of being fragile 
would survive the replacement.”(Rives 2005:22) 
That is, Rives argues: 
(P1) V would survives changes to atoms a1-an 
(P2) The token of being fragile is tied to V 
Therefore: 
(C1) The token of being fragile would survive changes to atoms a1-an 
The argument is invalid. To see why, we turn to Rives’ remarks on sameness, 
survival and identity. 
 
Rives prefaces his argument that dispositional tokens are multiply realised with 
remarks on change and sameness: 
“Consider a particular vase V. Like any other ordinary object, V will 
survive changes in its make-up. It will, for example, remain the same vase 
even after a piece of it breaks off and is replaced.” (Rives 2005:22) 
V will also remain the same vase after changes to atoms a1-an — that is, after 
atoms a1-an are replaced with exactly similar atoms (Rives 2005:22). The salient 
point here is that for Rives there is identity over time. As Rives has claimed, 
ordinary objects, such as vases, can change properties over time and yet 
“survive” and “remain the same”. There is debate and disagreement over the 
mechanics of how to account for identity over time, whether it be in terms of 
endurance or perdurance. Rives does not declare his hand on this matter and 
nothing in the debate turns on it. All that matters is that there is identity over 
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time. 
 
Let us return to Rives’ argument. The fact that V can remain the same and 
survive changes in its make-up (for example, changes to atoms a1-an or having a 
piece of it break off and be replaced) shows that V can lose properties that are 
tied to V and yet still remain V.19 In that case, all V’s survival entails is that a 
sufficient number or type of properties of V survive for V to be the same.20 To 
assume that one of these surviving properties is the token of being fragile is to 
assume what needs to be proven. Rives argument that the token of being fragile 
survives changes to atoms a1-an because it is tied to V, and V survives, begs the 
question. This argument of Rives’ fails to establish the truth of the premise that 
the token of being fragile would survive changes to atoms a1-an. 
 
The Causal Theory of Properties — argument two that being fragile 
would survive changes to atoms a1-an 
Rives presents a second argument that the token of being fragile would survive 
changes to atoms a1-an of V. It rests upon the casual theory of properties. Rives 
follows Mumford (Mumford: 1998: 162) in assuming that sameness of causal 
roles and relations entails sameness of property: 
“According to the causal theory, which Mumford himself accepts 
(1998:123-125), properties are individuated by the causal powers they 
potentially contribute to the particulars in which they are instantiated… 
the main idea is simple: properties are individuated by the causal power 
they bestow upon the particulars that have them.” (Rives 2005:24) 
In Mumford’s own words: 
                     
19 It appears Rives uses the “tied-to” relation to make the point that tropes or property instances 
are, unlike universals, non-transferable. This is what Rives has to say: 
“Phrases like ‘this particular weight of this particular apple’ denote property-instances, 
and suggest that their existence is tied to the very particulars (in this case, apples) that 
have them. Property-instances are, to use C.B. Martin’s phrase, non-transferable.” 
(Rives 2005:fn 11) 
The “tied-to” relation specifies that nothing else, be it another apple or otherwise, can have the 
same trope of weight that this particular apple possesses. Similarly, any property tied to V, such as 
the property instance of being fragile, is simply a non-transferable property. V may still gain or 
lose a property that is tied to it, such as being fragile.   
20 Rives notes that there is a question of how much of V could be replaced while still remaining 
the same vase (Rives 2005:fn9).  Rives does not settle this question and it is not one that we need 
to settle here. The salient fact remains — V can lose some of its properties and yet survive and be 
same. 
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“This is itself a dispositional criterion of property instance identity insofar 
as it stipulates that any two tokens with all the same causal roles are 
identical, and therefore are just the same token.”(Mumford 1998:162) 
 
Rives employs the causal theory of properties to argue that the token of being 
fragile is one and the same property before and after changes in atoms a1-an. He 
first claims that the vase V is fragile and that it enters into the same causal 
relations before and after changes in atoms a1-an. 
“[T]he vase will look, feel, and behave in exactly the same way it does in 
the actual world.” (Rives 2005:22) 
Given the Casual Theory of Properties, it follows that the token of being fragile is 
the same after changes in atoms a1-an. We can see that the argument is valid: 
(P3) V is fragile (assumption) 
(P4) V enters into same causal relations before and after changes in atoms 
a1-an (assumption) 
Therefore: 
(P5) The token of being fragile enters into same causal relations before and 
after changes in atoms a1-an (P3, P4)  
(P6) Sameness of causal roles and relations entails sameness of properties 
(Causal Theory of Properties) 
Therefore:  
(C2) The token of being fragile is one and the same property before and 
after changes in atoms a1-an. (P5, P6) 
 
While the argument is valid, it is nonetheless unsound. Premise P4 is false. Rives, 
following Prior, Pargetter and Jackson, endorses the impotence thesis: 
dispositions are causally impotent with respect to their manifestation (Prior, 
Pargetter and Jackson 1982:251, Rives 2005:24-27). For Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson and Rives it is the causal basis of a disposition that is causally potent. If 
dispositions are causally impotent, then they do not enter into any causal roles or 
relations. That is just what it means to be causally impotent. If dispositions do not 
enter into any causal roles or relations, then, according to the Causal Theory of 
Properties, there are no grounds for the identity or individuation of these 
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dispositional properties. Specifically, the impotence thesis entails that there are 
no grounds for the identity or individuation of the token of being fragile possessed 
by V. As such, the impotence thesis entails the falsity of P2 — that the token of 
being fragile enters into same causal relations before and after changes in atoms a1-
an. The token of being fragile does not enter into any causal relations. Rives has not 
merely failed to establish the truth of premise P4, his arguments show that P2 is 
false. 
 
Rives is quite aware that the impotence thesis is, at least on the face of it, 
incompatible with the Causal Theory of Properties: 
“The objection, then, is that the proponent of the argument cannot claim 
both that dispositions contribute no causal powers to particulars and that 
they nevertheless exist.” (Rives 2005:26-27) 
Rives’ solution appeals to “potential” causal powers. He argues that properties 
are to be: 
“individuated by the causal powers they [properties] potentially 
contribute to particulars.” (Rives 2005:26-27) 
The result is supposed to lead to a situation where: 
“Perhaps there are reasons for thinking that in some circumstances, we 
ought to take a dispositional property, and not its categorical base, to be 
contributing causal powers.” (Rives 2005:27) 
Rives’ conclusion is clear — in some circumstances dispositional properties 
contribute causal powers. In some circumstances dispositions are causally 
efficacious and so not impotent. Rives dissolves the apparent incompatibility 
between the causal theory of properties and the impotence thesis by simply 
denying the impotence thesis. This is rather a curious move to make for someone 
whose stated aim is to defend the impotence thesis (Rives 2005:19).  
 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson argue that the impotence thesis follows from the 
conjunction of the causal thesis and the distinctness thesis: 
“By the Causal Thesis, any disposition (and thus fragility) must have a 
causal basis. The causal basis is a sufficient explanation of the breaking as 
far as the properties of the object are concerned. But then there is nothing 
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left for any other properties of the object to do. By the distinctness thesis 
the disposition is one of these other properties, ergo the disposition does 
nothing.” (Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982:255) 
For Prior, Pargetter and Jackson, The impotence thesis is not open to rejection. 
The impotence thesis is a necessary consequence of the conjunction of the causal 
thesis and the distinctness thesis. 
 
Rives provides his own “metaphysically precise version of the argument” for the 
impotence thesis that does not mention the distinctness thesis and instead makes 
recourse to parsimony in the form of Occam’s Razor (Rives 2005:25-26): 
(P7) “If a disposition D is realized by a categorical property C, then the 
set of causal powers that individuates D is a proper subset of the set that 
individuates C.” 
(P8) “In taking inventory of the causal powers of particulars, then, we 
need not mention dispositional properties.”  
(P9) “Occam’s Razor demands that we do not posit anymore causally 
efficacious properties than we need in order to account for the causal 
powers of particulars.” 
Therefore: 
(C3) “We should therefore conclude that dispositions are causally 
impotent.”  
Appeal to the principle of parsimony (and not the distinctness thesis) appears to 
free Rives from accepting the impotence thesis as necessary. Parsimony merely 
suggests that entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity and so leaves 
open the possibility of causally potent dispositions, so long as they are not an 
unnecessary multiplication of entities. Rives does not set out what these 
circumstances would be, but instead notes that his argument does not rule out 
such a possibility. 
 
Regardless of the merits of Rives’ “metaphysically precise” argument for the 
impotence thesis, it does nothing to undermine Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s 
argument for the impotence thesis. Rives, like Prior, Pargetter and Jackson, is 
committed to both the distinctness thesis and the Causal Thesis, and so is also 
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committed to the impotence thesis (see Rives 2005:fn1). So long as Rives holds 
both the distinctness thesis and the Causal Thesis he cannot also claim, by 
recourse to potential powers, parsimony or otherwise, that there are 
circumstances under which dispositions are not impotent.  
 
Rives’ cannot employ the Causal Theory of Properties to argue that the token of 
being fragile would survive changes to atoms a1-an while also holding the 
impotence thesis. Yet he cannot reject the impotence thesis while also holding the 
Causal Thesis and the distinctness thesis. He explicitly states he is committed to 
all three theses. In attempting to defend his claim that the token of being fragile 
would survive changes to atoms a1-an Rives builds an inconsistency into the very 
pillars of his account of dispositions.  
 
Rives’ argument that the causal basis of the token of being fragile 
would not survive changes to atoms a1-an  
As noted above, in claiming that dispositional tokens are multiply realised by 
different causal bases, Rives attempts to argue for two premises: 
i. the token of being fragile would survives changes to atoms a1-an 
ii. the causal basis of the token of being fragile would not be the same before 
and after changes to atoms a1-an 
I have shown that Rives fails to establish the truth of the first premise. I now 
argue that the causal theory of properties undercuts the second premise: Rives’ 
claim that the causal basis of the token of being fragile would not be the same 
before and after changes to atoms a1-an. 
 
Rives asserts that before changes to the atoms a1-an, V possesses the causal basis 
having molecular bonding α and that after changes to the atoms a1-an, V possesses the 
causal basis having molecular bonding β. If, as Rives claims, these are different 
properties, then, on the causal theory of properties, they will differ in their causal 
effects and relations. However, according to Rives, V enter into the same causal 
roles and relations before and after changes to the atoms a1-an, regardless of 
whether V instantiates having molecular bonding α or having molecular bonding β: 
“In W, the vase will look, feel, and behave in exactly the same way that it 
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does in the actual world.”(Rives 2005:22)  
It follows, by the Causal Theory of Properties, that having molecular bonding α and 
having molecular bonding β are one and the same property. Rives does not merely 
fail to support his claim that the causal basis of the token of being fragile would not 
be the same before and after changes to atoms a1-an. Rather, a central principle of 
his — the Causal Theory of Properties — entails the falsity of this premise. 
 
Conclusion — Rives’ argument that dispositional tokens are 
multiply realised is unsound 
Rives (2005) attempts to defend Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s (1982) distinctness 
thesis against Mumford’s token-token response by arguing that dispositional 
tokens, like types, are multiply realised by different casual bases. I have shown 
that his argument is unsound. Rives not only fails to establish the truth of two key 
premises:  
i. the token of being fragile would survive changes to atoms a1-an  
ii. that molecular bonding α would not survive changes to atoms a1-an  
he is committed to their falsity. I have shown that his argument for premise (i) — 
that the property-instance of being fragile survives changes to atoms a1-an — is 
invalid. I have also shown that Rives’ commitment to the Causal Theory of 
Properties entails, contrary to his claims, that premise (ii) is false. Rives provides 
no reason to hold that dispositional tokens, such as being fragile, are multiply 
realised. As such, he has failed to defend Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s argument 
for the distinctness thesis against Mumford’s token-token response. 
 
4.1.3 Why we should reject multiply realisation arguments for the 
distinctness thesis 
So far, Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s claim that dispositional types are multiply 
realised has not been directly challenged. Rather, Mumford sidestepped the 
issue, pointing out that token identity of dispositions and causal bases is 
compatible with the multiple realisation of dispositional types and so does not 
entail the distinctness thesis. In this section, I attack the very project of multiple 
realisation arguments. I use an argument from Kim (1992) based on an analogy 
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with jade to claim the dispositions of macro objects such as fragility and solubility 
are not single properties and as such there is no single property to be multiply 
realised. 
 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson appear to be on strong empirical grounds when they 
claim that a disposition is realised by multiple causal bases. The dispositions and 
powers of everyday macro objects, such as, say, fragility, solubility and elasticity, 
are wide-ranging and broad groupings. Ming vases, glass panes, ecological 
systems and spider webs are all fragile. Yet it would be highly surprising to 
discover that such diverse and disparate entities all possess the one and same 
causal basis. Fragility has every appearance of being multiply realised. A similar 
story can be told about solubility. Sugar and salt differ in molecular structure, yet 
both possess the same dispositional property of solubility. Hence, the property of 
solubility appears to be multiply realised. 
 
Multiply realised entities such as pain are as diverse and disparate 
as the disjunct of their realising properties  
Kim thinks appearances are deceptive in these cases (Kim 1992:3). He contends 
we have not fully appreciated the implications of multiple realisation. When 
followed far enough, the implication is that pain (or any multiply realised entity, 
such as fragility or solubility) has no more unity than the group of entities that 
realise it. In other words, if pain is multiply realised, then pain is not a single, 
unitary property. 
 
Kim uses an analogy with jade to make his point that pain is as disjunctive and 
diverse a property as its realising bases. Remember, jade is not a mineral kind, 
rather jade is two distinct minerals — jadeite and nephrite. 
“If pain is nomically equivalent to N [a disjunct Nh, Nr, and Nm], the 
property claimed to be wildly disjunctive and obviously nonnomic, why 
isn't pain itself equally heterogeneous and nonnomic as a kind? Why isn’t 
pain’s relationship to its realization bases, Nh, Nr, and Nm analogous to 
jade's relationship to jadeite and nephrite?” (Kim 1992:15) 
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Just as jade is multiply realised by both jadeite and nephrite and so is not a single 
property, so too pain is multiply realised and is not single property.  
 
Kim also dismisses functionalist responses to multiple realisation. The point of 
multiple realisation arguments, and the functionalist response, is that pain has 
more than one property that meets the functional specification of pain. The need 
for a functional account of pain is an admission that pain is a disjunction of 
similar yet distinct properties and not a single property. As Kim notes: 
“Thus, on the construal of mental properties as second-order [functional] 
properties, mental properties will in general turn out to be disjunctions of 
their physical realization bases. It is difficult to see how one could have it 
both ways — that is, to castigate Nh v Ni v Nm as unacceptably 
disjunctive while insisting on the integrity of pain as a scientific kind.” 
(Kim 1992:15) 
According to Kim’s line of reasoning here, if fragility is multiply realised, then 
fragility is as diverse, disparate and disjunctive a property as the group of 
properties that realise fragility. To claim that fragility is multiply realised, as 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson do, is to admit that fragility is not a single, unitary 
property. However, if pain is not a single, unitary property, then there is no 
property of pain to be multiply realised, just as there is no single property of 
single property of jade.  
 
Arguments that there are no disjunctive properties   
So far, Kim has argued multiply-realised entities, such as fragility, are as diverse 
and disparate as the disjunction of properties that realise them. The next step is 
show why such a diverse and disparate disjunction of properties is not itself a 
property and, as such, to show why fragility and other multiply-realised 
properties are not real properties. 
 
Armstrong, a well-known critic of disjunctive properties, starts by noting that by 
a disjunctive property he means a disjunction of (property) universals (Armstrong 
1989a:82ff; 1989b:114-15 ). Armstrong asks us to consider the disjunctive 
property having charge C or mass M. Now consider two objects: One has charge 
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C but lacks mass M, the other has mass M but lacks charge C. Both objects 
possess the disjunctive property having charge C or mass M. From this 
Armstrong concludes: 
“But surely that does not show that, in any serious sense, they thereby 
have something identical? The whole point of a universal [aka a 
property], however, is that it should be identical in all different instances.” 
(Armstrong 1989a:82 ) 
Armstrong’s argument may appear limited in its scope to only those that view 
properties as universals and identical in all their instances. However I think his 
argument has broader appeal to any theory of properties that involves sameness, 
similarity or identity, be it in terms of universals, tropes or otherwise. A trope 
theorist can meaningfully ask if two objects resemble each other. Trope theorists 
explain particular property instances falling into natural groups or types in terms 
of exact resemblance which is a primitive concept. The fact that resemblance is a 
primitive concept for the trope theorist does not preclude questions of whether 
two entities resemble each other.  
 
Armstrong provides another argument, based on “powers to act”, against 
disjunctive properties: 
“Now suppose a thing has charge C but lacks mass M. In virtue of charge 
C, it has certain powers to act. For instance, it repels things with like 
charge. Possession of the disjunctive property C or M adds nothing to its 
powers. This suggests that while C may be a genuine universal [property], 
C or M is not.” (Armstrong 1989a:82) 
Here Armstrong ties properties to powers. Charge C is a genuine property in 
virtue of its powers. But the disjunctive property C or M adds no more powers 
and hence is not a property. 
 
We also find Heil (2003:40) and Kim (1992:11-12) arguing against disjunctive 
properties and kinds respectively, on the ground they are not projectible. Kim 
asks us to consider jade. Take the claim: 
(L) Jade is green 
Is this a law? There are two marks of lawlikeness: 
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i. Supports counterfactuals 
ii. Projectible 
Jade is green satisfies (i). It supports the counterfactual “If something was jade, 
then it would be green”. Why? Because both jadeite and nephrite are green. 
 
But jade is green is not projectible. Kim’s argues: 
“For we can imagine this: on re-examining the records of past 
observations, we find, to our dismay, that all the positive instances of (L), 
that is, all the millions of observed samples of green jade, turn out to have 
been samples of jadeite, and none of nephrite! If this should happen, we 
clearly would not, and should not, continue to think of (L) as well 
confirmed.” (Kim 1992:12) 
Kim sees this failure of projectibility as a part of a more general problem with 
disjunctive properties — they do not guarantee similarity of instances falling 
under them. In the jade example, our observations merely confirm that jadeite is 
green, not that jade is green.21 
 
In the above discussion I have treated a disjunctive property as a disjunction of 
properties. What if we take the disjunction Nh, Ni, Nm as the single physical 
substrate of pain, say N. In such a case, fragility is not realised by the disjunction 
of properties Nh or Ni or Nm. Rather fragility is realised by N a single property, 
a single disjunctive property. Let us put aside doubts about the very existence or 
intelligibility of such singular disjunctive properties.22 Even if we accept such 
suspect properties, they are of no help to Prior, Pargetter and Jackson in 
defending the multiple realisation of dispositions. If fragility is realised by a single 
disjunctive property, then fragility is not multiply realised. Rather, it is realised by 
one property. 
 
                     
21 Kim also sees closure as a problem for disjunctive properties: 
“The point about disjunctive properties is best put as a closure condition on properties: 
the class of properties is not closed under disjunction (presumably, nor under negation). 
Thus, there may well be properties P and Q such that P or Q is also a property, but its 
being so doesn't follow from the mere fact that P and Q are properties.” (Kim 1992:13) 
22 Kim and Armstrong have argued that a disjunction of properties is not a property. If a 
disjunction of properties is not a property, then it is not a singular property. Heil goes so far as to 
declare that such a single disjunctive property is an oxymoron (Heil 2003:40 fn1). 
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So far it has been argued that multiply-realised entities, such as fragility, are as 
diverse and disparate as the disjunction of properties that realise them. I have 
now argued that a disjunction of properties is not itself a property. It follows that 
supposedly multiply-realised dispositional properties such as fragility and 
solubility are not single unitary properties and as such there is no such single 
property as fragility to be multiply realised.23 Multiply-realised structure-
unrestricted dispositions of macro objects, such as fragility and solubility are too 
diverse and disparate to be real, single properties. This serves as a general 
criticism of all multiple realisation arguments and so is an argument against 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s claim that dispositional types are multiply realised. 
Structure-unrestricted dispositional types, such as fragility, are not multiply 
realised because fragility is not a real, single property. A crucial premise in Prior, 
Pargetter and Jackson’s multiple realisation argument for the distinctness thesis is 
false — fragility is not multiply realised. Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s multiple 
realisation argument for the distinctness thesis is unsound and gives us no reason 
to hold that a disposition and its causal basis are distinct. 
 
Species and structure-specific identities 
As Kim notes, his argument against multiply-realisation arguments does not 
entail there are no pains, only that there are no species-unrestricted pains (Kim 
1992:25). For Kim, mental properties are species-specific. There is, say, human 
pain, Martian pain, canine pain etc. 24 Presumably, when we reach properties 
                     
23 Lewis, in defending his account of causation, also expresses similar misgivings about the unity 
of dispositions. He claims that the dispositions and powers of macro objects (such as fragility and 
solubility) are inefficacious because they are “too unnatural a property, too disjunctive…to figure 
in the conditions of occurence of any event”. (Lewis 1983:370 fn29). 
24 The claim that mental properties are species or structure specific does not originate with Kim. 
Lewis(1969) argues that reductive identities are always domain-specific. Lewis (1983) also uses 
“sophisticated functionalism” to argue for structure-specific reductions and to defend type identity 
of mental states and physical states.  
In Lewis(1976) we find similar sentiments. Lewis argues that powers and abilities are not 
unrestricted. Rather, abilities and powers are tied to the notion of what is compossible with 
certain facts. That is, they are relative to a certain domain of facts, fixed by the context. For 
example, relative to one set of facts, Lewis can speak Finnish: 
“An ape can’t speak a human language – say, Finnish – but I can. Facts about the 
anatomy and operation of the ape’s larynx and nervous system are not compossible with 
his speaking Finnish. The corresponding facts about my larynx and nervous system are 
compossible with my speaking Finnish.” (Lewis 1976 232)  
However, Lewis’ speaking Finnish is not compossible with another, more inclusive, set of facts: 
But don’t take me along to Helsinki as your interpreter. I can’t speak Finnish. My 
speaking Finnish is compossible with the facts considered so far, but not with further 
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that are not multiply realised we have reached the relevant specificity of species 
or structure.  
 
Similarly, the supposed multiple realisation of dispositions, such as, say, solubility 
and fragility does not entail there are no fragile objects. Rather multiple 
realisation shows no properties answer to such general, structure-unrestricted 
dispositional concepts as solubility and fragility, at least at the macro level. 
Rather, there are structure-restricted dispositional concepts such as, say, sugar-
solubility, salt-solubility etc. These are local reductions or identities to the 
physical mechanisms of a given structure-type. It is up to the empirical sciences 
to determine what these structure-types are. The significant point is that these 
structure-specific properties are not multiply realised.  
 
This concludes my argument that Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s multiple-
realisation argument fails to establish that a disposition and it causal basis are 
distinct. I now turn to the question of why Prior, Pargetter and Jackson draw the 
wrong conclusion from the multiple realisation of fragility. That is, why do Prior, 
Pargetter and Jackson insist, in the face of multiple realisation, that fragility is a 
single property? Heil contends that multiple-realisation arguments, and 
concomitant appeals to functionalism, are underpinned by the Picture Theory. 
Heil (2003:5) claims that metaphysics, at least since Kant, has been influenced by 
an implicit adherence to the picture theory of representation: 
“As I conceive of it, the Picture Theory is not a single, unified doctrine, 
but a family of loosely related doctrines. The core idea is that the 
character of reality can be ‘read off’ our linguistic representations of 
reality…A corollary of the Picture Theory is the idea that to every 
meaningful predicate there corresponds a property.” (Heil 2003:6) 
                                                        
facts about my lack of training. What I can do relative to one set of facts, I cannot do, 
relative to another, more inclusive, set. Whenever the context leaves it open which facts 
are to count as relevant, it is possible to equivocate about whether I can speak Finnish.” 
(Lewis 1976 232) 
It would seem to follow that the powers and dispositions of an object are determined by what 
facts count as relevant and that objects only possess powers and dispositions relative to a certain 
set of facts. So long as the set of facts is not fully specified, these abilities and powers may be 
equivocal. 
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According to this corollary of the picture theory, if a single predicate “fragile” 
truly applies to a number of entities, then there must be a corresponding single, 
common property of fragility possessed by these entities. However, as argued in 
chapter 3.2, predicates and properties are not isomorphic. The picture theory is 
false: We cannot “read off” the character of reality from our linguistic 
representation of the world as the picture theory demands.  
 
We do not need to hunt for any such implicit assumptions to find what underpins 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson claim that fragility is a single unitary property. The 
counterfactual definition of dispositions explicitly motivates Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson claim that fragility is a single property common to all and only fragile 
objects. To analyse dispositional terms such as “fragile” on the grounds of inputs 
(that is stimulus conditions) and outputs (that is, manifestations) is to group 
together a range of entities on the grounds that they would exhibit similar 
behavior under similar circumstances. The counterfactual definition of 
dispositions drives Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s claim that fragility is a single 
property common to all and only fragile entities. However, the counterfactual 
definition is false. There are object that would shatter if struck that are not fragile 
and there are fragile objects that would not shatter if struck. This is just to say 
that the truth of a counterfactual statement is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
an entity to possess a particular disposition.  
 
The false counterfactual definition of dispositions groups together a diverse range 
of entities do not share any single common property, such as fragility or 
solubility. Just as we cannot move from the fact that we truly apply a single 
predicate to a range of objects to the conclusion that these objects possess a 
single, common property, so too we cannot move from the fact that a 
counterfactual statement is true of a range of entities to the conclusion that these 
objects possess a single, common dispositional property. A false semantics of 
dispositions in the form of the counterfactual definition of dispositions motivates 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s multiple realisation argument for the distinctness 
thesis by grouping together a diverse range of objects as being fragile that do not 
share a single common property of fragility.  
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Conclusion  
This chapter has looked at two arguments by Prior, Pargetter and Jackson for the 
distinctness thesis, the claim that a disposition and its causal basis are distinct 
properties. Section one showed that Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s modal 
argument for the distinctness thesis is unsound. I argued that a faulty semantics of 
dispositional terms and ascriptions, in the form of the counterfactual definition of 
dispositions, underpins their modal argument. Sections two and three looked at 
multiple-realisation arguments by Prior, Pargetter and Jackson and Rives for the 
distinctness thesis. I argued, following Mumford, that Prior, Pargetter and 
Jackson’s argument that dispositional types are multiply realised does not entail 
the distinctness thesis and so is invalid. I also pointed out that Rives’ argument in 
defence of Prior, Pargetter and Jackson is unsound. Finally, I used Kim to 
criticise the very program of multiple-realisation arguments. I argued that 
multiple-realisation arguments demonstrate there is no single unitary property of 
fragility to be multiply realised.  
 
At the heart of arguments for the distinctness thesis is a confusion between how 
we talk about the world and how the world is. Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s 
multiple realisation argument for the distinctness thesis mistakenly groups 
together a diverse range of entities on the grounds that a certain counterfactual 
statement is true of them. They then use the fact that this diverse range of entities 
does not share a common causal basis to claim that a disposition and its causal 
basis are distinct. However, this is to mistake the way we pick out and refer to 
dispositional properties for the way these properties are. In particular, the false 
counterfactual definition of dispositions used by Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 
confuses the manner in which we fix the reference of dispositional terms for the 
meaning of those terms. This faulty semantics of dispositions underpins both their 
modal argument and multiple realisation argument for the distinctness thesis. 
Counterfactual statements are useful as a defeasible, rough and ready way to pick 
out dispositions. But to think that these counterfactuals give the meaning of 
dispositional terms and ascriptions is a mistake. It is a mistake that leads Prior, 
Pargetter and Jackson to make unwarranted and unsupported claims about the 
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nature of dispositions. Prior, Pargetter and Jackson fail to provide any reason to 
conclude that a disposition and its causal basis are distinct. 
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Chapter 4.2 — Pure powers and dispositional essentialism  
4.2.1 The pure powers view  
• Dispositional essentialism 
• Essentially dispositional powers are necessary  
• Laws of nature are metaphysically necessary 
o What laws are there? 
o Finks show laws admit exceptions and so are not necessary 
4.2.2 Arguments for pure powers and dispositional essentialism 
• Bird’s argument to the best explanation for dispositional essentialism 
o Categoricalism provides an inadequate account of properties 
§ First epistemic arguments against categorical accounts of 
properties — permutation argument 
§ Second epistemic arguments against categorical accounts 
of properties — duplication argument 
• These arguments are metaphysical, not epistemic 
and they beg the question 
o Categoricalism provides an inadequate account of laws 
§ Regularity theory account of laws 
• Dispositional essentialism open to same criticism 
§ Nomic necessitation account of laws 
• Dispositional essentialism open to same criticism 
o Criticism of argument to the best explanation 
• Arguments from science for dispositional essentialism 
o Particle physicists have not found structure in fundamental 
particles 
§ Headless woman fallacy 
o Physicists uses only dispositional terms 
§ Conflates the way we fix the reference of dispositional 
terms for the meaning of those terms  
4.2.3 Arguments against pure powers 
• Truth-making regress 
• Epistemic regress 
• Individuation regress 
o Bird’s response: powers modelled as graphs 
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4.2.1 Pure powers and dispositional essentialism — introduction 
This section explores the pure powers view and dispositional essentialist accounts 
of properties. It is divided into three parts. Part one introduces the pure powers 
view — properties are solely or purely dispositional — and shows how it entails 
dispositional essentialism and the necessity of causal laws.  
Part two examines two arguments for dispositional essentialism and the existence 
of pure powers. The first is an argument to the best explanation. Bird (2007) 
claims that to deny dispositional essentialism (and so adopt categoricalism) is to 
forego an adequate account of properties and causal laws. I argue that Bird fails 
to show dispositional essentialism provides a superior account of properties and 
fails the test by which arguments to the best explanation are judged. The second 
is an a posteriori argument from science. The findings of particle physics suggests 
that fundamental particles are simple, pointlike and lacking in structure. This is 
thought to support dispositional essentialism’s claims that powers are purely 
dispositional and possess essences. I show that this line of reasoning commits the 
headless women fallacy (Armstrong 1968) and so should be rejected. It is also 
argued that the use of solely dispositional terms, such as “spin” and “charge”, to 
characterise and talk about the properties of fundamental particles entails that 
these properties are solely dispositional. To draw such a conclusion is to confuse 
and conflate how we talk about the world for the nature of the world. The 
properties of fundamental particles are characterised using dispositional terms 
and discovered using dispositional means. However, it is wrong to conclude that 
these properties are therefore purely dispositional. I conclude that these 
arguments fail to support Bird’s claim that the properties of fundamental particles 
are pure powers with dispositional essences. 
Part three presents criticism of the pure powers view. I examine three regress 
arguments that arise due to the relational nature of properties as pure powers. I 
argue that the individuation regress shows the pure powers view is incoherent 
and so should be rejected. I conclude that we should reject the pure powers view 
of dispositions.  
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Pure powers view 
The pure powers view can be simply stated: Properties are solely or purely 
powers in that properties are nothing more than their power to effect and be 
affected by other properties. Properties are purely dispositional. 
Paradigm examples of pure powers are the properties of fundamental particles, 
such as the mass, charge and spin of an electron.25 On the pure powers view, the 
property of negative charge is nothing more than the power it confers, nothing 
more than how it acts upon and interact with other properties. Specifically, there 
is nothing more to the property of negative charge than repelling like charged 
entities and attracting oppositely charged entities. 
 
Given that properties are nothing more than their power to effect and be affected 
by other properties, it follows that the pure powers view is a relational view of 
properties. As Bird notes: 
“According to dispositional essentialism [pure powers] properties have 
distinct natures, given by their relations with other properties.” (Bird 
2007:3) 
The nature of a property is determined solely by its relations with other 
properties, by how it acts and interacts with other properties. The nature of a 
these other properties are in turn nothing over and above their relations, their 
actions and interactions, with other properties, and so on. On the pure powers 
view, the nature and identity of properties appears to involve a regress. In section 
3 of this chapter I ask whether this is indeed a regress and whether it is vicious.26  
                     
25 Bird refers to as these as “fundamental properties of physics” (Bird 2007:5). While Ellis and 
Lierse refer to them as properties of “the most fundamental kinds of things” (Ellis and Lierse 
1994:29). 
26 Jennifer McKitrick argues for “bare powers”, a closely related view to pure powers, and one 
that stresses the ungrounded nature of powers (McKitrick 2003b). The bare powers view 
contrasts itself with categoricalism, which argues that powers and dispositions possess categorical 
causal bases. It is important to note that the bare powers view rejects distinct bases, and not bases 
tout court. In this, the bare powers view appears to differ from the pure powers view, which rejects 
causal bases tout court, as bases would constitute something over and above the causal powers that 
property confers on its bearer. It is also worth noting that the bare powers view leaves open the 
possibility that a disposition or power, say, D, is self-grounded, in that D is ontologically sufficient 
for its own nature and being. In other words, the bare powers view leaves open the possibility that 
dispositions can be their own causal bases (McKitrick 2003b:fn28 358). That is, it leaves open the 
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The pure powers view denies that a property has a nature that determines how it 
acts. Rather, how a property acts and interacts with other properties determines 
its nature. In this, pure powers may be contrasted with the impure powers of 
macroscopic objects, such as the solubility of sugar. Sugar has a nature — a 
certain molecular structure — that explains how it acts and interacts with other 
objects and properties. The weak intermolecular bonds of sugar explain why 
sugar forms a solution when placed in water. 
 
There are at least three variants of the pure powers view. They differ as to what 
properties are counted as pure and essential powers. The first is dispositional 
monism or pan-dispositionalism. It contends that all genuine properties are 
powers. As powers are pure, it follows that all genuine properties are pure 
powers. Prominent exponents include Popper (1959), Shoemaker (1980, 1998) 
and Mellor (1974). 
A second variation is natural kind dispositional essentialism. It claims the 
properties of fundamental objects and natural kinds are pure powers (and so 
essentially dispositional). Bird (2007) is the chief proponent of natural kind 
dispositional essentialism. It should be noted that pan-dispositionalism collapses 
into natural kind dispositional essentialism if the domain of genuine properties is 
restricted to the properties of fundamental objects and natural kinds. 
The third variation of the pure powers view, expounded by Ellis (2001) and Ellis 
and Lierse (1994), is known as Weak Essentialism or the mixed view. Its chief 
claim is that the properties of fundamental properties (such as the charge, spin 
and mass of electrons) are pure powers. While higher-order objects (such as 
macroscopic objects including chairs, tables and trees, etc.) possess properties that 
are not pure powers.  
Dispositional essentialism 
                                                        
possibility that a bare disposition has no causal basis in any further properties beyond the 
disposition (McKitrick 2003b; Molnar 2003:137; Bauer 2010). 
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In advocating that powers are pure, Bird (2007) and Ellis and Lierse (1994) are 
committed to dispositional essentialism. Bird characterises dispositional 
essentialism as follows: 
“To say that a property has a dispositional essence or is essentially 
dispositional is to say first that that property has some essence that may be 
characterised dispositionally.” (Bird 2007:45) 
Bird makes two claims here about properties: one, that properties possess 
essences or essential natures and two, that these essential natures are 
dispositional. It follows that properties are individuated by their dispositional 
essences. We can elaborate on these central claims of dispositional essentialism by 
noting that the properties of fundamental objects, such as the charge, mass and 
spin of electrons are causal properties. As such, dispositional essentialism may be 
recast as claiming that properties possess essential causal roles and are 
individuated by their causal roles. I will refer to this view as property dispositional 
essentialism. 
 
To put these claims in more concrete terms, let us consider charge. If the 
ontology of dispositional essences includes charge, and charge has the causal role 
of repelling like charges, then repelling like charges is essential to the property of 
charge and is what makes charge the property it is, rather than some other 
property. Furthermore, there is nothing more to property of charge than this 
causal role of repelling like charges.  
 
Bird also characterises dispositional essential properties in terms of their stimulus-
response conditions (Bird 2007:7). Accordingly, we may represent properties as 
such: 
D(S,M) 
where D stands for disposition, S for stimulus and M for manifestation. This 
brings out the point that the causal role and identity of a property is given by its 
stimulus and manifestation conditions. The essential nature and identity of 
disposition D is constituted by, fixed and exhausted by the stimulus and 
manifestation conditions it enters into. For example, the property of fragility is 
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constituted by and has its essential nature fixed by its stimulus conditions of 
dropping and its manifestation condition of breaking.  
 
We can represent the fact that the stimulus-response relation holds between these 
three properties of fragility (F), dropping (P) and breaking (B) as: 
SR[(F,P),B] 
To characterise properties in terms of their stimulus-response conditions brings 
out the relational, networked nature of properties. In the case of fragility, there 
are three properties at play — the disposition fragility, the stimulus condition 
being dropped, and the manifestation condition breaking or shattering — that 
are linked to each other by the stimulus-response relation. These properties of 
fragility, being dropped and breaking or shattering are constituted by and have 
their essential nature fixed by the stimulus-response conditions they enter into — 
that is, by their relation with other properties. These properties in turn are 
constituted by and have their essential nature fixed by the stimulus-response 
conditions they enter into, and so on. What it is to be a property is to be part of a 
vast network of other properties: 
“Think of all the natural properties and all the SR-relations they enter 
into with respect to each other. They form a vast network. Each property 
p has a position in that network. That position will be one that uniquely 
identifies the property p [on the condition this structure is 
asymmetrical].” (Barker and Smart 2012:717) 
 
Ellis and Lierse (1994) extend dispositional essentialism to also include objects 
and object kinds. They claim that fundamental objects and kinds, not merely 
properties, possess dispositional essences. That is, both fundamental properties 
(such as charge) and fundamental objects (such as electrons) possess their powers 
essentially:  
“What makes something an electron, for example, is its causal powers, 
capacities and propensities. An electron is not some thing which can be 
identified independently of these. On the contrary, what an electron is 
disposed to do, e.g., how it is disposed to interact with fields and other 
particles, is what makes it the kind of thing it is. A particle is an electron if 
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and only if it is disposed to behave as an electron does. Its dispositional 
properties are of its essence.” (Ellis and Lierse 1994:32-33) 
According to Ellis and Lierse, the essence of an electron — what makes an 
electron an electron — is determined by its causal powers, by the causal role it 
plays and how it acts and interacts with other entities. I will refer to this view as 
object dispositional essentialism in order to distinguish it from the property 
dispositional essentialism advocated by Bird. 
 
Dispositional essences are necessary 
Both property and object dispositional essentialism entails necessity. If a 
property’s powers are essential, as property dispositional essentialism contends, 
then these powers are also necessarily possessed by that property. Likewise, if an 
object or object kind’s properties are essential, as object dispositional essentialism 
contends, then these properties are also necessary properties of the object or 
object kind. This follows from the general principle that essence entails 
necessity.27 As Bird notes, in the case of property dispositional essentialism:  
                     
27 As noted above, the relationship between essence and necessity is such that if a is essentially F, 
then a is necessarily F. However, the converse does not hold as a general principle. All essential 
properties of an object are necessary properties, but not all necessary properties of an object are 
essential properties of that object. There may be necessary properties (possessed by an object in 
all possible worlds that it exists) that do not constitute an object’s identity. Kit Fine (1994) 
provides two examples of necessary but accidental (that is, non-essential) properties. In the first 
example, Fine argues that membership in the singleton set {Socrates} is necessary but not 
essential to Socrates: 
“Consider, then, Socrates and the set whose sole member is Socrates. It is then 
necessary, according to standard views within modal set theory, that Socrates belongs to 
singleton Socrates if he exists; for, necessarily, the singleton exists if Socrates exists and, 
necessarily, Socrates belongs to singleton Socrates if both Socrates and the singleton 
exist. It therefore follows according to the modal criterion that Socrates essentially 
belongs to singleton Socrates. 
“But, intuitively, this is not so. It is no part of the essence of Socrates to belong to the 
singleton. Strange as the literature on personal identity may be, it has never been 
suggested that in order to understand the nature of a person one must know to which set 
she belongs. There is nothing in the nature of a person, if I may put it this way, which 
demands that he belongs to this or that set or which demands, given that the person 
exists, that there even be any sets.” (Fine 1994:4-5) 
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“Essentially dispositional properties are ones that have the same 
dispositional character in all possible worlds.” (Bird 2007:44) 
To possess the same dispositional character in all possible worlds is just to possess 
those dispositional charactersistics necessarily. 
 
We can make a similar argument for necessity in the case of object dispositional 
essentialism. We may define essential and necessary properties as follows: 
DF essent: F is an essential property of a iff being F constitutes the identity 
of a. 
DF nec: F is a necessary property of a iff a has F in all possible world in 
which a exists. 
It is clear from these definitions that essence entails necessity for object 
dispositional essentialism. If F is an essential property of a and so constitutes the 
identity of a, then it follows that all possible worlds in which a exists must also be 
worlds in which a is F, thereby satisfying our definition of necessity. 
                                                        
 
In the second example Fine argues that it is necessary, but not essential, that Socrates and the 
Eiffel Tower are distinct: 
“Consider two objects whose natures are unconnected, say Socrates and the Eiffel 
Tower. Then it is necessary that Socrates and the Tower be distinct. But it is not 
essential to Socrates that he be distinct from the Tower; for there is nothing in his nature 
which connects him in any special way to it.” (Fine 1994:5) 
This shows there is a distinction between essence and necessity. It shows that “essential” and 
“necessary” are not interchangeable terms.   
 
However, Bird suggests there is no such distinction between necessary and essential properties at 
the level of fundamental properties, where powers are dispositional essences and pure. For Bird, 
at the level of fundamental properties, a is necessarily F if and only if a is essentially F. He 
contends that it is only at the level of non-fundamental properties that it is not the case that if a is 
necessarily F, then a is essentially F: 
“Since there is a distinction between necessarily and essentially, there could in theory be 
properties that are necessarily dispositional but not essentially dispositional. In fact I 
think that being aqueous necessarily confers the power to dissolve salt on its instances, 
but does not have that character essentially. But I doubt any fundamental properties are 
like this.” (Bird 2007:98 fn64)] 
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Heil makes a further argument that property dispositional essentialism entails the 
necessity of dispositional essences. Heil views Bird’s commitment to necessary 
powers and dispositional essentialism as following from the purity of powers. Heil 
argues that if properties are purely powers, then properties and powers cannot 
co-vary and so are identical and necessary: 
“If properties are powers [and so are dispositional essences], however, 
there could be no question of its being contingent that a given property 
confers a given power; if all there is to the property is the power it confers, 
there is no prospect of powers and properties varying independently…” 
(Heil 2003:75-76) 
Heil is surely right to conclude that property kinds and powers kinds cannot vary 
independently and so are necessary, on the assumption that all there is to a 
property is the pure power it confers. This claim is no more than the necessity of 
identity — a property is the pure power it confers.  
 
Laws of nature are metaphysically necessary 
Dispositional essentialism, in both its property and object forms, also entails the 
metaphysical necessity of causal laws. Arguments for the necessity of causal laws 
put forward by both Bird and Ellis and Lierse are based on two fundamental 
claims:  
i. The causal powers that a property confers on its instances (or that a 
property confers on an object) are essential (and so necessary) to the 
property or object. (Dispositional essentialism) 
ii. The causal laws describe the causal powers associated with properties (or 
objects possessing properties). 
It follows from these two premises that causal laws are necessary.28 This 
argument for the metaphysical necessity of causal laws is only as strong as the 
                     
28 It is worth noting that the dispositions and powers of fundamental objects are causal powers. As 
such, this argument for the necessity of laws is an argument only for the necessity of causal laws. If 
there are laws of nature that are not causal, then this argument fails to establish that they are 
necessary. 
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premise that properties have their associated causal powers (in the case of 
property dispositional essentialism) or that objects have the properties they do 
essentially and necessarily (in the case of object dispositional essentialism). That 
is, the argument for the necessity of causal laws is only as strong as the arguments 
for dispositional essentialism.  
 
Ellis and Lierse (1994) argue that object dispositional essentialism entails 
necessary causal laws. Their argument assumes the transworld identity of powers. 
It has the form of a reductio ad absurdum and starts by assuming the negation of 
what it intends to prove — that laws of nature are contingent: 
(P1) If the laws of nature are contingent then there are possible worlds 
where particulars can have different dispositions to the ones they have in 
the actual world. (Proposition) 
(P2) The dispositions of fundamental kinds, such as electrons, cannot vary 
from world to world without loss of identity of the fundamental kind. 
(Object dispositional essentialism)  
Therefore: 
(C1) There cannot be a possible world where the laws of nature differ 
from the actual laws. (P1, P2, reduction) 
Therefore: 
(C2) The laws of nature are necessary.  
This argument appears to be valid. If premise P2 — which is simply a statement 
of object dispositional essentialism — is true, then it follows that the laws of 
nature are necessary.  
 
Ellis has a second argument for the necessity of causal laws based on object 
dispositional essentialism (Ellis 2002:1-5): 
(P1) The essential properties of a natural kind could not be otherwise. 
(Object dispositional essentialism) 
(P2) Laws are concerned with the essential properties of natural kinds. 
(Proposition)  
(C) So too the laws of nature could not be otherwise. (P1, P2)  
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To flesh this argument out with an example, consider the natural kind electron 
and its essential property of being negatively charged. Things could not be 
otherwise — if the entity in question is not negatively charged, then it is not an 
electron. This is a statement of object dispositional essentialism as applied to 
fundamental objects. But how do we move from this statement of dispositional 
essentialism to the necessity of causal laws? That work appears to be left to P2 
and the “concerned with” relation. Laws are “concerned with” the essential 
properties of natural kinds. Being “concerned with” is a rather vague relation. 
But it is clear what is intended — in some sense, laws “flow from” or are fixed by 
natural kind properties and this guarantees that the “could not be otherwise” 
nature of the essential properties of natural kinds applies to laws. 
 
We find a similar argument in Bird, claiming that property dispositional 
essentialism entails metaphysically necessary laws of nature: 
“According to this view [property dispositional essentialism] laws are not 
thrust upon properties, irrespective, as it were, of what those properties 
are. Rather the laws spring from within the properties themselves. The 
essential nature of a property is given by its relations with other 
properties. It wouldn’t be that property unless it engaged in those 
relations. Consequently those relations cannot fails to hold (except by the 
absence of the properties altogether, if that is possible). The laws of nature 
are thus metaphysically necessary.” (Bird 2007:2)    
Bird’s argument here sheds light on the crux of the argument for necessary laws 
of nature — once the essential nature of properties is fixed (as decreed by 
property dispositional essentialism), then so too are the laws of nature. And just as 
the essential nature of properties is necessary, so too are the laws of nature. Bird 
considers this commitment to necessary causal laws as a virtue of the pure powers 
view, as we shall see below in the next section. 
 
Bird has made dispositions and powers the cement of the universe and by so 
doing has produced an anti-Humean ontology and account of causation and 
laws. Laws are not independent of the character of the properties they govern. 
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Rather, laws are dependent upon and determined by the essentially dispositional 
natures of properties. 
 
Dispositional essentialism provides an ontologically deflationary account of laws. 
Laws are not an ontologically addition on top of potencies possessing 
dispositional essences. Rather, once you assume dispositional essentialism then 
nothing more is needed for the existence of laws. This lead David Yates to 
describe the dispositional essentialist account of laws as providing “an ontological 
free lunch” (Yates 2013:105). Mumford goes one step further, calling for the 
“outlawing of laws” on the grounds that we only need posit dispositional essences 
(Mumford 2008:216-238).  
 
Mumford rejects laws for at least two reasons. One reason for outlawing laws is 
that they are redundant. If powers with dispositional essences explain and govern 
the existence of regularities, then there is no work for laws to do. Laws are otiose 
and redundant. To countenance the existence of laws and thus claim that laws 
explain and govern regularities is to accept that these regularities are 
overdetermined. Both laws and dispositional essences explain and govern 
regularities.  
 
Bird denies that there is a problem of overdetermination. He claims laws are 
supervenient features of the world — they supervene on the dispositional essences 
of powers — and that this saves laws from redundancy: 
“My response was that even if potencies do govern, that doesn’t require 
us to exclude laws. Laws in my view supervene on potencies, and so exist 
if potencies do.” (Bird 2007:202) 
I find Bird’s response unconvincing. His appeal to the supervenience of laws 
upon potencies may well give us reason to hold that laws exist. However, it does 
not address the issue of overdetermination. This is because the claim that laws 
and dispositional essences co-vary, as stipulated by the supervenience relation, 
has nothing to say about the governing role of laws.  
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A second reason for outlawing laws relates to their explanatory role. It is thought 
that real, genuine laws should explain and govern. However, Mumford argues 
that if laws are nothing more than or supervene upon the essences of properties, 
as dispositional essentialism contends, then they cannot in turn explain or govern 
those properties.29 The principle appealed to here is that something cannot 
explain or govern itself. Rather, there must be some metaphysical distance 
between the explanandum and explanans, between what governs and what is 
governed. 
 
Bird thinks Mumford’s claim — that something may not explain or govern that 
which it supervenes upon — is too strong (Bird 2007:196). He tentatively asserts 
that in virtue of this supervenience relation, laws are able to play an explanatory 
and governing role 
“Indeed, it is not obvious that this supervenience relation prevents laws 
from having at least an explanatory function, and, depending on what 
you think ‘governing’ amounts to, perhaps a governing role also.” (Bird 
2007:202) 
Bird backs his claim with an example of supervenience with governance: 
“Let us imagine that F determines or governs G but does not supervene 
on G. Now consider the mereological sum of F and G. Clearly F 
supervenes on that sum but determines part of it.” (Bird 2007:196) 
 
Bird’s claim that laws supervene on dispositional essences leads him to describe 
laws as epiphenomenal: 
“The dispositional essentialist view will regard the motor and cement of 
the universe as residing ultimately not in the laws themselves but rather in 
the dispositional nature of properties. The laws are, in a sense, 
epiphenomenal.” (Bird 2007: 47) 
It seems Bird views the supervenience relation — A supervenes upon B iff there 
cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference — as having parallels with 
                     
29 Mumford employs the same argument that Bird (2007:ch.4) levels against the Lewisian-
Humean regularity account of laws — that because such laws are identical with regularities they 
cannot explain those regularities or their instances. That is, laws cannot be constituted by what 
they explain or govern. 
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epiphenomenalism’s claim that mental events are caused by physical events, yet 
have no effects upon any physical events. But if this is the case, then it is hard to 
see how laws are supposed to explain or govern. Epiphenomenal mental events 
do not explain or govern physical events. Bird does qualify his claim that laws are 
epiphenomenal with the remark “in a sense”. Maybe we should not take Bird’s 
epiphenomenal comparison too literally.  
 
Nonetheless, I think Bird’s epiphenomenal remark points to a problem with his 
use of the supervenience relation to explain the relation between dispositional 
essences and laws. Supervenience is a particularly weak relation, too weak to 
ground Bird’s requirement that laws have an explanatory or governing role. Bird 
is caught in a bind. He wishes to make the relation between dispositional essences 
and laws weak enough to avoid that problem that something cannot be 
constituted by what they explain or govern. However, the relation needs to be 
strong enough to be explanatory. If the relation is too weak, then laws will not be 
able to explain or govern. Supervenience appears to be too weak a relation to 
met this requirement. 
 
Why not follow Mumford and outlaw laws? As we will see below, for Bird a 
crucial argument for dispositional essentialism is that it provides a robust account 
of laws. According to Bird, dispositional essentialism provides a superior account 
of laws to Armstrong’s nomic necessitarian and Lewisian-Humean regularity 
account of laws. If Bird follows Mumford and outlaws laws, then he must forgo 
his argument to the best explanation for dispositional essentialism. 
 
What laws are there? 
 We have looked at numerous arguments that dispositional essentialism entails 
necessary causal laws. What would a world of necessary laws look like? Bird 
sketches various possibilities.  
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On the assumption that at least some properties, namely the sparse, fundamental 
properties, have dispositional essences, partial necessitarianism about laws 
follows: 
(PNL) At least some of the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary 
This would result in a mixed view of laws: some laws are metaphysically 
necessary and explained as a consequence of dispositional essences, while some 
laws are not necessary and are explained as a consequence of say, regularity 
among properties or nomic necessitation between universals. Bird describes this 
mixed view of two classes of laws as “an untidy metaphysic” (Bird 2007:48). He 
suggests we embrace a unified account of laws: 
(U) Whatever it is, the true account of fundamental laws is a unified 
account 
If we take Bird’s suggestion and accept that a true account of fundamental laws is 
indeed unified, then (on the assumption that the laws of nature are fundamental 
laws or derivable from fundamental laws) a commitment to partial 
necessitarianism about laws becomes a commitment to full necessitarianism 
about laws: 
(FNL) All the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary  
There are two versions of full necessitarianism about laws:  
i. weak necessitarianism  
ii. strong necessitarianism  
Weak necessitarianism holds that the laws that exist in any possible world are 
necessary, but denies that every possible law need exist in every possible world. 
For example, if P is a law, then P is a necessary law. However, there may be 
worlds where P does not hold. As such, there may be worlds with different laws 
and hence different properties (given that laws “flow” from properties possessing 
dispositional essences).  
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Strong necessitarianism contends that laws are (i) necessary and (ii) hold in all 
possible worlds. This means that all possible worlds are indistinguishable with 
regards to what laws there are (and therefore also indistinguishable with regards 
to properties and dispositional essences). Bird characertises strong 
necessitarianism as committed to the claim that “any possible property [and so 
law] is actual” (Bird 2007:51).  
While Bird’s intent is easy to grasp — any possible law and any possible property 
is actual — it is nonetheless a slightly misleading claim. To characterise strong 
necessitarianism in terms of possible properties and laws is to assume what strong 
necessitarianism denies. According to strong necessitarianism, there are no 
properties or laws that exist in some worlds and not in others. That is, there are 
no possible laws or properties, only necessary laws and properties. It appears that 
strong necessitarianism about laws is too strong to ground or account for the 
semantics of Bird’s characterisation of strong necessitarianism. 
Is strong necessitarianism too strong? In everyday talk we use conditionals such 
as “if kangaroos had no tails, then they would topple over” to conceptualise the 
role that tails plays in keeping kangaroos upright. Similarly, science uses such talk 
of possible properties and entities as a way to conceptualise and explore the 
nature and interactions of properties and entities. Strong necessitarianism is too 
strong to make sense of our semantics for our talk about possible laws and 
properties.  
Problem for necessary laws — finks show laws admit of exception 
and so are not necessary 
As mentioned in chapter two, Martin (1994) introduces finks to argue against the 
conditional analysis of dispositions. A disposition is finkish when the stimulus 
conditions for its manifestation are the very conditions that may cause the object 
to lose or gain the disposition in question. Finks show that the truth of a 
counterfactual is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of a dispositional 
ascription. The existence of finks also entails that laws admit exceptions and so 
are not necessary. For example, suppose it is a necessary causal law that all vases 
shatter upon being struck. A fragility-finked vase will not shatter upon being 
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struck and so is a counterexample to the supposed law that necessarily all vases 
break upon being struck. 
Bird is rightly concerned that if finks exist, then it shows laws admit exceptions 
and so are not necessary (Bird 2007:60ff). If laws are not necessary, then Bird’s 
dispositional essentialist account of powers and dispositions cannot be true. Bird 
responds by arguing that only non-fundamental properties and powers are 
finkable. At the level of fundamental properties and powers there are no finks. As 
such, finks pose no challenge to dispositional essentialism. At the heart of Bird’s 
argument is the claim that finks require dispositional bases and a temporal space 
between stimulus and manifestation. 
Bird describes a finked property as involving the following machinations: 
“Let D, S and M be instances of a potency and its characteristic stimulus 
and manifestation in some object x. A case of finkishness would have to 
operate like this. The object x with D receives stimulus S. However, 
before manifestation M can occur, x is caused by a finkish intervention to 
lose D and so fails to manifest M.” (Bird 2007:60-61) 
The salient point here is that, according to Bird, finks operate in the temporal 
space between stimulus S and manifestation M.  
This temporal gap arises due to the existence of causal bases in non-fundamental 
dispositions. Bird fleshes out this account of how dispositions are realised with an 
example: 
“For in such a case the manifestation of the [non-fundamental] 
disposition will be a result of process involving its more-or-less complex 
causal basis — when for example the breaking of a vase is the outcome of 
forces, stresses and cracks spreading throughout the vase.” (Bird 2007:61) 
In this case, the causal basis gives rise to “stresses and cracks spreading 
throughout the vase”. These stresses and cracks presumably take time and so are 
not instantaneous. Moreover, they occur after the striking but before the 
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shattering, and so open the supposedly required temporal gap between stimulus 
and manifestation in which the fink may operate. For Bird the existence of a 
causal basis is the source of non-fundamental dispositions having non-
instantaneous manifestations.  
A necessary (and perhaps sufficient) condition for a disposition to be finkish is 
that an entity can gain of lose the dispositional power in question. Bird admits 
this is possible at the fundamental level: 
“electrons can be spin-up or spin-down and they can be caused to change 
from the one to the other.” (Bird 2007:60) 
This leads Bird to admit there “might be room for finkishness of fundamental 
properties.” (Bird 2007:60). 
However, Bird rules out such a possibility on the grounds that fundamental 
properties are pure powers lacking causal bases and therefore lacking the time 
gap between stimulus and manifestation in which a fink may operate: 
“But in the case of a fundamental property which by definition has no 
causal basis, it becomes mysterious why there should be a time gap 
between stimulus and manifestation…” (Bird 2007:61) 
For Bird, change in properties at the fundamental level is instantaneous. There is 
no time gap for finks to emerge. This leads Bird to declare that finkishness is not 
possible for fundamental properties, and so finks provide no reason to hold that 
causal laws are not necessary.  
I think Bird is wrong in his characterisation of finks. I counter that if the 
manifestation can be instantaneous with the stimulus conditions, as Bird 
contends, then so too can the actions of a fink. The general issue here is that any 
mechanism employed to rule out finks, such as instantaneous manifestation given 
the stimulus conditions, is also available to finks. If the manifestation can be 
instantaneous with the stimulus, then so too can the actions of the fink, which is 
just a different manifestation given the same stimulus conditions.  
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All that is required for the existence of finks is that an entity can gain or lose a 
power or disposition. Bird admits this is possible at the fundamental level. If an 
object can gain or lose a power and do so instantaneously, as Bird admits 
happens at the fundamental level, then an object can lose its power, for whatever 
reason, at the very instant of the stimulus condition. That would ensure the 
stimulus did not result in the excepted manifestation, which is just to say the 
power is finked.  
Bird’s argument fails to rule out finks at the level of fundamental properties. 
Nonetheless, I think there is still reason to hold that the dispositional essentialist’s 
account of properties is immune from finks and so there is no reason to doubt 
that causal laws are necessary.  
How would a supposedly finked property look on the dispositional essentialist 
account? According to dispositional essentialism, D(S,M) gives the nature and 
identity of a property. If the property D were finked, then the same stimulus 
conditions S would result in a different manifestation condition, say M’, giving us 
D(S,M’). However, this description cannot be correct. The nature and identity of 
a property is fixed by its stimulus-response conditions, that is, by the causal roles 
it enters into. It follows that this supposedly finked property D(S,M’) is actually a 
different property, say D’(S,M’). It appears that properties are immune from 
finking on conceptual grounds. Given the dispositional essentialist’s definition of 
a property, it is not possible for a property to have the same stimulus conditions 
and different manifestation conditions and remain the same property. For this 
reason, fundamental properties cannot be finked. 
Although fragility is not a fundamental property, it can still serve as an example 
to make this point. According to dispositional essentialism, the dispositional 
essence of a property is fixed by how it acts and interacts with other properties. 
Specifically, the nature and identity of the property fragility is fixed by its 
stimulus and manifestation conditions of striking and breaking, respectively. That 
means that any property that has the stimulus condition striking but lacks the 
manifestation conditions breaking is simply not an example of fragility, finked or 
otherwise. Rather, it is by definition a different property. If dispositional essences 
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determine the identities of properties, then how a thing acts and interacts 
determines its identity. Anything that does not act by breaking upon being struck 
simply is not fragile. This shows that fragility (imagined as a fundamental 
property with a dispositional essence for this example), by definition cannot be 
finked. Fundamental properties are not finkable and as such finks pose no threat 
to the dispositional essentialist’s claim that causal laws are necessary. 
The discussion of finks brings out an interesting point about the nature of 
dispositional essences and the necessity of causal laws. Dispositional essences and 
causal laws are supposed to be metaphysically necessary. However, the discussion 
of finks suggests that this necessity is conceptual. By definition a property cannot 
have a dispositional essence different to the dispositional essence it has. 
Mumford (2008:ch10.8) also charges that dispositional essentialism is committed 
to conceptual, rather than metaphysical, necessity, but for reasons unrelated to 
the analysis of finks. Mumford argues that for Ellis and Lierse the necessity of a 
fundamental entity’s dispositional essence and behaviour is conceptual, not 
metaphysical: 
“While it is certainly true that an electron would not be an electron if its 
behaviour were different from the behaviour it has in the actual world, 
this necessity is purely conceptual.” (Mumford 2008:237) 
He contends that Ellis and Lierse make a scope distinction mistake when arguing 
for the metaphysical necessity of dispositional essences and causal laws: 
“The Ellis/Lierse view involves a misunderstanding of the scope of the 
logical necessity involved. From the conceptual necessity 
☐∀x(x is an electron ↔ x has behaviour B) 
it does not follow, for any particular x, that x has behaviour B necessarily. 
That a particular possesses any disposition is logically contingent even 
though some particulars, such as electrons, would not have been classed 
as such if they had different behaviour. To deny this would be to claim 
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that an electron’s behaviour is dictated by logic and, presumably, physics 
is a trivially analytic human folly.” (Mumford 2008:237) 
Given this scope distinction mistake, Mumford thinks the move that Ellis and 
Lierse make from dispositional essentialism to the necessity of physical laws is 
contentious and unnecessary (Mumford 2008:237).  
4.2.2 Arguments for pure powers and dispositional essentialism 
So far I have introduced the pure powers view and shown it to entail 
dispositional essentialism and the necessity of causal laws. I now turn to examine 
two arguments for pure powers and dispositional essentialism:  
i. the argument to the best explanation  
ii. the argument from science.  
Bird’s argument to the best explanation contends that dispositional essentialism 
provides a more robust account of properties and laws than categoricalism (the 
denial of dispositional essentialism). I show that arguments claiming that 
dispositional essentialism provides a more robust account of properties and laws 
fail to establish the truth of their conclusions. I then demonstrate that even if we 
ignore these problems, Bird’s argument to the best explanation fails the cost 
benefit analysis by which we judge such arguments. I conclude that Bird’s 
argument to the best explanation fails to give us any reason to accept that 
properties are purely dispositional.   
 
There are two arguments from science. The first argues from the fact that 
particle physics has not found structure in fundamental particles to the 
conclusion that fundamental particles are simple and so their properties must be 
purely dispositional. This argument commits the headless woman fallacy and so 
should be rejected. The second argument from science argues from the fact that 
particle physics employs only dispositional terms to characterise the properties of 
fundamental particles to the conclusion that the properties of fundamental 
particles are purely dispositional. This argument confuses the manner in which 
we talk about properties with the nature of these properties. I conclude that 
arguments for the existence of pure powers and dispositional essentialism fail to 
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establish the truth of their conclusions. That is, these arguments fail to give any 
reason to hold that the properties of fundamental particles are purely 
dispositional.   
 
Bird’s argument to the best explanation for dispositional 
essentialism 
As just noted, Bird employs an argument to the best explanation in favour of 
dispositional essentialism. He argues that dispositional essentialism provides a 
more robust account of both properties and causal laws than categoricalism (the 
denial of dispositional essentialism) and so should be accepted.  
 
Bird employs two supposedly epistemic arguments in an attempt to show that 
categoricalism provides an inadequate account of properties. I demonstrate that 
the issue here is metaphysical not epistemic. The issue is over whether the nature 
of a property is exhausted by the causal role it occupies. Bird assumes that it is. 
But this is to assume what needs to be proved. Following this, Bird argues that 
categoricalism fails to give an adequate account of causal laws and so should be 
rejected in favour of dispositional essentialism. I show that the criticisms Bird 
levels against both regularity and nomic necessitation accounts of laws also befall 
dispositional essentialist accounts of causal laws. Putting these problems aside, I 
conclude that Bird’s argument to the best explanation in favour of dispositional 
essentialism fails the cost benefit analysis by which we judge arguments to the 
best explanation and so gives us no reason to accept that properties are purely 
dispositional.  
Categoricalism provides an inadequate account of properties 
Let us now turn to Bird’s two epistemic arguments that categoricalism fails to 
give an adequate account of properties. Bird defines categoricalism in negative 
terms as the denial of dispositional essentialism (Bird 2007:ch4). Categoricalism is 
the view that the fundamental natural properties lack dispositional, nomic and 
causal essences. Categorical properties possess powers and enter into nomic and 
causal causal relations with other properties, just as do properties with 
dispositional essences. However, the powers and relations possessed by 
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categorical properties are not necessary, but contingent and non-essential. Bird 
provides an example of categorical properties and their powers: 
“Properties are categorical in the following sense: they have no essential 
or other non-trivial modal character. For example, and in particular, 
properties do not, essentially or necessarily, have or confer any 
dispositional character or power. Being made of rubber confers elasticity 
on an object, but it does not do so necessarily. Being negatively charged 
confers on objects the power to repel other negatively charged objects, 
but not necessarily. In other possible worlds rubber objects are not elastic, 
negatively charged objects attract rather than repel one another.” (Bird 
2007:67) 
In this world, according to categoricalism, the property of being negatively 
charged confers the power to repel other negatively charged objects. But in 
another world, with different, contingent laws, being negatively charged confers 
the power to attract rather than repel other negatively charged objects. 
The fact that “properties do not, essentially or necessarily, have or confer any 
dispositional character or power” leads Bird to declare that: 
“the transworld identity of universals [properties] does not supervene on 
their qualitative properties, where now ‘qualitative’ means powers.” (Bird 
2007:72) 
The powers that properties possess are contingent and so the nomic and causal 
relations they enter into are also contingent. As a result, the powers and nomic 
and causal relations that properties possess fail to individuate and give the 
identity of properties. For this reason, Bird proclaims that categorical properties 
lack any non-trivial modal character. All there is to the identity and nature of a 
categorical property is its identity with itself and its distinctness from other 
properties. This means categorical properties are all essentially alike and differ 
only in their mutual distinctness. This is a thin notion of a property, one that 
according to Robert Black renders properties “intrinsically inert and self-
contained” (Black 2000 in Bird 2007:67).  
 
Such “thin” properties are termed “quiddities”. Bird regards it as a shortcoming 
of categoricalism that properties are quiddities and so fail to account for the 
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transworld identity of properties.30 In particular, Bird contends that quiddities 
lead to epistemic problems. 
 
Categoricalism’s commitment to quiddities makes the transworld identity of 
properties independent of any of the features in virtue of which we are capable of 
detecting them. According to categoricalism, the nature and identity of a 
property is independent of, and so not determined by, its causal roles. However, 
any feature of a property that renders it detectable and so knowable will be part 
of its causal role. It follows that if categoricalism is true, the identity of properties 
is independent of any features by which we can detect and know such properties. 
It follows that we cannot detect or know any properties. However, Bird counters 
that we do have knowledge of properties, and so categoricalism must be false. 
Bird mounts two sceptical arguments against categoricalism: the permutation 
arguent and the duplication argument.  
 
Epistemic argument one — the permutation argument against 
categoricalism 
Bird adapts Chisholm’s (1967) argument against haecceitism — the claim 
particulars lack essential properties, and hence that the transworld identity of 
particulars does not supervene on their qualitative features — and applies it to 
quiddities.  
Chisholm notes that if particulars are haecceities, then particulars can swap 
properties and still retain their identity. In such a case, there is a possible world 
wp that differs from the actual world wa in that in wp Adam has all the properties 
possessed by Noah in wa and Noah in wp has all the properties possessed by Adam 
in wa. These worlds are qualitatively indistinguishable. Despite being different 
worlds, we cannot know who is Adam or Noah and we cannot know which world 
we are in, wa or wp.  
                     
30 Lewis manages to provide an account of modality — an account of possibility and necessity — 
without recourse to transworld identity of particulars. Particulars exist only in one world, but 
have counterparts in other worlds. For example, it is not Nixon that is, say, the emperor of 
Ethiopia in some possible world, but Nixon’s counterpart. However, Lewis does not extend his 
counterpart theory to properties or universals. Properties do have primitive transworld identity 
for Lewis and so can exist across possible world. This raises the question of whether a modal 
realism with counterpart properties is a live possibility. Perhaps transworld identity of properties 
is not necessary for an adequate account of modality. 
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Bird applies this argument to quiddities. Just as particulars conceived as 
haecceities can swap all their properties and still retain their identity, so too 
properties as quiddities can swap all their powers and retain their identities:  
“If… the quidditist conception of properties is that they have primitive 
identity, identity that is completely independent of their powers, then 
there should be no reason why we cannot swap powers without swapping 
universals — or swap universals without swapping powers.” (Bird 
2007:74) 
In such a case, there is a possible world wp that differs from the actual world wa in 
that in wp mass plays the charge role and charge plays the mass role. Despite 
being different worlds, wa and wp are indistinguishable with respect to the causal 
roles of their properties. As a result, we cannot know which property plays the 
charge role and cannot know which world we are in. Bird thinks our intuitions 
show there is something wrong with wp (Bird 2007:75). He holds that wp is just the 
actual world with the names “charge” and “mass” swapped (Bird 2007:75). 
Which leads him to conclude, that just as we should reject haecceitism, so too we 
should reject quidditism.  
 
Epistemic argument two — Bird’s duplication argument against 
categoricalism 
Bird’s second skeptical/epistemological argument against categoricalism is a 
version of the replacement argument. Bird asks: 
“If identity is independent of powers, why shouldn’t two properties 
possess the same powers in the same world.” (Bird 2007:76) 
Bird envisages a case in which two different properties, say, charge and mass, 
possess the same powers: 
“…two properties entering into entirely parallel causal roles and nomic 
relations. I.e. let F and G be properties, and let it be the case that for 
every other property H, it is a law that Fs are Hs iff it is a law that Gs are 
Hs, and so on. If this were the case, then F and G would be 
indistinguishable — where there seemed to be one law there would in fact 
be two.” (Bird 2007:76)  
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Bird uses this example to draw a skeptical conclusion about our knowledge of 
properties (Bird 2007:76-77). If quidditism were correct we would not know 
whether we are in w1 (where there is only one property responsible for its being 
such that if a force is applied then a corresponding acceleration would result) or 
w2 (where two or more properties are responsible for its being such that if a force 
is applied then a corresponding acceleration would result). 
 
Bird also uses reference fixing problems to press his skeptical conclusion against 
categoricalism (Bird 2007:77). If two fundamental properties play the inertial 
mass role, as in the duplication example, then there is no unique reference for the 
term “inertial mass” and so the term fails to refer. To see this how this problem 
arises for categoricalism, we will follow Lewis in defining such fundamental terms 
such as “inertial mass” using the Ramsey-sentences of the theories they feature in 
(Lewis 1990). “Inertial mass” will then mean something akin to “the unique 
actual occupant of the inertial mass role”. However, in the duplication example 
above, there is no unique actual occupant of the inertial mass role — two 
properties, charge and mass, occupy the inertial mass role. As such, “inertial 
mass” fails to refer. This raises the skeptical problem that, on the categoricalist 
account of properties as quiddities, we cannot know that any causal role is 
uniquely occupied and so cannot know that any property term refers. 
 
These skeptical problems lead Bird to conclude that we should reject 
categoricalism’s account of properties and powers in terms of quiddities in favour 
of dispositional essentialism. 
  
Yates (2013) summarises Bird’s epistemological arguments as an anti-sceptical 
modus tollens: 
“(1) If categoricalism is true, we cannot know which property occupies the 
[say] charge role; (2) we can know which property occupies the charge 
role; so categoricalism is false.” (Yates 2013:96) 
Lewis, a proponent of categoricalism, denies the conclusion that categoricalism is 
false by denying premise two (Lewis 2009). That is, Lewis denies that we can 
know the fundamental properties of nature and argues instead for what he calls 
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“Ramseyan humility” (Lewis 2009). In the case of the replacement argument, 
Lewis accepts that we cannot tell whether we are in wa or wp.  
 
At the heart of his argument for epistemic humility concerning the fundamental 
properties is his claim that just because we know that a certain property role is 
occupied it does follow that we know what property or power occupies that role: 
“To be the ground of a disposition [say] is to occupy a role, but it one 
thing to know that a role is occupied, another thing to know what 
occupies it. The point generalizes. Being the ground of a certain 
disposition is only one case among many of role-occupancy. There are a 
variety of occupied roles, among them nomological roles and others as 
well. Quite generally, to the extent that we know of the properties of 
things only as role-occupants, we have not yet identified those properties. 
No amount of knowledge about what roles are occupied will tell us which 
properties occupy which roles.” (Lewis 1990:204) 
Bird regards Lewis’ epistemic humility as too high price to pay for maintaining 
quidditism and categoricalism. He thinks we should reject categoricalism on the 
grounds that it provides a metaphysics of properties that condemns us to the 
necessary ignorance of properties (Bird 2007:78). 
 
Dispositional essentialism avoids Lewisian epistemic humility about fundamental 
properties not by expanding our knowledge of properties beyond that proscribed 
by Lewis’ epistemic humility but rather by truncating our account of what a 
property is. Lewis claims that we can know that a certain property role is 
occupied, but denies that we know what property or power it is that occupies that 
role. For dispositional essentialism, a property just is its causal role. As such, for 
dispositional essentialism, to know that a certain property role is occupied is to 
know what property or power occupies that role. Bird avoids epistemic humility 
about properties by holding an account of properties that collapses the distinction 
that Lewis draws between knowing that a certain property role is occupied and 
knowing what property or power it is that occupies that role. For dispositional 
essentialism a property just is its (causal) property role.  
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The point I want to stress here is that Bird and Lewis are in agreement: both 
agree we can know that a certain property role is occupied. However, they 
disagree about whether the nature and identity of a property is exhausted by the 
causal role it occupies. As such, the disagreement is not epistemic, as Bird claims, 
rather it is metaphysical. Bird’s supposedly epistemic argument against 
categoricalism turns out to be a metaphysical disagreement about the nature of 
properties. The disagreement is about whether or not the nature of a property is 
exhausted by the causal role it plays. The epistemic argument only gains traction 
by assuming dispositional essentialism, by assuming that there is no more to a 
property than its causal role, and so cannot be used as an argument against 
categoricalism without facing the charge of begging the question. As such, Bird’s 
supposedly epistemic argument does not provide any reason to hold that 
cateogoricalism fails to provide an adequate account of properties. 
 
Categoricalism provides an inadequate account of laws 
Bird argues that both well-known categoricalist account of laws — (i) the 
regularity view and (ii) the nomic necessitation view — fail to give an adequate 
account of laws and so categoricalism should be rejected in favour of dispositional 
essentialism. I show that the criticisms Bird levels against both regularity and 
nomic necessitation accounts of laws also befall dispositional essentialist accounts 
of causal laws. As such, Bird fails to provide any reason to favour the 
dispositional essentialist account of laws over categoricalist accounts.  
 
The regularity view of laws 
In the case of the regularity view, Bird argues it is unable to ascribe explanatory 
power to laws and so fails as an adequate account of laws. 
The regularity view, as espoused by Lewis, contends that laws are regularities 
that supervene on the vast mosaic of local matters of fact, where these local 
matters of fact are categorical properties (Lewis 1994). On this account, laws are 
general facts of the form that all instances of the property F are instances of the 
property G. The law that, say, all diamonds are hard is a general fact that 
supervenes on the fact that all instances of diamonds are instances of hardness. 
The nature of the supervenience relation is such that once the arrangement of 
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particular local facts is fixed, namely, the fact that all instances of diamonds are 
instances of hardness, then the law that all diamonds are hard is fixed as a result.  
 
However, laws are meant to be explanatory and not merely reports of local 
matters of fact. They are meant to explain both (i) their instances (why, say, this 
instance of a diamond is hard) and (ii) the regularities in the world (they should 
explain why, say, all diamond are hard).  
 
Unfortunately, Bird argues, the regularity view of laws cannot fulfil this 
explanatory task. His argument rests upon the assumption that: 
“facts may explain other facts but they cannot explain themselves.” (Bird 
2007:86) 
The basic idea here is easy to appreciate. The cricket ball striking the window 
and the window breaking are two distinct events and facts. As such, the one can 
explain the other. The fact that the ball strikes the window explains the fact that 
the window breaks. However, a fact cannot explain itself. The fact that the ball 
strikes the window does not explain the fact that the ball strikes the window.  
 
Bird asks to us to consider a gemstone that is very hard. He holds the simplest 
explanation available of the gemstone’s hardness is that the stone is a diamond 
and that it is a law that diamonds are hard. However, if this law is a regularity, as 
Lewis asserts, then Bird claims it will not be able to explain the gem’s hardness. 
“Would it be explanatory to cite the regularity that all diamonds are 
hard? One instance of this regularity is the fact that this diamond is hard. 
But by our assumption [that facts cannot explain themselves] it cannot 
explain itself. So does the remainder of the regularity provide the 
explanatory power? No, since all that the remainder says is that other 
diamonds are hard. The fact that some other diamond is hard does not 
explain why this diamond is hard.” (Bird 2007:86) 
The problem as Bird sees it is that regularities (and hence laws) supervene on 
their instances and so are not distinct facts. On the assumption that “facts may 
explain other facts but they cannot explain themselves”, it follows that no 
regularity can explain its incidences of that regularity.  
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In particular, the fact that all diamond are hard is a regularity that supervenes 
on, and so is not distinct from, the instances of diamonds that are also instances 
of hardness. Hence, the regularity that all diamond are hard cannot explain why 
a particular instance of a diamond is also an instance of hardness. 
 
Laws are supposed to explain why a particular instance of a diamond is hard 
(and also why it is a law that all diamond are hard). However, as Bird argues, the 
regularity view of laws cannot fulfil these roles. As such, according to Bird we 
must conclude that the regularity view cannot ascribe explanatory power to laws, 
and so the regularity view fails to provide an adequate account of laws. Bird has 
argued that categoricalism gives an inadequate account of laws, and so we should 
reject categoricalism. 
 
Dispositional essentialism is also open to the same criticisms that (i) 
no regularity can explain its instances and (ii) that it gets the 
direction of explanation the wrong way around 
A problem with this argument is that dispositional essentialism is open to the very 
same objection that Bird has leveled against categoricalism. As Bird admits, the 
dispositional essentialist’s account of laws may be viewed as a regularity account 
of laws (Bird 2007:89). In this case, laws are regularities that hold in virtue of the 
dispositional essences of properties. Given that Bird holds no regularity can 
explain its instances, he is forced to concede that laws are not explanatory on a 
dispositional essentialist account of laws. Instead, he claims it is potencies (that is, 
powers as dispositional essences) that are explanatory: 
“Thus although talk of explaining things with laws is strictly mistaken, 
that is harmless enough because associated with each law is a potency (or 
set of potencies) that does (or do) provide all the explanation required.” 
(Bird 2007:90) 
Let us accept Bird’s claim that potencies (or sets of potencies) are explanatory. 
Dispositional essentialism is thereby able to explain why an instance of a 
diamond is also an instance of hardness and also why all diamonds are hard.  
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However, dispositional essentialism still fails to provide an account of how laws 
are explanatory. Bird starts his criticism of Lewis’ categorical regularity view of 
laws by declaring laws must be explanatory:  
“Laws have an explanatory capacity. They explain their instances, indeed 
they explain the regularities we find in nature.” (Bird 2007:86) 
Yet he finishes by concluding that for dispositional essentialism laws are not 
explanatory:  
“The dispositional essentialist regularity theory must concede that its laws 
do not explain…” (Bird 2007:90) 
 
Bird is faced with a dilemma. If laws do not need to be explanatory, then Bird’s 
argument that categoricalism should be rejected because it does not provide an 
adequate account of laws, on the grounds that they are not explanatory, fails. 
However, if laws do need to be explanatory, then dispositional essentialism come 
up short. On Bird’s account of dispositional essentialism, laws are epiphenomenal 
and not explanatory. Properties are explanatory on Bird’s account, not laws.  
 
Bird further criticises the regularity view on the grounds that it gets the direction 
of explanation the wrong way around. 
“Lewis’s Humean supervenience claim says that laws depend on the 
pattern of their instances and other matters of particular fact (things 
possessing properties). This seems to get the relationship between laws 
and matters of particular fact the wrong way round. It is laws that direct 
or explain the matters of particular fact, not vice versa.” (Bird 2007:1) 
Once again, Bird is open to the same criticism that he levels against the regularity 
account of laws. On the dispositional essentialist account it is not laws that direct 
or explain the instances, but vice versa. Laws are epiphenomenal. The 
dispositional essences (that is, potencies) are the engines of explanation. As a 
result, the direction of explanation, and the relationship between laws and 
matters of particular fact, is also the “wrong way round”, just as it is for 
categoricalism. Dispositional essentialism has no advantage over categorical 
regularity accounts of laws when it comes to explanatory content.  
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Nomic necessitation account of laws 
Bird turns his attention to the second well-known categoricalist account of laws 
— the nomic necessitation view. Bird argues that David Armstrong’s (1983) 
nomic necessitarian conception of laws is committed to a vicious regress and so 
should be rejected. However, Barker and Smart (2012) show that Bird’s 
dispositional essentialist account of necessary causal laws also faces the very same 
vicious regress levelled against Armstrong.  
 
Armstrong contends that a law is a relational state of affairs, expressed as N[F,G], 
where N is a second-order relation with relata that are first-order properties F 
and G (considered as universals), such as having-mass-of one kilo or having 
negative charge. The relation N[F,G] necessitates the patterns of instantiation of 
Fs and Gs. However, it is a contingent matter that the properties (as universals) F 
and G enter into an N-relation.  
 
Bird asks how is N[F,G] meant to necessitate that every F is G? He asks what 
necessitates the connection between N[F,G] and every F is G? Bird claims that 
the N relation is contingent and as such attempts to necessitate the connection 
between N[F,G] and every F is G leads to an infinite regress. This leads Bird to 
conclude that we should reject categoricalism’s nomic necessitarian account of 
laws.  
 
Bird notes that Armstrong’s N-relation is a universal property and so must be 
categorical. As a categorical property, it is not part of N’s essential nature to have 
any necessitating role. That means the identity of properties (as universals) is not 
fixed by the causal/nomological roles they play or the N-relations they enter into 
with other properties. The significant point here is that it is possible for the N-
relation connection not to hold. N could have different roles in different possible 
worlds. In which case, N[F,G] may hold at some world w, but it need not be the 
case that every F is G holds in this world.  
 
Bird argues that for the relation to hold, Armstrong needs a higher, third-order 
relation: 
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“What Armstrong needs, in other words, is a third-order relational fact, 
N*[N,R], where N* is a third-order relation standing between the N-
relation and R, a relation such that wherever R[F,G], it is simply 
analytically true that Every F is G.” (Bird 2005:150) 
But this only pushes the problem up a level. We now need to explain this third-
order necessitation, by positing a fourth-order property N**, and similarly a fifth-
order property N*** and so on ad infinitum. This infinite hierarchy of N-relations 
fails to explain the source of the necessity in question, as Bird argues, and so 
generates a vicious regress for Armstrong’s account of laws. 
“In the necessitation hierarchy Nn is supposed to have certain quasi-
modal and explanatory properties, but it can have them only if they are 
conferred upon it by some Nn+1 that has precisely the same kind of 
quasi-modal and explanatory properties. If so the source of this modality 
and explanatory force has not been located. There is nothing in the 
hierarchy that generates these features. In each case they are passed on 
from the higher-order N to the lower-order N, but we have no explication 
of whence they come.” (Bird 2007:94) 
 
Dispositional essentialism open to same criticism 
Barker and Smart argue that Bird’s dispositional essentialist account of laws also 
suffers a vicious regress in accounting for the necessity of laws (Barker and Smart 
2012). For Bird, the essential nature, identity and modal roles of a property are 
fixed by the stimulus-response relations it enters into with other properties. For 
example, the essential nature of fragility is constituted by the stimulus and 
response relations of dropping and shattering, respectively. The fact that the 
stimulus-response relation holds between the properties fragility, being dropped and 
shattering can be represented as: 
SR[(F,D),S] 
where F=fragility, D=dropped, and S=shattering. Barker and Smart present the 
necessitation that Bird requires of laws as: 
“SRN: If SR[(F,D),S] obtains in any metaphysically possible world w, 
then every x that is F and D in w, is (or will tend to be) S in w.” (Barker 
and Smart 2012:719). 
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Barker and Smart (2012) ask where the necessitation found in Bird’s account 
comes from? 
“But in virtue of what does this necessitation between the second-order 
fact, SR[(F, D), S], and the first-order patterns of tendency hold? This is, 
effectively, the same question that leads us on Bird’s [that is, Armstrong’s] 
regress. To explain the necessitation in SRN, we need a third-order fact 
to link SR[(F, D), S] to the tendency between particular concrete events. 
Bird is hoist by his own petard.” (Barker and Smart 2012:720). 
Bird’s SR relation is a second order relation, just like Armstrong’s nomic N 
relation. Just as Armstrong requires a further higher-level relation to account for 
the necessity it imposed on the lower-level relation between properties (as 
universals), so too Barker and Smart argue Bird’s second-order SR relation 
requires a further higher–level relation to account for the necessity of the lower-
level relation. 
 
Why does Bird fail to notice his account of laws faces the same regress as 
Armstrong? Barker and Smart claim that Bird confuses the role that necessity 
plays in his account of modality. They note that there are three points at which 
necessity can enter Bird’s account of laws: 
A. First-order (events/states of affairs) causally necessitate other first-order 
states.  
B. Second-order facts, like SR[(F, D), S] necessitate patterns of instantiation 
amongst first-properties. 
C. Properties may by necessity have modal roles (like those specified in B). 
According to Barker and Smart, Bird’s mistake is to confuse B and C and hold 
that the necessity found in C gets rid of the necessity found in B. 
“He [Bird] thinks that by showing properties essentially have certain 
modal roles (by dint of relational constitution) he has dispensed with the 
kind of necessity we require at B. But that’s false, since modal roles are 
defined by this kind of necessity.” (Barker and Smart 2012:722)  
The very regress that Bird charges Armstrong with in accounting for the 
necessity of laws has been shown to infect Bird’s dispositional essentialist account 
of necessary laws. The requisite necessity that Bird seeks is not accounted for by 
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adding higher-level relations and so the regress is vicious. As such, dispositional 
essentialism is on the same footing as the nomic necessitarian account of laws. 
They both fail to provide an adequate account of laws. Dispositional essentialism 
thereby has no advantage over categoricalism in accounting for the necessity of 
causal laws. 
 
Criticism of the argument to the best explanation 
It has been shown that dispositional essentialism does not provide a better 
explanation of properties and laws than its denial, categoricalism. Bird’s 
arguments that dispositional essentialism provides a better, more robust account 
of properties was shown to be circular. While the arguments Bird ranged against 
categoricalist accounts of laws were shown to also rule out the Disposition 
Essentialist account of laws. There is no argument to the best explanation in 
favour of dispositional essentialism. Bird fails to provide any reason to accept his 
claim that properties are pure powers and possess dispositional essences.  
 
I now want to put these problems aside to show that even if we accept Bird’s 
claim that dispositional essentialism does provide a more robust account of 
properties and laws, it nonetheless still fails as an argument to the best 
explanation in favour of dispositional essentialism. Arguments to the best 
explanation are judged on a cost-benefit analysis. A good argument to the best 
explanation is one that, according to Mumford, is “wealth-creating” and 
“inflationary” (Mumford 2005:432). Unfortunately, Ellis and Bird’s arguments 
for dispositional essentialism fail any such cost-benefit analysis. The problem is 
that the supposed benefits of dispositional essentialism in accounting for 
properties and laws are nothing more than the initial assumptions of dispositional 
essentialism. 
 
Bird’s argument to the best explanation claims that if we assume dispositional 
essentialism and take it as primitive that the properties of fundamental particles 
are dispositional essences and necessary, then this provides a robust account of 
some troubling metaphysical issues concerning causal laws and properties. The 
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first thing worth noting is that to assume essences and necessity as primitive 
features of an ontology is a big assumption.  
 
We know the cost — assuming necessity as a primitive. What are the benefits? 
And are they wealth creating and inflationary? Let us look at Bird’s account of 
causal laws. As noted above, Bird is quite explicit that dispositional essentialism 
provides an ontologically deflationary account of laws. Laws are not an 
ontological addition on top of potencies possessing dispositional essences. Once 
dispositional essentialism is assumed then nothing more is needed for the 
existence of necessary laws. As such there is no cost benefit to be found here for 
dispositional essentialism in its account of metaphysically necessary laws. The 
benefits are nothing more than the costs.  
 
The case is no better for properties. Bird claims that dispositional essentialism 
provides an account of the transworld identity of properties, something that 
categorical properties as quiddities fails to do. However, the transworld identity 
of properties is nothing more than the assumption that properties possess 
dispositional essences and so are necessary. In other words, Bird assumes 
primitive transworld identity of properties in formulating the dispositional 
essentialist position. To claim that properties have transworld identity is just to 
claim that properties are necessary. As such, there is no cost benefit to be found 
in dispositional essentialism’s account of properties.  
 
As the examples above illustrate, the supposed robustness gained is nothing more 
than the robust necessity that was assumed to get dispositional essentialism going 
in the first place. I conclude that Bird’s argument to the best explanation in 
favour of dispositional essentialism fails the cost benefit analysis by which we 
judge such arguments and so gives us no reason to accept dispositional 
essentialism. 
 
Argument from science for dispositional essentialism 
I now turn to the second argument advanced in favour of dispositional 
essentialism — the argument from science. Particle physics suggests that the 
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fundamental particles, such as quarks and electrons, are pointlike and simple, 
lacking parts and structure (Kane 1995). Proponents of pure powers (and 
dispositional essentialism) believe these finding support their cause in two ways. 
Firstly, it is thought that if fundamental particles are simple and lack structure, 
then there is no structure to ground the powers of fundamental particles and 
these powers must therefore be pure, bare and ungrounded. I show that this line 
of reasoning commits the headless women fallacy and so should be rejected. 
Secondly, it is noted that science uses only dispositional terms, such as “spin” and 
“charge”, to characterise the properties of fundamental particles. The fact that 
particle physics only uses to dispositional terms to talk about these properties is 
thought to entail that these properties are solely dispositional. However, to draw 
such a conclusion is to confuse and conflate how we talk about the world for the 
nature of the world. I conclude that the argument from science fails to support 
Bird’s claim that the properties of fundamental particles are purely dispositional 
essences. 
 
Particle physics supports the existence of pure powers — physicists 
have not found structure in fundamental entities 
Let us turn to the first reason for thinking the findings of particle physics support 
the existence of pure powers and dispositional essentialism. Particle physics finds 
no structure at the level of fundamental entities, despite using projectile energies 
over a hundred thousand times greater than those at which structure might have 
been expected to appear, and despite the best efforts of particle physics, electrons 
and quarks continue to behave like entities without structure. Science suggests 
subatomic particles are simple. If subatomic particles are simple, then, it is 
reasoned, their properties must be pure powers.  
 
Gordon Kane (1995) notes that science has historically revealed more and more 
fine-grained matter. For example: 
“…[I]n the nineteenth century, the chemical elements (oxygen, carbon, 
silver, etc.) were each found to have a smallest recognizable unit, those 
units were named atoms. More research early in the twentieth century 
revealed that those atoms had structure (a nucleus at the center, 
 148 
surrounded by electrons)… Then it was learned that the nucleus 
contained protons and neutrons and, in the 1960s, that protons and 
neutrons contained quarks.” (Kane 1995:5) 
But recent experiments, Kane points out, have found no deeper structure: 
“Historically, every significant increase in projectile energy has lead to the 
discovery of a deeper level of structure. For over half a century larger and 
larger machines called accelerators have been built in order to probe 
matter with increasingly energetic projectiles — electrons and other 
particles. The most recent experiments on electrons and quarks have used 
projectile energies over a hundred thousand times greater than those at 
which structure might have appeared if history were going to repeat itself 
once more.” (Kane 1995:9) 
This leads Kane to suggest “that the historical search for smaller constituents 
may have ended” and that the fundamental particles are simple, pointlike and 
lack structure (Kane 1995:10). 
 
A number of philosophers take these finding of particle physics to show the 
powers and dispositions of fundamental particles are pure and bare.31 For 
example, McKitrick declares that: 
“Our best scientific theories posit properties which are bare dispositions.” 
(McKitrick 2003b:356) 
Ellis and Lierse echo similar sentiments. They take it that science shows the 
fundamental particles cannot be categorical and must be purely dispositional: 
“There is one argument against categorical realism, however, which 
appears to be decisive. This is the argument from science. With few 
exceptions, the most fundamental properties that we know about are all 
dispositional. They are of the nature of powers, capacities and 
propensities.” (Ellis and Lierse 1994:32)  
Blackburn also contends that science shows properties are purely dispositional 
when he declares that: 
                     
31 See Molnar (2003:133-34), Ellis and Lierse (1994:32), McKitrick (2003b:356), Strawson 
(1980:280) and Blackburn (1990:255) 
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“…[S]cience finds only dispositional properties, all the way down.” 
(Blackburn 1990:255)  
 
The reasoning here is easy to see, if fundamental particles are simple and lack 
structure, then there is no structure to ground the powers of fundamental 
particles and these powers must be pure, bare and ungrounded. The issue is 
simple — the powers and dispositions of fundamental particles cannot be 
explained in terms of deeper structure as science shows there is no deeper 
structure. Dispositions and powers are therefore thought to be pure and 
baseless.32 The Argument from Science appears to offer empirical evidence that 
rules out grounding via compositional structure. 
 
I will examine two possible responses to this argument. One response is to 
challenge the claim that the conclusion (that science rules out powers grounded 
via compositional structure) follows from the findings of particle physics. It may 
be objected that the argument from science for structureless properties falls foul 
of Armstrong’s headless woman fallacy. Armstrong notes that not seeing a 
woman’s head is not the same as seeing that the woman has no head. 
Armstrong’s states his argument in more general terms: 
“What the example shows is that… it is very natural for human beings to 
pass from something that is true: ‘I do not perceive that X is Y’ to 
something that may be false ‘I perceive that X is not Y’.” (Armstrong 
1968:48) 
In the case at hand, we cannot move from “experience does not reveal structure 
in subatomic particles” to the claim that “experience reveals subatomic particles 
lack structure”. In other words, our inability to discover structure at the 
subatomic level does not license the claim that we discover no structure at the 
subatomic level. This would be an invalid pattern of inference. The truth of the 
premise that science has not discovered structure at the subatomic level does not 
force the conclusion that science has found no structure at the subatomic level. It 
is possible to accept the premise and deny the conclusion. As such, the argument 
                     
32  Versions of this structureless argument for pure powers can be found in Blackburn (1990), 
Broad (1925), Goodman (1954), Harre (1986), Harre and Madden (1975), Martin (1993, 2008), 
Molnar (1999, 2003), Mumford (2006), Psillos (2006), and Strawson (1980).  
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from science for simple, structureless subatomic properties (and thus pure powers) 
is not a deductively valid argument.  
 
The argument from science was introduced as an empirical argument for the 
simplicity of subatomic properties. Kane takes the argument to be empirical, 
noting that it cannot prove the simplicity of subatomic properties: 
“Of course, we can never prove that smaller subdivisions will not be 
found if a future supercollider can probe to smaller distances. But we have 
seen that matter had already been probed to distances far smaller than 
where structure might have occurred, so perhaps we do know the final 
constituents.” (Kane 1995:107) 
In this case, we run up against he problem of induction. As Karl Popper (1959) 
argues, scientific theories are not confirmed or verified. Instances of not finding 
structure in subatomic particles do not support or confirm the claim that all 
subatomic particles lack structure. At best theories can be falsified or 
“corroborated”. The theory that the properties of subatomic particles are pure 
may well count as corroborated in that is has been subjected to rigorous testing 
without falsification. However, corroboration should not be confused with 
evidential support. 
 
A second response to the argument from science is to accept that the argument 
from science rules out the grounding of powers via compositional structure and 
instead argue there are other forms of grounding powers which are categorical. 
Neil Williams (2011) argues that powers are grounded via a supervenient notion 
of structure, which is categorical. In which case powers are not pure.  
“Here the categorical properties are instantiated by the same object 
which is characterized dispositionally, without moving to a lower level of 
constituent entities. The ‘lower’ level is a level of properties: the 
dispositional properties of the object supervene on the categorical 
properties of the object. The structure is a supervenient structure.” 
(Williams 2011:83) 
Williams holds that the argument from science may well rule out the grounding 
of powers via compositional structure, but says nothing against such grounding 
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via categorical supervenient structures. This leads Williams to conclude that so 
long as the supervenient sense of structure remains an open possibility, the 
argument from science for pure powers fails: 
“It does not follow from the lack of compositional structure that there is 
no possible grounding structure: the supervenient sense remains an open 
possibility. Hence the argument [from science] fails.” (Williams 2011:83)   
 
Psillos (2006) provides another account of non-compositional structure using 
symmetries. According to Psillos, symmetries are categorical structures of a 
system of particles. These symmetries are categorical properties and account for 
and ground powers and dispositions of subatomic particles. The existence of 
these symmetries, and thereby the categorical grounding of dispositions, is 
compatible with the argument from science. As such, the argument from science 
fails to rule out non-pure powers at the subatomic level. 
 
A significant move in Psillos’ argument is that symmetry is a categorical structure 
of a system of particles. This holistic, system-based account finds resonance in 
contemporary scientific debate that suggests the powers and dispositions of 
fundamental particles are holistic and belong to whole systems of entities.33 On 
this account, powers such as spin and charge are properties of a whole system. 
They are not powers of individual constituents or types of constituents. Electrons, 
understood as a type, do not possess charge. Rather charge is possessed by a 
system as a whole. It is only systems that possess powers. Contemporary science 
not only does not support the pure powers view, it suggests quite the opposite — 
that powers are not pure.34 
 
Physicists use only dispositional terms  
A second reason advanced for thinking that the findings of particle physics 
support the existence of pure powers and dispositional essentialism is that physics 
uses only dispositional terms in characterising the properties of fundamental 
entities: 
                     
33  See Healey (1991) and Teller (1986), Williams (2011:75 fn10) 
34  Harre (1986) introduces a similar holistic notion of “ultra-grounding”. Powers and dispositions 
are grounded in a holistic system-based account of powers. 
 152 
“The terms physicists use to characterize the fundamental physical 
entities are dispositional: ‘spin’, ‘charge’, ‘mass’, and so on are all overtly 
dispositional terms. And not only are these terms prima facie dispositional 
(in that they strike one as concerning what the fundamental entities can 
and will do) — the same conclusion can be drawn from a closer 
examination of their use and interpretation within contemporary physics. 
For instance, ‘charge’ names the disposition to produce electromagnetic 
fields, and ‘spin’ the disposition to contribute to the total angular 
momentum of a system.” (Ellis 2002:47) 
 
Not only are the terms physics uses to characterise the properties of fundamental 
entities dispositional, the very scientific method employed to discover and 
characterise these properties is also dispositional. The manner in which we probe 
and detect the nature and properties of subatomic particles using accelerators is 
in terms of how such entities act and interact when hit with an energetic 
projectile, such as a stream of electrons. Kane uses an analogy to demonstrate the 
dispositional nature of scientific method used to explore subatomic particles:  
“For example, if you throw a small steel pellet at a peach, it will bounce 
off. If you shoot the pellet at high speed (therefore at higher energy) it will 
penetrate the peach, but bounce off the pit. So you can learn that peaches 
have pits without cutting into them. You could even learn the size of the 
pit by studying which pellets went all the way through and which ones 
bounced.” (Kane 1995:8-9) 
When we probe and explore the nature of subatomic particles in terms of how 
they act and interact it is in terms of their dispositional properties. The very 
method of investigation is dispositional.  
 
Williams argues that scientific methodology, at least as it applies to the 
fundamental particles, is dispositional: 
“The only access we have to the unobservable entities of microphysics is 
through their responses to various tests. We are restricted, as it were, to 
poking and prodding at them with bombardments, and ‘seeing’ (through 
instruments) how they react. This informs us about the reactions, 
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responses, and outputs that the fundamental entities produce in response 
to testing; it tells us what behaviour the entities exhibit.” (Williams 
2011:77-78) 
The salient point here is that scientific methodology has only one mode of 
characterising and exploring the properties of fundamental entities: the 
dispositional. So the fact that science tells us that the fundamental particles are 
dispositional is not a reflection on the nature of the world and the nature of 
fundamental particles. Rather it is a reflection on the methodology of science. 
The dispositional characterization of the fundamental particles and their powers 
is an inescapable consequence of the methodology used. As a result, the solely 
dispositional characterisation of the fundamental particles and their powers 
provides no evidence that these entities are solely dispositional. Even if the 
properties of fundamental entities are categorical, particle physics would still use 
dispositional methods to explore them and characterise them in dispositional 
terms.  
 
Williams suggest that the dispositional nature of scientific methodology not only 
shows that science does not support the claims of dispositional essentialism, it also 
argues for epistemic humility about the nature of fundamental properties: 
“The nature of scientific practice in microphysics leaves us unable to say 
(with any confidence) what the intrinsic natures of the properties of the 
fundamental entities are really like. Because the dispositional 
characterization applied to the fundamental entities is an inescapable 
consequence of the methodology, that the characterization is exclusively 
dispositional provides no evidence that the fundamental properties are 
exclusively dispositional — even if that happens to be the case.” (Williams 
2011:79) 
 
It has been shown that our use of dispositional terms to characterise the 
properties of subatomic particles, and the fact that these properties are discovered 
and identified by dispositional, scientific method does not entail that these 
properties are purely dispositional. To think otherwise is to mistake the way we 
characterise and discover these properties for the nature of these properties. 
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As noted in chapter three, Kripke shows that it is a mistake to take the manner in 
which we fix the reference of a term for the meaning of the term. It would appear 
dispositional essentialism mistakenly conflates the manner in which we fix and 
characterise the reference of property terms for the meaning of these terms and 
draws unwarranted ontological conclusions from this conflation. It is a mistake 
for dispositional essentialism to hold that just because we have no qualitative or 
categorical language or manner of probing and exploring these properties that 
they must be purely dispositional and cannot be categorical.  
 
This section has looked at two arguments put forward in support of dispositional 
essentialism — the argument to the best explanation and the argument from 
science. The argument to the best explanation fails to support Bird’s claim that 
properties are pure powers possessing dispositional essences. Bird does not 
succeed in arguing that dispositional essentialism provides a more robust account 
of properties and laws than its cateogoricalism, the denial of dispositional 
essentialism. The very criticisms that Bird levels against categoricalsim were 
shown to also befall dispositional essentialism. Furthermore, Bird’s argument to 
the best explanation fails the cost benefit analysis by which we judge such 
arguments.  
 
The argument from science also fails to support Bird’s claim that properties are 
pure powers possessing dispositional essences. It has been shown that our use of 
dispositional terms to characterise the properties of subatomic particles, and the 
fact that these properties are discovered and identified by dispositional, scientific 
method does not entail that these properties are purely dispositional. To think 
otherwise is to mistake the way we characterise and discover these properties for 
the nature of these properties. 
 
4.2.3 Arguments against pure powers 
So far, in section one, I introduced the pure powers view and showed it entails 
dispositional essentialism and the necessity of causal laws. In section two I looked 
at arguments in support of dispositional essentialism and demonstrated they 
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failed to establish that the properties of fundamental particles are pure powers 
with dispositional essences. In this section I look at three regress arguments that 
threaten dispositional essentialism. I conclude that the individuation regress poses 
a serious problem. It shows dispositional essentialism is incoherent and so should 
be rejected. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, dispositional essentialism is a relational account 
of properties. According to dispositional essentialism, properties are nothing 
more than their power to effect and be affected by other properties (such as their 
stimulus and manifestations conditions). As such, properties are nothing more 
than their relation with other properties and so the dispositional essentialist 
account of properties is relational. The nature of a property is determined solely 
by its relations with other properties. It also appears to involve a regress. A 
property is nothing more than its power to effect and be affected by other 
properties, which in turn are nothing more than their power to effect and be 
affected by other properties, and so on.  
There are at least three versions of the regress argument. The truth-making 
regress argues that dispositional ascriptions are made true by facts about their 
manifestations, which in turn are made true by their manifestations, and so on. 
The epistemic regress argues that disposition ascriptions are known through their 
manifestations, which in turn are known through their manifestations, and so on. 
While the individuation regress argues that disposition ascriptions are 
individuated by their manifestations, which in turn are individuated by their 
manifestations, and so on. 
Truth-making regress 
Simon Blackburn (1990) argues that a world of pure powers leads to a vicious 
regress about truth and so is incoherent: 
“To conceive of all the truths about a world as dispositional is to suppose 
that a world is entirely described by what is true at neighbouring worlds. 
And since our argument was a priori, these truths in turn vanish into truths 
about yet other neighbouring worlds, and the result is that there is no truth 
anywhere.” (Blackburn 1990:64) 
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Blackburn’s premise that: 
“To conceive of all the truths about a world as dispositional is to suppose 
that a world is entirely described by what is true at neighbouring worlds”  
rests upon two crucial assumed premises: (i) dispositions are analysed 
counterfactually and (ii) counterfactuals are made true by what happens at 
neighbouring worlds.  
 
We may represent this argument in the following manner: 
(P1) Science finds only dispositional properties 
(P2) Dispositions are analysed counterfactually 
(P3) Counterfactuals are made true by what happens at neighbouring 
worlds 
(P4) What is true at neighbouring worlds is a matter of what dispositions 
there are in that world, which in turn are made true by what happens at 
yet other neighbouring worlds. 
Therefore: 
(C) A world containing just dispositional properties is incoherent. 
 
Blackburn’s argument rests upon the false counterfactual analysis of dispositions. 
Martin has shown that the truth of a counterfactual is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for the possession of a disposition (Martin 1994). If disposition are not 
analysed counterfactually, then there is no reason to claim that dispositional 
ascriptions are made true by what happens at neighbouring worlds and so the 
regress cannot get started. Premise (P2) is false and as such Blackburn’s argument 
that dispositional essentialism is incoherent is unsound. Blackburn fails to 
establish the truth of his conclusion that a world containing just dispositional 
properties is incoherent. 
 
Epistemic regress 
Richard Swinburne (1980:316-19) argues that a world of pure powers leads to a 
regress that precludes us from knowing what property anything has. Here is the 
regress: knowledge of a property requires knowledge of its manifestation, which is 
itself a property, and so in turn requires knowledge of its manifestation, and so 
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on. This leads to an infinite chain without any property being known. Hence the 
regress is vicious. Here is Swinburne’s argument: 
“One can recognize that objects have powers only if one can recognize 
when such changes have occurred…[T]o recognize that changes have 
occurred, one has to recognize properties. But if properties are nothing 
but potentialities for contributing to causal powers, we have a vicious 
infinite regress.” (Swinburne 1980:317) 
Bird argues that we can stop the regress and thus have knowledge of properties:  
“It therefore seems as if we can only know any property if this regress 
ends somewhere with a property which is not a potency but is something 
else, and colours or colour qualia seems instances of such non-potency, 
categorical properties. But in fact the epistemological chain can end with 
a property which while a potency is itself a state of knowledge (or other 
epistemic state) concerning other potencies. There is no further regress 
since there is no requirement that to be in a state of knowledge one must 
know that one is in such a state…” (Bird 2007:135) 
Bird argues that the regress identified by Swinburne stops when it reaches 
observation, in the form of colours and colour qualia in this case. For the 
dispositional essentialist, colours are not categorical properties. So the regress is 
not halted by the existence of categorical properties. Rather, Bird makes recourse 
to a distinction between knowing x and knowing that you know x to use 
observation to stop the regress. Troy Cross shows how this distinction halts the 
regress: 
“Of course, these regress-halting observations are themselves dispositions, 
like everything else, but we detect their contents not be first detecting that 
we are having the observation. Rather, the observation already is a 
detection of its contents. The epistemic regress stops, in other words, 
when it runs through epistemic states themselves.” (Cross 2012:2)  
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With this move Bird stops Swinburne’s regress and so saves dispositional 
essentialism. 
Individuation regress 
The third and most troubling argument against dispositional essentialism is 
Lowe’s individuation regress argument (Lowe 2010). Lowe argues that 
dispositional essentialism fails to provide an adequate account or criterion for the 
individuation of properties. The argument starts by assuming that properties as 
powers are individuated, at least partly, by their manifestation. Lowe then argues: 
“But…the manifestation of powers themselves always consist simply in 
the acquisition of further powers. This seems to raise the threat of a vicious 
circularity (or else an infinite regress) in the individuation of powers…” 
(Lowe 2010:8)  
The idea here is that the manifestation of a property as a power is itself a 
property and so its identity consists in the manifestation of further properties, and 
so on. This leads to a regress. It is either circular or vicious and so shows that the 
claim properties are pure powers is incoherent. 
Bird contends that the real problem of circularity that critics such as Lowe level 
against dispositional essentialism turns on the relational nature of dispositional 
essences: 
“Dispositional essences are relational — the essence of a property is a 
relation to other properties. If essences fix identity, as Aristotle says, then 
the identity of a property is determinate only if the properties to which its 
essence relates it themselves have determinate identity. And that is just 
what is ruled out by circularity.” (Bird 2007:137) 
Bird embraces the relational nature of the identity of properties (Bird 2007:139). 
He responds to the individuation regress by appealing to structuralist 
considerations in the form of graph theory to argue that the identity of properties 
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can be determined relationally. In outline Bird’s argument is simple and direct. 
In detail it is complex and technical. Here is the argument in outline: 
1. properties as pure powers can be modelled using graphs  
2. graphs are able to determine the identity of their relational elements, so 
long as the graph is asymmetrical.  
From this Bird concludes that pure powers are capable of being individuated.   
A graph is a mathematical structure, consisting of a set of vertices connected by 
edges, used to model relations between entities. A graph is an ordered pair 
G = (V, E) comprising a set V of vertices or nodes together with a set E of edges or 
lines, which are two-element subsets of V. Bird declares that the thesis under 
discussion, one that he defends is this: 
(S) The identity and distinctness of the elements of a set E of entities 
supervene on the instantiations of some relation R (or set of relations {Ri}) 
on the elements of E. 
Bird holds that by appeal to graph theory we can show that a set of R-relations 
on E is sufficient to determine the identities of each element of E. The idea here 
is that the identity and distinctness of the vertices of a graph can supervene on 
the structure of the graph. 
For this to work the graph must be asymmetrical. If the graph is symmetrical, 
then, as Bird explains, the graph will not determine the identity of its entities: 
“It can be easily seen that [if the graph is symmetrical] a rotation of 180° 
will take all the vertices onto different vertices yet leave the structure 
unchanged. Consequently the structure of this graph fails to determine 
the identity of its vertices.” (Bird 2007:140) 
What is required, Bird notes, for a graph to be able to determine the identity of 
its relational elements is that it be asymmetrical: 
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“Such a graph would have no way of swapping vertices while leaving 
structure unchanged. Which is to say that the structure determines the 
identity of the vertices — the structure itself distinguishes each vertex 
from every other vertex; i.e. the identity of vertices supervenes on the set 
of instantiations of the edge relation.” (Bird 2007:139) 
The idea is that properties as powers can be modelled or represented on a graph 
that is able to determine the identity of its relational elements, so long as the 
graph is asymmetrical. Properties as powers are individuated by their position in 
the power structure of which they are a part. Bird summarises and concludes his 
argument against the identity regress: 
“[I]t remains the case that there are graphs that represent possible 
structures of pure potencies that have the property that the identity and 
distinctness of the vertices supervene on the structure of manifestation 
and stimulus relations. We may confidently conclude therefore that the 
regress objection can be answered. There may be structures of potencies 
that are circular (or that involve infinitely many potencies) but that is no 
obstacle to the identities of those potencies being fully determined by the 
asymmetric pattern of those structures.” (Bird 2007:146)  
Bird has produced and elegant argument to claim that relational entities, such as 
pure powers, can be individuated by structural elements.  
However, Bird’s recourse to graphs and structure is thought to be an inadequate 
response to the individuation regress for a number of reasons. I look at four. For 
one, as Lowe (2010) and Cross (2012:304) argue, the whole dispositional 
structure is not individuated by anything and so, according to Bird’s own 
criterion, the dispositional structure as a whole lacks identity and is 
indeterminate. While it may seem odd that the structure itself lacks identity and is 
indeterminate, its lack of identity does not seem to rule out the structure’s ability 
to individuate properties in the structure.  
Another problem is epistemic. On Bird’s structuralist, graph account, knowledge 
of one property would require knowledge of the whole structure of dispositions. 
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This leads to the sceptical conclusion that we cannot have any knowledge of the 
fundamental properties, something Bird is at pains to deny. While this may be a 
problem for Bird, it is not fatal for dispositional essentialism if one is happy to 
embrace epistemic humility about such properties, as Lewis does. 
A third problem is that Bird now appears to have two criteria for the identity and 
individuation of properties as powers. On one criterion properties are 
individuated by their position in the power structure. On another criterion 
properties are individuated by the stimulus response relations they enter into. 
Perhaps these two criteria amount to the same thing. However, it is certainly far 
from obvious that they are the same. The defender of dispositional essentialism 
needs to explicitly show that there are not now two different account of how 
properties are individuated. Without such an argument there are real concerns 
about the coherence of Bird’s position.   
The fourth and most serious problem is that symmetrical dispositional structures, 
that is, structures that would fail to individuate properties, are possible. The 
problem here is that there is no reason to think that the power structure in any 
world is actually asymmetrical. It could be that all worlds possess symmetrical 
power structures. In which case properties as pure powers would not be 
individuated. As Lowe notes: 
“It surely will not do to proclaim as an a priori truth that the power 
structure of any possible world must exhibit symmetries which permit the 
assignment of each power in that world to a unique position in that 
structure.” (Lowe 2010:19) 
Bird’s problem here is not that he is wrong to claim that asymmetrical graphs 
and structures are capable of individuating properties as pure powers and giving 
them identity. Rather, the issue is that there is no reason to hold that such 
asymmetrical structures must exist. There is nothing to rule out the possibility of 
a world of symmetrical power structures in which the notion of properties as pure 
powers is incoherent on the grounds that such properties could not be 
individuated. This is a serious problem for Bird and counts as a strong reason to 
reject the dispositional essentialist account of properties as pure powers possessing 
dispositional essences. 
 
 162 
Conclusion 
Dispositional essentialism (at least in the guise of pan-dispositional) claims that all 
real properties are pure powers posssessing dispositional essences. Dispositional 
essentialism is right to reject a dualist account of categorical and dispositional 
properties, as advocated by Prior, Pargetter and Jackson. Instead it provides a 
monist, unitary account of properties. However, it is wrong to claim that 
properties are solely and purely dispositional. As was shown, arguments 
advanced in support of dispositional essentialism give us no reason to accept such 
an account of properties. Bird’s argument to the best explanation was shown to 
fail the cost benefit analysis upon which arguments are judged. The criticism he 
levelled against categoricalist accounts of properties and laws were shown to also 
befall dispositional essentialism. The argument from science rested on the claim 
that particle physics finds only simple, pointlike, structureless entities at the 
subatomic level. However, as the headless women argument illustrates, not 
finding structure is not the same as finding there is no structure. While the 
argument from science may fail to establish the truth of dispositional essentialism, 
it nonetheless motivates and underpins dispositional essentialism. Bird argued 
science uses dispositional terms to characterise the properties of subatomic 
particles and uses dispositional methodology to identify these properties. 
Dispositional essentialism is motivated by a confusion between the manner in 
which we characterise and identify the reference of properties and power terms 
with the meaning of those terms. Dispositional essentialism wrongly draws 
conclusions about the nature of properties and dispositions based on how we 
identify and talk about properties and dispositions.  
Not only is there little reason to accept dispositional essentialism, there is also 
strong reason to reject such an account of properties. The individuation regress 
poses a serious problem for dispositional essentialism that Bird cannot overcome. 
It shows dispositional essentialism is incoherent and so should be rejected. 
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Chapter 4.3 — Categoricalism 
 
4.3.1 Armstrong’s categoricalist account of dispositions 
• Dispositions are reducible to and identical to categorical properties 
• The identity between dispositions and categorical properties is contingent 
(as the laws of nature are contingent)  
4.3.2 Motivations and arguments for categoricalism 
• Truthmaker argument for categoricalism:  
o Statement of truthmaker principle 
o Dispositions entail counterfactuals 
o Counterfactuals not made true by counterfactual facts, as they do 
not exist 
o Truthmaker cannot be a dispositional properties as dispositions 
involve unacceptable intentionality and so do not exist 
o Truthmaker must be categorical property 
• Problem with the truthmaker argument for categoricalism 
o Dispositions do not entail counterfactuals 
o Dispositions are not intentional 
o Criticism of truthmakers — cannot account for negative truths   
4.3.3 Criticism of cateogoricalism 
• Armstrong has two incompatible accounts of dispositions 
o Dispositions identical to categorical properties 
o Dispositions identical to categorical properties plus laws 
• All categorical properties are also dispositional 
• No epistemic access to causally inert properties 
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Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with categoricalism, the claim that properties are solely 
categorical or qualitative and the denial that there are any irreducible 
dispositions and powers. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section one 
introduces Armstrong’s categoricalist account of properties. He argues that 
powers are identical to and reducible to categorical properties. 
 
Section two examines arguments for categoricalism. Armstrong’s claim that all 
properties are categorical is motivated by his commitment to the truthmaker 
principle and rejection of intentionality, which he finds in dispositions. It is shown 
that Armstrong’s arguments for categoricalism are unsound. He confuses how we 
pick out the reference of dispositional terms, via counterfactuals, for the meaning 
of those terms and also conflates the manifestation of a disposition for the 
disposition itself. 
 
Section three looks at problems and complications with the categoricalist account 
of dispositions and asks whether it provides an adequate account of properties. 
These problems include a tension in Armstrong’s account of how categorical 
properties account for dispositions, claims that purely categorical properties are 
unknowable, and that assertion that there are no purely categorical properties — 
that all properties involve dispositionality. I argue that these objections can be 
met be a proponent of categoricalism and that they provide no reason to reject 
categoricalism. At the same time, Armstrong fails to provide any sound 
arguments for why we should accept that all properties are categorical.    
 
I conclude that categoricalism is right to claim that just because we make 
dispositional ascriptions and use a language of dispositional properties in talking 
about the world it does not follow that there are dispositional properties. 
Dispositional terms do not describe irreducible dispositional properties or states 
of affairs. Instead, dispositional ascriptions are just ways of talking about and 
designating categorical properties. However, categoricalism makes the mistake of 
taking categorical ascriptions and concepts to mirror reality.  They fail to apply 
the same skepticism about dispositional talk to categorical talk and are make 
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unwarranted ontological implications based on language when they claim that all 
properties are purely categorical. 
 
4.3.1 Armstrong’s categoricalist account of properties 
In explicating categoricalism, I concentrate on Armstrong’s account of 
categoricalism.35 Armstrong argues that all properties are solely categorical or 
qualitative. In doing so he denies there are any irreducible dispositions or powers. 
Rather, dispositions and powers are explained in terms of, identical to and 
reducible to categorical properties. For example, a sugar cube’s possessing the 
dispositional property of solubility is explained in terms of the sugar cube 
possessing a certain molecular structure understood as a categorical, non-
dispositional property of the sugar. Furthermore, the sugar’s solubility is identical 
to and reducible to these categorical, non-dispositional properties of the sugar.  
 
The identity between dispositions and categorical properties is contingent, 
according to Armstrong. There are worlds indistinguishable from our world in 
terms of categorical properties, yet possessing different dispositions and powers. 
In this world solubility may be identical with and reducible to a certain 
microstructure, but there are other worlds in which sugar has the same 
microstructure, yet is not soluble.  
 
Armstrong denies that the identity of dispositions and categorical properties is an 
identity of property constitution, such as the a posteriori necessary identification of, 
say heat with the motion of molecules, or of light with electromagnetic radiation 
(Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:39).  Rather, Armstrong uses the functional 
notion of playing a causal role to argue for contingent identity. He uses the 
identity of genes with (sections of) DNA molecules as a model for the contingent 
identification of dispositions and categorical properties:   
“Genes are, by definition, those entities which play the prime causal role 
in the transmission and reproduction of hereditary characteristics. At least 
                     
35 Two chief proponents of categoricalism are Armstrong (1969, 1996) and Lewis (1997). 
Armstrong provides the most sustained and detailed defence of categoricaism, and so I 
concentrate on his account.  
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in some possible world whose laws of nature differ from the actual world, 
something other than DNA might have played the causal role of genes. 
But in fact sections of DNA play that role. So genes are (are identical 
with) sections of DNA.”(Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:39) 
 
Armstrong then applies this account of contingent identity to the case of 
brittleness and its categorical microstructure: 
“In the same way, other microstructures may have played the brittleness 
causal role in the glass, at least in a world whose laws of nature differ from 
the actual world. But it is a contingent truth that the brittleness causal role 
is played by this microstructure, i.e. that the brittleness of this glass is (is 
identical with) this microstructure.” (Armstrong, Martin and Place 
1996:39) 
Given the laws of nature are contingent, as Armstrong argues they are, it is a 
contingent matter that the microstructure in question plays the brittleness role in 
this world. In a world with different laws, the same microstructure may play a 
different casual role and so not be brittle. Hence, the identity of a disposition and 
its causal, categorical basis is contingent. What becomes apparent here is that 
dispositional terms, such as “brittleness”, are non-rigid designators for 
Armstrong. “Brittleness” may pick out different categorical properties in different 
worlds.  
 
Armstrong’s account of the contingent identification of dispositions and 
categorical properties appears to run contrary to his claim that powers are 
identical to and reducible to categorical properties. If the same categorical 
property can have different powers in a world with different laws, then it follows 
that powers are not identical with categorical properties. Armstrong appears to 
have two different accounts of the identity of dispositions. On one account 
powers are identical to and reducible to categorical properties. On the other, 
powers are identical to and reducible to categorical properties plus causal laws. I 
return to this issue below in section three.  
 
4.3.2 Truthmaker argument for categoricalism 
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Armstrong’s argument in Armstrong, Martin and Place (1996) that dispositions 
and powers are identical to and reducible to categorical properties rests upon 
three key planks:  
i. His commitment to the truth-maker principle  
ii. The belief that dispositional ascriptions entail counterfactual statements 
iii. The rejection of intentionality.  
I show that all three of these key planks is open to challenge and as such his 
argument is unsound and so gives us no reason to accept that all properties are 
categorical. Here is a summary of the argument:  
 
 (P1) For every true contingent statement there must be something in the 
world which makes the statement true (Truthmaker principle) 
(P2) Dispositional ascriptions entail counterfactual statements. 
(Counterfactual analysis of dispositions) 
(P3) Counterfactual statements entailed by dispositional ascriptions must 
have a truthmaker. (P1, P2) 
(P4) The truthmaker for a counterfactual statement is not a counterfactual 
state of affairs, as there are no counterfactual states of affairs. 
(Assumption) 
(P5) The truthmaker must be a property of the disposed object and so 
must be either a dispositional or categorical property. (Assumption) 
(P6) The truthmaker for a counterfactual statement is not a dispositional 
property, as there are no dispositional properties. (Assumption) 
Therefore,  
(C1) The truthmaker for a counterfactual statement entailed by a 
dispositional ascription must be a categorical property. (P3, P5, P6)  
As it stands this argument is valid.  
  
Let us look at the argument in detail. The truthmaker principle introduced in 
(P1) holds that: 
“For every true statement, or at least for every true contingent statement, 
there must be something in the world which makes the statement true.” 
(Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:15) 
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Armstrong also refers to the truth-maker principle as the “principle of an 
ontological ground” (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:15). This 
characterisation brings out the point that a truth-maker is supposed to provide an 
ontological ground for the truth of a statement. Armstrong finds the truth-maker 
principle to be “fairly obvious once attention is drawn to it” but admits he does 
not know how to argue for it any further (Armstrong 1989a:89). 
 
Armstrong also holds, as noted in (P2), that dispositional ascriptions entail 
counterfactual statements:  
“It is uncontroversial that this statement [‘This glass is brittle’ said truly of 
an unstruck glass] entails a counterfactual statement along these general 
lines: If this glass had been suitably struck, then this striking would have 
caused the glass to shatter.” (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:15) 
Applying the truthmaker principle, Armstrong asks what makes a counterfactual 
statement entailed by dispositional ascription true?36 He asks, what is its 
ontological ground? (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:15).  
 
One “very bad answer”, according to Armstrong, is that the counterfactual 
statement is made true by a counterfactual state of affairs or fact such as 
(Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:15): 
“…[T]he state of affairs that if, contrary to fact, the glass had been 
suitably struck, then this striking would have caused the glass to break.” 
(Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:15) 
Armstrong does not explicitly state why this would be a very bad answer. 
However, it seems clear enough what the problem is. Truthmakers are states of 
affairs or facts. However, a counterfactual “fact” is by definition contrary to fact 
and so does not exist. By definition there can be no counterfactual facts to serve 
as truthmakers for true counterfactual statements.  
 
After rejecting counterfactual facts, Armstrong instead looks for the required 
truthmaker among the properties of the unstruck glass. He assumes that the 
                     
36 The claim that counterfactuals require truthmakers has been denied by Isaac Levi (2003) on 
the grounds that counterfactuals do not possess truth values.  
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properties of the glass are either dispositional or categorical properties. He then 
argues that the dispositional properties of the unstruck glass cannot serve as 
truthmakers for counterfactuals entailed by dispositional ascriptions on the 
grounds that dispositional properties do not exist. His argument that there are no 
dispositional properties has the form of a modus tollens (and so is valid).   
(P7) Dispositional properties entail there is intentionality in the ultimate 
structure of the universe. 
(P8) There is no intentionality in the ultimate structure of the universe.  
Therefore,  
(C2) There are no dispositional properties. (P7, P8 modus tollens) 
 
In support of premise (P7), Armstrong uses the independence of a disposition and 
its manifestation to argue that dispositions would introduce intentionality into the 
world:  
“For suppose that a thing has, in addition to its purely categorical 
features, active and passive powers and dispositions. It is obviously not a 
necessary truth, indeed it is not true at all, that every active and passive 
power of a particular is always manifested at some point in the existence 
of the particular. Consider then an object that has a particular power, but 
does not manifest it at any time. Given that this power is a non-
categorical property, or is the non-categorical side of the property, then 
the power ‘points’ to a categorical manifestation of the power, but the 
manifestation never exists.” (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:16) 
 
Franz Brentano (Brentano 1924:124f) identifies two criteria for identifying 
intentionality.37 One criterion is that the intentional state or object is directed to 
something beyond itself. The second criterion is that the object or state directed 
                     
37 Brentano (1924:124f) uses the notion of intentionality to mark off the mental from the non-
mental:  
“Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages 
called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, 
though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object…” 
(Brentano 1924:88) 
More recently, a number of philosophers, including Place (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:19-
32) and Molnar (2003:60-81), have questioned Brentano’s distinction by arguing that the 
physical, in the form of dispositional properties or states, are “directed” towards other objects 
(their manifestation) that need not exist and so are intentional. See also Chisolm (1967). 
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at need not exist. For Armstrong, as the quote above makes clear, a disposition 
that is never manifested points beyond itself to a manifestation that does not exist 
and so, he concludes, dispositions are intentional.  
 
Armstrong rules out intentional entities such as dispositions on the grounds that 
intentionality entails an objectionable, inferior level of potential being: 
“Armstrong38 finds irreducible dispositions very mysterious. The 
dispositional property points to, or is pregnant with, a certain 
manifestation. Yet in the case considered, at no point in the whole history 
of the world does this manifestation occur. It is this that prevents one 
taking the disposition as a relation to its manifestation… Yet somehow 
the irreducible disposition involves the manifestation. It would appear 
that we have a second, inferior, level of being: merely potential being. 
With his teacher John Anderson, Armstrong is extremely reluctant to 
postulate such a second level of being.” (Armstrong, Martin and Place 
1996:91)   
Armstrong here argues for premise (P8): There is no intentionality in the ultimate 
structure of the universe. When combined with premise (P7), this forces the 
conclusion (C2) that there are no dispositional properties. This conclusion is used 
to support premise (P6): That the truthmaker for a counterfactual statement is 
not a dispositional property, as there are no dispositional properties. 
 
Having ruled out dispositional properties as truthmakers, Armstrong concludes 
that categorical properties supply the ontological grounding for counterfactual 
statements entailed by dispositional ascriptions:   
“…[T]he truthmaker for the true counterfactual should be sought in 
purely categorical properties of the glass: such things as the molecular 
structure of the glass.” (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:16) 
 
This concludes the overview of Armstrong’s truthmaker argument for 
categoricalism. However, it is worth noting that Armstrong’s account of 
                     
38 This is Armstrong speaking here. The three authors of (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996) 
refer to themselves in the third person. 
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categorical properties as truthmakers is complicated by his claims that strong 
laws of nature are also as part of the truthmaker for true attributions of 
dispositions: 
“Armstrong accepts the need for truthmakers for true attributions of 
unmanifested dispositions. But he suggests that non-dispositional 
properties of the disposed thing plus ‘strong’ laws of nature linking these 
non-dispositional properties may be sufficient truthmakers.” (Armstrong, 
Martin and Place 1996:91-92) 
These two apparently different truthmakers — on the one hand categorical 
properties and on the other hand, categorical properties plus laws of nature — 
mirror the two apparently different accounts of the identity and reducibility of 
dispositions mentioned above. As noted above, I return to this issue in section 
three below.  
 
Problems with the truthmaker argument that all properties are 
categorical 
I now turn to problems with Armstrong’s argument that all properties are 
categorical. I show Armstrong is wrong to claim dispositional ascriptions entail 
counterfactual statements. I also argue Armstrong is wrong to assert dispositions 
are intentional. Finally, I challenge Armstrong’s assertion that all true contingent 
statements require a truthmaker. This leads me to conclude that his truthmaker 
argument that all properties are categorical is unsound and so gives us no reason 
to accept that all properties are categorical. I argue that Armstrong’s 
commitment to the (false) counterfactual analysis of dispositions leads him to 
misunderstand the implications of the independence of a disposition and its 
manifestation when he argues that disposition as are intentional.  
 
Dispositional ascriptions do not entail counterfactual statements 
Finks, mimics, masks and antidotes show that Armstrong is wrong to claim that 
dispositional ascriptions entail counterfactual statements. As noted in chapter 
two, Martin’s electro-fink and reverse electro-fink examples illustrate that the 
truth of a dispositional ascription is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth 
of a corresponding counterfactual statement. As such, Armstrong is wrong to 
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claim that a dispositional ascriptions, such as “This glass is brittle”, entail a 
corresponding counterfactual statement, such as, “If this glass had been struck, 
then this striking would have caused the glass to shatter”. Premise (P2) — the 
claim that dispositional ascriptions entail counterfactual statements — is false and 
so Armstrong’s argument that all properties are categorical is unsound.   
 
However, it appears that Armstrong’s truthmaker argument for categoricalism 
can be recast without making reference to his (false) claim that dispositions entail 
counterfactual statements. Armstrong may simply ask: what is the truthmaker for 
a statement making a dispositional ascription? For example, what is the 
truthmaker for “This glass is fragile”? Such a move would allow Armstrong’s 
argument to proceed without introuducing the troublesome, false semantics of 
the counterfactual analysis of dispositions.   
 
Dispositions are not intentional 
A more serious problem resides in Armstrong’s claim that dispositions are 
intentional. As noted above, Armstrong uses the independence of a disposition 
and its manifestation to argue that dispositions are intentional objects. Powers 
and dispositions can exist in the absence of their manifestation. As such, powers 
and dispositions are ontologically independent of their manifestation.39 Token 
independence seems obvious and undeniable. The Ming vase on level two of the 
Morven Brown building is fragile even when it is not shattering. It need never 
shatter, yet it still remains fragile. Type independence of a disposition and its 
manifestation also holds. A world in which salt (as a type) never came in contact 
with water (or any other liquid) and so never dissolved could still be a world in 
which salt is soluble. Another way of making the point is that it is only a 
contingent matter that in this world salt has been immersed in water and so 
dissolved. That means there is a possible world indistinguishable from our world 
                     
39 Independence seems so obvious that it is worth asking why anybody would deny that a 
disposition and its manifestation are ontologically distinct and independent. Why would someone 
confuse and conflate a disposition with its manifestation? Mumford contends that empiricist, 
verificationist and anti-realist assumptions that refuse to separate evidence from ontology are at 
fault (Mumford 1998:ch3). Verificationist principles entail that a disposition just is its observable 
events, namely its manifestation. 
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accept that no sample of salt has ever come in contact with water and dissolved. 
In such a world salt would still be soluble.  
 
Armstrong is correct to claim a dispositions and its manifestation are 
independent. However, he draws the wrong lesson from independence when he 
argues that dispositions are intentional. Armstrong uses the fact that a disposition 
can exist independently of its manifestation to claim that a disposition is directed 
or points beyond itself to its unrealised, and so non-existent, manifestation and is 
thereby intentional.  
 
The ontological independence of a disposition and its manifestation shows that a 
disposition is a fully formed and respectable property independently of its 
manifestation. The lesson to drawn from this is that dispositions do not point 
beyond themselves. Dispositions are ontologically self-contained in that there 
existence is not dependent on anything else such as manifestations. A disposition 
can exist while its manifestation does not and so is not directed at anything. This 
shows, pace Armstrong, that dispositions need not involve the manifestation and 
do not point beyond themselves to what does not exist and so are not intentional. 
Even if Armstrong is right to state that manifestations involve a second, inferior, 
level of merely potential being this does not entail that dispositions introduce 
such merely potential being into the world. A disposition and its manifestation 
are ontologically distinct and so a disposition has no ontological commitment to 
the existence of any merely potential being in the form of an unrealized 
manifestation. A disposition stands fully formed and ontologically whole 
independently and distinct from any manifestation and its supposedly inferior 
level of being. 
 
A faulty semantics of dispositional ascriptions, in the form the counterfactual 
analysis of dispositions, may have lead Armstrong astray here. The 
counterfactual statement “If this glass had been struck, then this striking would 
have caused the glass to shatter” makes mentions of the disposition’s 
manifestation — its shattering — and so encourages one to mistakenly think the 
manifestation is part of the dispositional ascription and dispositional property.  
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In using independence to attribute intentionality to dispositions it appears 
Armstrong has conflated a way in which we characterize and identify dispositions 
— conditionally, with reference to their possible manifestation — for the 
disposition itself. This leads him to wrongly consider the manifestation to be part 
of the disposition. In doing so Armstrong runs afoul of his own warning not to 
project the ghost of the manifestation into the disposition.  
“what more natural, then, when we turn to the metaphysics of 
dispositionality, than to project into the disposed thing a ghostly image of 
the manifestation of the disposition, even when it is not manifested?” 
(Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:93) 
Yet again, it appears that a faulty semantics of dispositions, in the form of the 
counterfactual analysis, has lead us astray in our understanding of the nature of 
dispositions and properties. Independence shows Armstrong fails to establish that 
dispositions introduce intentionality into the world and so he has given us no 
reason to accept the truth of premise (P6) — that the truthmaker for a 
counterfactual statement entailed by a dispositional ascription is not a 
dispositional property. We therefore have no reason to accept the conclusion of 
his argument that all properties are categorical. 
    
Criticism of the truthmaker principle 
Further problem beset Armstrong’s argument for categoriclism. The prime 
motivation of Armstrong’s argument for categoricalism — the truthmaker 
principle — has been questioned on the grounds it is not generalizable. There 
are true negative existential statements, such as “There are no Artic penguins” 
for which there appear to be no truthmakers.  
 
As noted above, Armstrong finds the truth-maker principle to be “fairly obvious 
once attention is drawn to it” but admits he does not know how to argue for it 
any further (Armstrong 1989a:89). Lewis (1992 in Lewis 1999:203-204) remarks 
that it is easy to believe that some truths have truthmakers, such as he existential 
truth that there are dogs. Dog Harry makes it true (as long as Harry is essentially 
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a dog, and so could not have existed without being a dog) (1992 in Lewis 
1999:203). 
 
However, the existence of negative truths, such as “there are no penguins in the 
Artic”, poses a problem for the truthmaker principle. What are the truthmakers 
for negative truths? One suggestion is that for every negative statement (such as, 
“there are no penguins in the Artic”) there exists a positive state of affairs that is 
incompatible with, and so cannot co-exist with, there being penguins in the Artic. 
Molnar argues that such an account fails on the grounds that a statement of 
incompatibility (such as “p is incompatible with the existence of penguins in the 
Artic”) is a negative statement and so fails to provide an adequate reductive 
explanation. Incompatibility is a relation between two states when it is not 
possible for them to obtain together.    
“We can only explain the truth of ¬p by reference to the truth of p if q is 
incompatible with p. For the explanation to work, ‘p is is incompatible 
with q’ must be true. But this is a negative statement.  Explanations of 
negative truths by incompatibility cannot succeed as reductive 
explanations because such explanations themselves rely on a negative 
statement.” (Molnar 2000:74)  
 
Another suggestion is that negative truths are made true by lack of truthmakers. 
That is, the claim “there are no penguins in the Artic” is true not because of the 
existence of something, but rather because something does not exist — namely a 
counterexamples does not exist to there being no penguins in the Artic. Both 
Lewis and Molnar argue this commits one to the existence of negative facts. 
Lewis argues:  
“…to say that a negative existential is true for lack of truthmakers is the 
same as to say that it’s true because there aren’t any false-makers. The 
demand for truthmakers might lead one into ontological seriousness 
about lacks, but not vice versa.” (Lewis 1992 in Lewis 1999:204) 
While Molnar reasons: 
“If negative existential truths are not to count as true without the benefit 
of anything that exists making them true, it had better be claimed that 
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there really exist such items as lacks, absences, or more generally, 
negative states of affairs. The lesson to be learnt here is that truths that 
are true for lack of false-makers are made true by negative facts! If 
absences are to work for us as truthmakers, we have to take them 
ontologically seriously.” (Molnar 2000:75) 
 
Absence of truthmakers cannot serve as truthmakers for negative statements as 
they would have to postulate negative facts. Molnar argues we should reject 
negative facts on the grounds they are acausal and mysterious.  
 
Armstrong responds to the problem of truthmakers for negative existential 
statements by positing “totality facts”: 
“Now we are in a position to consider negative existential truths. Let it be 
true that a is not F. What makes it true? …Given that a is G and is H and 
that this is the totality of a’s properties, then it is entailed that a is not F.” 
(Armstrong 1989b:96)  
The fact that there are polar bears, Artic foxes, narwhales, snowshoe hares etc. in 
the Artic cannot serve as a truthmaker for the negative existential truth “There 
are no penguins in the Artic”. The existence of these animals does not rule the 
existence of Artic penguins. But if we add a further fact that this is the totality of 
things in the Artic, then these facts would entail the truth of, and so serve as the 
truthmaker for, the statement “There are no penguins in the Artic”. 
 
There are two problems with Armstrong’s appeal to totality facts. Firstly, Molnar 
argues that totality facts are negative facts: 
“The abiding difficulty of TF [totality facts] is that a totality fact is not a 
positive fact at all… Totality statements state the non-existence of certain 
entities, they state ‘no more facts’.” (Molnar 2000:81-82) 
That polar bears, Artic foxes, narwhales, snowshoe hares etc. are all there is in 
the Artic is the same state of affairs as there being nothing that is both a polar 
bear, Artic fox, narwhale, snowshoe hare, snow goose etc. and not in the Artic 
(Molnar 2000:81). We have already rejected negative facts and states of affairs 
and so we must reject totality facts. 
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Both Lewis and Molnar (2000:84) raise a further problem with Armstrong’s 
appeal to totality facts — they are incompatible with Armstrong’s 
combinatorialism. Lewis notes that: 
“The idea [of combinatorialism] was that anything can coexist with 
anything, yet these totality facts have as their very raison d’etre to refuse to 
coexist with other facts. (Lewis 1992 in Lewis 1999:205)  
A totality fact is incompatible with and cannot co-exist with the facts that it rules 
out. That’s exactly the point of using such a truthmaker. However, it violates the 
claim that anything can coexist with anything, as propounded by Armstrong’s 
combinatorialism. 
 
Despite its strong intuitive appeal, there is good reason to hold the truthmaker 
principle as an ontological principle for the grounding of statements cannot be 
generalised. Nonetheless, Lewis thinks there is something right about 
Armstrong’s demand for truthmakers: 
“Yet it [Armstrong’s demand for truthmakers] is not altogether wrong. I 
think it is an overreaction to something right and important and 
underappreciated. What’s right, roughly speaking, is that truths must 
have things as their subject matter. The special case of a negative 
existential is the exception that proves the rule.” (Lewis 1992 in Lewis 
1999:206) 
For Lewis the “kernel of truth” in truthmaking is that propositions have a subject 
and as such their truth or falsity is dependent in some sense on how the world is, 
on its subject matter. Lewis caches this out in terms of supervenience: the truth of 
proposition supervenes on its subject.   
 
I have argued that we should reject all three planks upon which Armstrong’s 
argument for categoricalism rests. I have shown that: dispositional ascriptions do 
not entail counterfactual statements, dispositions do not introduce intentionality 
into the world, and the truthmaker principle is not generalisable as an ontological 
grounding of true statements. Categoricalism may well be true. However, 
Armstrong’s argument that all properties are categorical is unsound and so gives 
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us no reason to accept categoricalism. I showed that a false semantics of 
dispositions, in the form of the counterfactual analysis of dispositions, underpins 
Armstrong’s claims that dispositions entail counterfactual statements and that 
dispositions introduce intentionality and merely potential being into the world. 
 
4.3.3 Problems with categoricalism 
I now turn to three criticism of categoricalism. One criticism claims Armstrong 
has two incompatible accounts of dispositions. A second criticism is that there are 
no purely categorical properties, that all categorical properties are also 
dispositional. A third criticism argues that categorical properties are epistemically 
inaccessible and we therefore have no reason to posit their existence. I argue that 
Armstrong’s categoricalist account of properties and powers can fend off these 
objections and conclude they provide no reason to reject categoricalism. 
 
Armstrong has two incompatible accounts of dispositions 
As noted in section one, Armstrong appears to have two different and 
incompatible accounts of dispositional properties. On one account dispositions 
are identical with and reducible to categorical properties. In particular:  
“…[T]he brittleness of this glass is (is identical with) this microstructure.” 
(Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:39) 
On the other hand, Armstrong’s account of the contingent identity of the 
dispositional and categorical suggests that powers are not reducible to merely 
categorical properties, but rather to categorical properties plus causal laws.40  
                     
40 This tension is also mirrored in his account of truthmakers for counterfactual statements 
entailed by dispositional ascriptions, as noted in section two. Armstrong declares that the 
truthmaker is a categorical property of the disposed object: 
“What Armstrong has to do therefore is to make plausible the idea that categorical 
properties by themselves will provide adequate truthmakers for the counterfactuals 
associated with dispositions, capacities and, more generally, with all active and passive 
powers.” (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:41) 
While elsewhere he includes laws of nature as part of the truthmaker: 
“Armstrong accepts the need for truthmakers for true attributions of unmanifested 
dispositions. But he suggests that non-dispositional properties of the disposed thing plus 
‘strong’ laws of nature linking these non-dispositional properties may be sufficient 
truthmakers.” (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:91-92) 
With different laws, the vase could have possessed the same categorical properties, yet not been 
fragile. As such, the vase and its categorical properties are not a complete truthmaker for the 
counterfactual statement “if this vase had been struck it would have shattered”. For Armstrong 
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Armstrong willing concedes the importance of laws in his reductionist account of 
dispositions: 
“It is obvious that this treatment of dispositions places great weight on the 
notion of a law of nature.” (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:41) 
Armstrong dissolves this apparent incompatibility in these two accounts of 
dispositions by arguing that laws of nature are not casual factors and so are not 
part of dispositional ascriptions (or truthmaker for statements entailed by 
dispositional ascription). According to Armstrong, the microstructure of a fragile 
vase is a causal factor in bringing about its manifestation and is part of the 
truthmaker of a dispositional ascription. However, he claims laws of nature are 
not causal factors. Laws of nature do not bring about the manifestation of a 
disposition. Rather, entities act in accordance with laws of nature: 
“There is no call for non-categorical properties. Notice that the laws are 
not causal factors. The causal factors, real and feigned, bring about the 
manifestation in accordance with the relevant laws, and not with the addition 
of the laws.” (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:41) 
 
To better understand why laws of nature are not casual factors I turn to a debate 
between Ellis and Bird. Ellis attempts to distinguish between categoricalism and 
the pure powers view of properties on the grounds that categorical properties are 
intrinsically passive entities (that are pushed and pulled around by laws of nature 
external to the properties), while properties as pure powers are essentially active 
(Ellis 2002:139-144). On Ellis’ account of categoricalism laws are causal factors. 
Bird rejects Ellis’ account of passive categorical properties pushed around by 
laws: 
“But the picture is highly misleading. Strictly, the metaphysics of laws 
does not tell us that the laws push and pull things around. The only 
pushing and pulling is done by one object on another, in virtue of the 
forces between them. To be sure, the forces exist in virtue of the laws, but 
that doesn’t make it legitimate to talk of the laws doing any pushing or 
pulling. Imagine some object attached to a spring. We may explain its 
                                                        
there appear to be two different truthmakers for counterfactual statements entailed by 
dispositional ascriptions. 
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motion by the force exerted by the spring, a force governed by Hooke’s 
law. But that doesn’t make Hooke’s law exert a force — it is only the 
spring that exerts a force. ‘Pushing’, ‘pulling’, ‘exerting a force’ are all 
causal notions. But on no metaphysics of laws do laws cause anything, 
although they may govern what causes what. No doubt, such talk is 
intended metaphorically and so not to have its usual causal implications. 
But those implications nonetheless make the metaphor a misleading one.” 
(Bird 2007:129) 
Bird shows why Ellis is wrong to characterize categorical properties as passive 
and laws as causal factors pushing things around. In so doing, Bird’s account of 
the role of laws fleshes out Armstrong’s claim that objects act in accordance with 
laws of nature rather than being caused to act by laws. The spring causes the 
object to act the way it does, not Hooke’s law. Hooke’s law does not exert any 
force on the object and does not cause it to act.  
 
On the basis of the claim that laws of nature are not casual factors, Armstrong 
dissolves the apparent tension of having two different accounts of dispositions and 
avoids admitting non-categorical entities such as laws to his account of 
dispositions. Armstrong’s argument here rests upon the claim that only causal 
factors are part of the dispositional ascription (or truthmakers for counterfactual 
statements entailed by dispositional ascriptions).  
 
Categorical properties are also dispositional. 
Franklin (1986), Heil (2003) and Martin (Armstrong, Martin and Place 1996:73) 
challenge Armstrong’s claim that all properties are purely categorical. They 
argue that supposedly purely categorical properties are also dispositional.  
 
Franklin asks us to consider Democritus’ attempt to reduce all properties to the 
shape (a categorical property) and movement of atoms. In particular, Democritus 
explains the hardness (a dispositional property) of solids in terms of the hooked 
shape (a categorical property) of the atoms of solids. These hooked atoms stick to 
one another and thereby make an object solid. However, Franklin notes that the 
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hardness of a solid depends not only on the hooked shape of its atoms but also on 
their rigidity (a dispositional property): 
“In order to make the solid hard, however, the atoms must not only be 
hooked, but must retain their hooked shape when they come into contact 
with other atoms.” (Franklin 1986:62) 
To retain their hooked shape these atoms must also be rigid. However, rigidity 
— the property of preserving shape when acted upon in certain ways — is a 
dispositional property. Franklin’s argument shows that shape, a paradigm 
categorical property, involves a dispositional property. Franklin draws the 
conclusion that dispositions cannot be eliminated from our ontology.  
 
Heil uses a different example to make the same point as Franklin (Heil 2003:93). 
Heil argues that a ball rolls or could roll in virtue of its spherical shape, but only if 
it is also rigid. The ball’s disposition to roll cannot be reduced to a purely 
categorical property of shape, but must also include the dispositional property of 
rigidity. Just as the categorical property of shape is insufficient for hardness, so 
too the ball’s shape is insufficient for the ball to possess the power to roll.  
 
Martin finds it so evident that structural properties, used by Armstrong as 
examples of purely categorical properties, are also dispositional, that he does not 
bother to argue the point: 
“Place and Armstrong have emphasized structural properties in their 
discussion of dispositional properties. Martin thinks the emphasis is 
misguided, not only because what is structural is evidently intrinsically 
dispositional itself, but, more importantly, because the issue can be more 
cleanly discussed in terms of non-structural properties.” (Armstrong, 
Martin and Place 1996:73) 
 
Armstrong accepts Martin’s claim that, structural properties, such as shape, 
involve dispositionality: 
“In talking about the categorical properties that dispose a thing to act in a 
certain manner if and when certain initiating causes are present, 
influenced no doubt by a desire to tie the discussion to paradigm cases 
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such as brittleness, both Place and Armstrong speak of ‘structures’. But 
structures such as bondings, the sort of structures that are relevant to 
dispositions such as brittleness, are, as Martin says, ‘evidently intrinsically 
dispositional’ themselves. Bonding, in particular, is a sort of negative 
disposition, involving resistance to parting.” (Armstrong, Martin and 
Place 1996:90) 
 
Armstrong preserves his categorical account of properties in the face of these 
counterexamples by following Martin’s suggestion and restricting his ontology to 
the fundamental particles, that are pointlike and lacking in structure:  
“Armstrong therefore sees the force in Martin’s suggestion that it is best 
to work with such cases as hypothetical non-structural properties of 
(hypothetical) genuinely elementary particles.” (Armstrong, Martin and 
Place 1996:90)  
Armstrong asks that a grain of salt be used when talking about categorical 
structures underlying ordinary everyday dispositions of macroscopic objects, as 
he finds such examples useful to give concreteness to the discussion of 
dispositions.  
 
How successful is this move by Armstrong? It was argued that structural 
properties such as shape also involve dispositionality and are not purely 
categorical. In response, Armstrong makes an ontological retreat to the realm of 
fundamental properties, which are point like and lacking in structure. The 
counterexamples and criticisms presented by Franklin and Heil have no purchase 
in this realm of structureless entities and so give us no reason to think that 
fundamental properties are dispositional. 
 
No epistemic access to causally inert properties 
Categoricalism has also been criticized on epistemic grounds. It is claimed that if 
properties are categorical, then we cannot have any knowledge of them. One 
argument contends that categorical properties are causally inert and so are 
undetectable and unknowable. A second argument rests upon the identity 
conditions for categorical properties. It reasons that if categorical properties are 
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quiddities, then their identity is independent of any of the features in virtue of 
which we are capable of detecting and knowing them. I show both arguments fail 
to establish the truth of their conclusion. The first argument rests upon a 
misunderstanding of categorical properties. The second begs the question. 
 
A number of philosophers have questioned how we could have epistemic access 
to purely categorical properties on the ground that they are causally inert 
properties. For example, Heil voices these concerns when he notes that: 
“An advocate of the view that properties are powers can reasonably 
challenge an opponent [that is, a proponent of categoricalism] to produce 
an example of a purely qualitative property. If such a property is 
detectable, then it would not seem to be purely qualitative after all. If it is 
not detectable, it will be tricky to recruit it as an example.” (Heil 2003:87) 
 
This epistemic criticism assumes that categorical properties are acasual. 
However, this assumption relies on Ellis’ misleading metaphor of categorical 
properties as passive, inert entities. As noted above, Bird shows why this 
metaphor is wrong. He argued that categorical properties are not inert, passive 
entities pushed and pulled around by laws of nature. Rather, properties act in 
accordance with laws of nature. If this is correct, then categorical properties are 
not inert, passive entities and so need not be undetectable and unknowable. 
Furthermore, once this misleading metaphor is dispelled, there is also no reason 
to think that detectability entails a property is not purely categorical. 
Detectability is accounted for in terms of purely categorical properties acting in 
accordance with laws of nature. The significant point here is that powers, and so 
detectability, are accounted for without admitting any non-categorical entities. 
This argument that categorical properties are unknowable is unsound. It rests on 
the false premise that categorical properties are acasual. 
 
I now turn to the second epistemic argument against the existence of categorical 
properties. In chapter 4.2 I discussed Bird’s contention that categorical properties 
are quiddities. It follows, argues Bird, that the transworld identity of properties as 
quiddities is independent of any of the features in virtue of which we are capable 
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of detecting them. As such, Bird reasons, we cannot detect or know any 
categorical properties. Bird counters that we do have knowledge of properties, 
and so categoricalism must be false. This leads Bird to conclude that we should 
reject categoricalism’s account of properties and powers in favour of dispositional 
essentialism.  
 
I showed that Lewis, a proponent of categoricalism and properties as quiddities, 
rejects Bird’s conclusion by rejecting his premise that we do have knowledge of 
properties. He argues for “Ramseyan humility”, an epistemic humility about 
properties (Lewis 2009). In advocating epistemic humility, Lewis argues that we 
can know that a certain property role is occupied, but denies that we can know 
what property or power it is that occupies that role.  
 
As I argued in chapter 2.2, for dispositional essentialism, a property just is its 
causal property role. As such, for dispositional essentialism, to know that a 
certain property role is occupied is to know what property or power occupies that 
role. The point I stressed in chapter 2.2 was that Bird and Lewis are in 
agreement in so far as we can know that a certain property role is occupied. They 
disagree about whether the nature and identity of a property is exhausted by the 
causal property role it occupies. As such, the disagreement is not epistemic, as 
Bird claims. Rather the dispute is metaphysical. I concluded that Bird’s 
supposedly epistemic argument against categoricalism turns out to be a 
metaphysical disagreement about the nature of properties. The disagreement is 
about whether or not the nature of a property is exhausted by the causal role it 
plays. Bird’s epistemic argument against categoricalism only gains traction by 
assuming dispositional essentialism, by assuming that there is no more to a 
property than its causal role. As such, Bird’s epistemic argument cannot be used 
as an argument against categoricalism without facing the charge of begging the 
question. Bird’s epistemic argument fails to give us any reason to reject 
categoricalist accounts of properties. 
 
Conclusion 
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Armstrong’s categoricalist account of properties and powers manages to fend off 
the three objections ranged against it here in section 4.3.3. Categoricalism is not 
inconsistent or obviously false. However, as argued in section two, Armstrong has 
failed to provide any reason to accept his claim that all properties are categorical 
and that dispositions are reducible to and identical to categorical properties. His 
argument for categoricalism was shown to be unsound. Two premises — the 
claim that dispositional ascriptions entail counterfactual statements and that 
dispositions are intentional — were both shown to be false. Both premises rest 
upon the false claim that dispositions entail and are analysable in terms of 
counterfactuals. The problem is that counterfactual conditions merely provide a 
defeasible, rough-and-ready way to pick out dispositions. Armstrong has confused 
and conflated a means by which we picks the reference for dispositional terms for 
the meaning of those terms and made unwarranted ontological conclusion about 
the nature of dispositions and dispositional ascriptions.  
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Chapter 4.4 — Dispositions are not extrinsic properties 
Introduction — Arguments that dispositions are extrinsic properties of 
their bearers are invalid or unsound and so fail to establish the truth of 
their conclusions. 
 
4.4.1 The intrinsic extrinsic distinction 
o Two definitions of intrinsic: independence, duplicate 
o Problems with the with intrinsic extrinsic distinction  
4.4.2 Smith’s argument that dispositions are relational and extrinsic 
properties of their bearers 
o Prior’s response — the complete dispositional predicate defeats Smith 
o Choi’s distinction between being fragile and being disposed to be 
fragile undercuts Prior 
o Independence of a disposition and its manifestation shows Smith is 
wrong to claim dispositions are extrinsic 
4.4.3 McKitrick’s arguments that dispositions are extrinsic 
properties of their bearers 
o McKitrick’s key-and-lock argument for extrinsic properties 
o McKitrick’s argument that weight is extrinsic 
§ Argument fails as McKitrick uses a non-rigid designator to 
define “weight” 
§ Bird’s reply that rest mass is “doing the work” and it is 
intrinsic 
4.4.4 Molnar on Boyle’s key-and-lock argument for relational, 
extrinsic properties 
o Boyle’s key-and-lock argument for relational, extrinsic powers. 
o Molnar uses Leibniz’ criticism of occasionalism to show extrinsic 
dispositional powers are founded on intrinsic properties 
o A better argument that extrinsic properties are founded upon and 
reducible to the intrinsic properties of their bearers 
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o Conflating a disposition and its manifestation underpins Boyle’s 
argument for relational, extrinsic properties 
 
Conclusion — Arguments that dispositions are relational, extrinsic properties 
of their bearers mistake the manner in which we identify, pick out and talk about 
dispositions for the nature of dispositions. These arguments conflate the 
manifestation of a disposition (which may be extrinsic) with the disposition itself 
and so make unwarranted ontological claims that dispositions are extrinsic. They 
also fail to distinguish between rigid and non-rigid ways of designating 
dispositions. Just because we can use an extrinsic property term to designate a 
disposition it does not follow that dispositions are themselves extrinsic. 
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Introduction 
This chapter examines arguments that dispositions and powers are extrinsic 
properties of their bearers. Molnar holds that:41 
“Powers are intuited as intrinsic by common sense, and the intuition is 
reinforced by the use of certain concepts, and the existence of certain 
practices, in science.” (Molnar 2003:102) 
However, a number of philosophers argue that powers are extrinsic and 
relational properties of their bearers. I examine arguments by A.D. Smith (1977), 
Jennifer McKitrick (2003) and Robert Boyle (1666) that powers and dispositions 
are extrinsic properties of their bearers.  
 
I make three claims. One, I conclude that arguments for extrinsic powers are 
either invalid or unsound and therefore fail to give any reason to accept that 
powers are extrinsic. Two, I show that even if dispositions are extrinsic 
properties, they are nonetheless founded upon and reducible to intrinsic 
properties of their bearers. Three, I note that these arguments mistake the 
manner in which we identify, pick out and talk about dispositions for the nature 
of dispositions. They confuse the manifestation of a disposition (which may be 
extrinsic) with the disposition itself. They also fail to distinguish between rigid 
and non-rigid ways of designating dispositions. We can use extrinsic property 
terms to designate and refer to a disposition, but it does not follow that 
dispositions are themselves extrinsic. 
 
4.4.1 The intrinsic extrinsic distinction 
Before examining arguments for extrinsic dispositional properties, I will say a few 
words about the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction.  
 
Two definitions of intrinsic 
Paradigms of intrinsic properties are shape, mass and internal structure. Whereas 
paradigms of extrinsic properties are weight and spatial relations; such as being 
                     
41 Other philosophers that view dispositions as intuitively intrinsic are Lewis (1997:148), Mellor 
(1974:158) and Mackie (1973:ch4). 
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five miles from Gundagai. There are at least two definitions of intrinsicality in 
philosophical debate:  
a. Duplicates — F is an intrinsic property of a iff there is no exact 
duplicate of a that is not F. (Langton and Lewis 1998) 
b. Independence — F is an intrinsic property of a iff a’s having F is 
independent of the existence or non-existence of any b that is distinct 
from a. (Molnar 2003) 
The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is also often used to mark a distinction between 
relational and non-relational properties.42 
c. Non-relationality — F is an intrinsic property of a iff F is a non-
relational property of a. (Smith 1977) 
 
Problems with the with intrinsic/extrinsic distinction  
Lewis notes that definitions of intrinsicality form “a tight little family of 
interdefinables” (Lewis 1999:112). In one case, intrinsicality is defined in terms of 
being a duplicate, which in turn is defined in terms of intrinsicality. In the other 
case, intrinsicality is defined in terms of independence, which in turn is defined in 
terms of intrinsicality.  
 
Perhaps interdefinable terms need not be a problem. For example, we may 
define necessity in terms of possibility and possibility in terms of necessity. In any 
case, Lewis and Langton (1998) claim that the problem of interdefinables can be 
overcome. I will not pursue the matter, but instead turn to a more serious 
problem that confronts both the duplicate and independence criteria for 
intrinsicality.  
 
                     
42 The terms “relational” and “intrinsic” are neither equivalent nor coextensive. A property may 
be both relational and intrinsic. Weatherson (2006) provides an example. Having longer legs than 
arms is an intrinsic property, yet it also involves a certain relation. Perhaps one could argue that 
the longer than relation supervenes on, or is some way reducible to, the intrinsic properties of its 
relata, and so may be intrinsic. However, there are convincing reasons for thinking 
foundationalism about relational properties is wrong. For example, Molnar (2003:51-54) shows 
that spatio-temporal relations are not reducible to their relata:  
“If relations between objects and space-time can change without the real intrinsic 
properties of either undergoing any change, then spatio-temporal relations appear to 
lack foundation in their relata.” (Molnar 2003:53) 
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Shape, often cited as a paradigmatic example of an intrinsic property, fails to 
satisfy either the independence or duplicate criteria for an intrinsic property. Ellis 
(2001:27) points out that the shape of a stretched rubber band depends in part 
upon the external, outside forces doing the stretching. As such, shape is not an 
intrinsic property, on either the independence or duplicate criteria. A duplicate 
of the rubber band need not be stretched, and so will have a different shape. 
Hence shape is not an intrinsic property on the duplicate definition. The shape of 
the rubber band is dependent, at least in part, on outside, external forces and so 
the rubber band’s shape is not independent of the existence or non-existence of 
any b distinct from the rubber band. Shape is not an intrinsic property on the 
independence definition. What does this show? I think this suggests that neither 
criterion is necessary for a property to be intrinsic. At best these definitions 
provide sufficient conditions for a property being intrinsic. But that is not enough 
for an adequate definition, which requires an equivalence relation between the 
definiendum and the definiens. 
 
Such problems have lead Brian Weatherson (2006) to suggest there may be no 
fact of the matter which distinction the words “intrinsic” and “extrinsic” latch 
onto. While Humberstone (1996) suggests that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction 
is at best confused and perhaps worthless. Faced with these problem, 
philosophers have been prone to give up on pinning down a notion of 
intrinsicality and declare that, despite these shortcoming, we nonetheless have 
enough or a working definition to get on with things.  
 
I share these misgivings. However, my primary concern in this chapter is to show 
that arguments for extrinsic dispositional properties are either invalid or unsound 
(and so fail to establish the truth of their conclusion). For the sake of argument, I 
accept the intrinsic/extrinsinc distinction has substance, and show that 
nonetheless, arguments advanced for the existence of extrinsic dispositional 
propeties fail.   
 
4.4.2 Smith’s argument that dispositions are relational and extrinsic 
properties of their bearers 
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I now turn arguments claiming that dispositions are extrinsic properties of their 
bearers. In this section, I show that A.D. Smith (1977) wrongly conflates the 
manifestation and manifestation conditions of a disposition (which may be 
extrinsic) for the dispositions itself when he argues that dispositions are relational 
and extrinsic properties of their bearers.   
 
Smith’s argument employs an example of a woodblock that gains a disposition — 
fragility — by changing its location:43 
“A sturdy wooden block is taken on a space flight to Neptune. The inner 
constitution of the block does not change at all, but when the astronauts 
who are flying the spacecraft arrive on Neptune and one of them 
inadvertently knocks the block to the ground it shatters.” (Smith 
1977:142) 
Not only has the woodblock gained a disposition on its travels to Neptune, it has 
done so without any change in its inner constitution or intrinsic properties: 
“It will make sense to say that an object has changed its nature even 
though the intrinsic constitution of the object has changed in no way 
whatever.” (Smith 1977:445) 
Smith intention here is to explicitly reject Armstrong’s (1968, 1973) claims that 
any dispositional change must be in the intrinsic properties of the object: 
“What our example shows is that Armstrong goes too far in insisting that 
the change in question must concern the intrinsic nature of the object in 
question.”(Smith 1977 142) 
 
Having ruled out that the change in disposition is a result of a change in the 
intrinsic properties of the object, Smith proposes that we look to the 
environment:  
“In our example the change consists in the translation of our block of 
wood from the earth’s environment to one which causes the wood to 
                     
43 Smith notes that it does not necessarily follow that the woodblock is fragile. It is possible an evil 
demon zaps the woodblock on Neptune with, say, a destructo-ray as it is falling, causing it to 
shatter. But he supposes that it is fragile. That is, Smith’s example is meant to show that it is 
possible that the same woodblock may be fragile on Neptune and yet not-fragile on Earth. 
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behave surprisingly differently from the way it behaves on earth.” (Smith 
1977:142) 
Change of environment here leads to change of disposition. This makes the 
environment part of the dispositional ascription, part of what it is to posses a 
disposition: 
“The first point to make is that all dispositional predication takes place 
against a presupposed environmental background.” (Smith 1977:443) 
Elsewhere, he reiterates this point: 
“That to ascribe a disposition to an object is, firstly, implicitly to locate an 
object in a general type of environment.” (Smith 1977:443) 
 
Smith is not arguing that a disposition is wholly determined by the environment 
and extrinsic properties. Rather, the environment is merely part of what it is for 
an object to possess a particular disposition: 
“It (Smith’s view) refuses to restrict this ‘basis’ to the internal constitution 
of the object which possesses the disposition.” (Smith 1977:445) 
Instead, it includes both the internal constitution of the object and its 
environment: 
“Since both the internal constitution of an object and the environment of 
that object are relevant to the behaviour of that object, so that both of 
these factors must be taken into account when using the concept of a 
‘basis’ for dispositions, and since, also, to assert that an object possesses a 
disposition is explicitly to say something about that object.” (Smith 
1977:443)  
 
Smith’s claim that the dispositional basis is relational (and includes external, 
environmental factors) commits Smith to the existence of extrinsic dispositions, 
on both the duplicate and independence criteria of extrinsic. According to the 
duplicate criterion: 
F is an extrinsic property of a if and only if there is an exact duplicate of a 
that is not F.  
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The woodblock on Neptune possesses the property of being fragile. However, a 
duplicate of the woodblock on Earth does not possess the property of being 
fragile. Hence, being fragile is an extrinsic property of the woodblock.  
 
According to the independence criterion: 
F is an extrinsic property of a if and only if a’s having F is dependent on 
the existence or non-existence of some b that is distinct from a.  
The woodblock on Earth lacks the property of being fragile, yet the woodblock 
on Neptune possesses the property of being fragile. We have a case of the same 
woodblock possessing different properties — being fragile and being not-fragile 
— in different environments. This shows that the property of being fragile is 
dependent on some b that is distinct from the woodblock. Hence, being fragile is 
an extrinsic property of the woodblock according to the independence criterion 
of intrinsicality.44 
 
Prior’s response — the complete dispositional predicate defeats 
Smith 
Prior uses her notion of the incomplete dispositional predicates to defend 
Armstrong’s claim that the dispositional basis must be one or more of the non-
relational properties of the disposed object (Prior 1985:54-58). She argues, 
contrary to Smith, that the woodblock is fragile wherever it is located and so does 
not gain a disposition on its journey to Neptune. If Prior is correct, then Smith is 
wrong to conclude that the dispositional basis is relational and extrinsic. I 
conclude that Prior is not correct. In the next section, I argue that Prior’s claim 
that the woodblock is fragile wherever it is located is undercut by a distinction 
Sungho Choi (2008) draws between possessing a disposition and being disposed 
to possess a disposition. 
                     
44 These extrinsic properties are real properties for Smith. They are not what P.T. Geach (1969) 
calls merely Cambridge properties, involved in merely Cambridge changes. Following Kim 
(1974), I use the example of Socrates’ death and Xanthippe becoming a widow. For Geach, 
Socrates’ death is a real change in Socrates. Whereas, Xanthippe’s becoming a widow is not a 
real change in Xanthippe. It is only a change in which predicates she satisfies. Being transported 
to Neptune brought about a change in the woodblock, a real change. It has, according to Smith, 
gained a disposition and with it a different way of acting and behaving — it shattered when struck 
on Neptune. It seems clear that Smith regards the change undergone by the woodblock to not be 
merely changes in its Cambridge properties or the predicates it satisfies.  
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Prior sees an ambiguity in ordinary language dispositional concepts that arises 
because the dispositional predicate is incomplete (Prior 1985:5). She uses 
solubility an example to make her point:  
“Consider the question ‘Is nail-polish soluble?’ How are we to answer this 
question? Certainly nail-polish will not dissolve in water of temperature 
20C, and under pressure of 1 atmosphere (these are ordinary room-type 
conditions). However nail-polish will dissolve in acetone (the basic 
ingredient of nail-polish remover) at 20C and 1atm.” (Prior 1985:6) 
Prior further notes that virtually any solid object will go into solution under some 
set of conditions: 
“There is no solid of which I can think for which I cannot also think of a 
solvent which will dissolve that solid at standard room temperature…. 
[F]or a given solid and a given solvent that solid will dissolve in that 
solvent if we just make the temperature and pressure high enough.” (Prior 
1985:6) 
The same point can be made of fragility. Is a steel beam fragile? Well that 
depends. A steel beam at room temperature will not shatter when struck with 
moderate force. However, a steel beam at room temperature will shatter when 
struck with massive force. Also, a steel beam cooled to absolute zero will shatter 
when struck with moderate force. 
 
According to Prior, the source of this ambiguity lies in the incompleteness of the 
dispositional predicate. The statement “a is F”, where is F is a dispositional 
predicate, appears to be a one-place predicate. However, this is misleading, 
dispositional predicates have at least two-places. Choi (2008) characterises Prior’s 
account of incomplete dispositional predicates as involving hidden argument 
places. This different perspective, or at least different terminology, sheds light on 
Prior’s position. Choi notes that the relational expression “…is taller than…” has 
two argument places. It requires completion by two terms to form a complete 
proposition and take a truth value: 
“In view of this, we can say that Prior’s thesis that ‘fragile’ is an 
incomplete predicate boils down to the claim that, though ‘fragile’ 
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appears to have one argument place, in fact it has more than one.” (Choi 
2008:158)  
In order to complete the dispositional predicate we need to fill in the background 
conditions (and perhaps the initiating cause of its manifestation).45 According to 
Prior: 
 “If we follow this intuition then we will say salt is water-soluble at STP, 
phosphorus is not water-soluble at STP, but phosphorus is water-soluble 
at high temperatures and pressure.” (Prior 1985:7) 
The dispositional predicate is F is incomplete and as a result the statement “a is 
F” lacks a truth value.  However, the dispositional predicate is F under conditions M 
and initiating cause N is complete and hence the statement “a is F under conditions N 
and initiating cause M” possess a truth value.  
 
Prior applies her analysis of the dispositional predicate to Smith’s claim that the 
woodblock is fragile. She takes the incomplete dispositional predicate “is fragile” 
and completes it: 
“Using dispositional predicates as incomplete predicates I would give the 
following account of Smith’s case. The block of wood is non-fragile (under 
conditions CE – Earth-type conditions), and fragile (under conditions CN 
– Neptune-like conditions). The block of wood possesses the disposition of 
fragility (under conditions CN), wherever it is located.” (Prior 1985:46) 
Instead of the incomplete predicate “is fragile”, we now have the (more) complete 
predicate “is fragile (under conditions Cn)”.  
 
With this move Prior undercuts Smith’s claim that the woodblock gained a 
disposition on its trip to Neptune, and with it his claim that dispositions are 
relational and extrinsic properties of their bearers. According to Prior’s complete 
dispositional predicate, the woodblock is fragile (under conditions Cn) wherever it 
is located. The woodblock is fragile (under conditions Cn) when located on 
                     
45 Prior notes that an unspecified initiating causes may also render a dispositional predicate 
incomplete: 
“Let us now focus our attention on the initiating cause. Suppose that we have a piece of 
steel and that the ordinary standing conditions obtain – temperature of 20C etc. This 
piece of steel will not shatter if struck with a blow of medium force. However, it will 
shatter if struck with a blow of immense force.” (Prior 1985:7) 
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Earth. And the woodblock is fragile (under conditions Cn) when located on 
Neptune. Hence, according to Prior’s analysis of the dispositional predicate, the 
woodblock does not gain (or lose) a disposition on the trip to Neptune. Smith’s 
argument that dispositional properties are relational and extrinsic properties of 
their bearers rests upon his claim that the woodblock gained a disposition. Prior’s 
complete dispositional predicate shows Smith has no reason to claim that 
dispositional properties are relational and extrinsic properties of their bearers. 
 
Choi’s distinction between being fragile and being disposed to be 
fragile undercuts Prior’s argument 
Choi draws a distinction between possessing a disposition and being disposed to 
possess a disposition. I use his distinction to argue Prior is mistaken when she 
claims, contrary to Smith, that the woodblock does not gain a disposition on its 
trip to Neptune. 
 
Choi describes a steel beam. It is not actually fragile, but would be fragile if 
cooled down to an extremely low temperature (Choi 2008:160). The steel beam 
has what Choi terms a “compound” disposition to be fragile, but this is not the 
same as actually being fragile:  
“It is to be realized that an object that is actually not fragile may have the 
compound disposition to be fragile if placed under the condition of low 
enough temperatures, and vice versa. Then it follows that the compound 
disposition in question must be distinguished from fragility.” (Choi 
2008:160) 
Choi seems right to draw this distinction. We do not call a steel beam fragile, 
even though there are circumstances under which it would shatter. 
 
Prior’s argument against Smith rests upon her claim that the woodblock did not 
gain a disposition on the trip to Neptune. But Choi’s distinction suggests 
otherwise. According to Choi’s distinction, the woodblock on Earth has a 
compound disposition to be fragile but is not actually fragile. Whereas the 
woodblock on Neptune is actually fragile. Contrary to Prior’s claims, the 
woodblock does gain a disposition when it journeys from Earth to Neptune. With 
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this, Prior’s argument against Smith collapses. Prior has shown no reason to 
reject Smith’s premise that the woodblock gains a disposition.  
 
In the next section I give an argument that shows why Smith is wrong to claim 
dispositions are extrinsic properties of their bearers. Before turning to that, I want 
to say a few words about how Prior’s understanding of dispositions is influenced 
by a faulty semantics of dispositions in the form of the counterfactual analysis of 
dispositions. On the counterfactual analysis: 
x is fragile if and only if x were dropped then x would shatter. 
On the counterfactual analysis anything that would shatter upon being struck or 
dropped (under some condition) is fragile. This presents a problem. As Prior 
noted, virtually any solid object will shatter under some set of conditions. 
Virtually every solid object is therefore rendered fragile on the counterfactual 
analysis of dispositions. The problem is that we do not ascribe fragility to virtually 
every solid object. Vases and glass are considered fragile, but not steel beams and 
concrete blocks. Prior describes the problem as such: 
“Dispositional predicates are useful because they divide the world into 
those items which posses a particular disposition D and those items that 
do not. Dispositional predicates would lose this utility if our criterion for 
ascribing disposition D to an item were simply that this item would 
manifest that disposition under some set of circumstances.” (Prior 1985:6) 
 
Prior and Choi respond to this problem in two different ways. Prior’s response is 
to treat the dispositional predicate as incomplete. The complete dispositional 
predicate leaves us with fragility under conditions N, fragility under conditions 
M, and so on. While virtually any object will break under some conditions, not 
every object will break under conditions M. This shows that the completed 
dispositional predicate is able to divide up the world into those items which 
posses a particular disposition D (under circumstances M) and those items that do 
not. The utility of dispositional predicates is saved. 
 
Choi responds by distinguishing between being fragile and being disposed to be 
fragile. The distinction between being fragile and being disposed to be fragile 
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allows for the existence of objects that would shatter upon being struck (such as 
steel beams), but are nonetheless not fragile (they only possess a compound 
disposition to be fragile). In making this distinction, Choi saves the utility of 
dispositional predicates. His distinction shows dispositional predicate are able to 
divide up the world into those items which posses a particular disposition D and 
those items that do not. All items may well shatter under some conditions, but, 
because of the distinction, the dispositional predicate is fragile does not apply to all 
objects. 
 
However, Choi’s distinction between being fragile and being disposed to be 
fragile undermines the counterfactual analysis. On Choi’s distinction, there are 
objects that satisfy the counterfactual definition of fragility — they would shatter 
if struck — but are nonetheless not fragile.46 I have argued in chapter two that 
the counterfactual analysis is wrong.) So I think Choi is right to distinguish 
between possessing a disposition and being disposed to possess a disposition. He 
is right to say that just because something would break upon being struck it does 
not follow that it is fragile. 
 
Independence of a disposition and its manifestation shows Smith is 
wrong to claim dispositions are extrinsic 
Despite the shortcomings of Prior’s argument, there is still good reason to hold 
that Smith fails to establish the truth of his premise that the woodblock gains a 
disposition on its journey to Neptune and his conclusion that dispositions are 
extrinsic properties of their bearers. I argue that Smith, in locating the 
dispositional basis in the relational properties of an object, confuses and conflates 
a disposition with its manifestation. The manifestation and the manifestation 
conditions of a disposition may well be extrinsic, but that gives us no reason to 
hold that the disposition (or its causal basis) is extrinsic. This is because a 
disposition and its manifestation are ontologically distinct. 
 
                     
46 Choi (2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2008b, 2009, 2011) devotes much energy to defending the 
counterfactual analysis of dispositions. However, he does not explicitly note or address this 
incompatibility between the counterfactual analysis and his distinction being possessing a 
disposition and being disposed to possess a disposition. 
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Smith claims the woodblock loses a disposition (sturdiness) and gains a disposition 
(fragility) on its journey to Neptune without any change in its “inner 
constitution”. According to Smith, the woodblock is not fragile on Earth, yet is 
fragile on Neptune. Perhaps Smith is correct, but his example alone fails to 
demonstrate this. All his inter-planet example shows is the woodblock has gained 
the conditions to manifest the disposition of fragility and so shatter on its journey 
to Neptune. Given the ontological independence of a disposition and its 
manifestation (as argued for in chapter 4.3), this is not sufficient to show that the 
woodblock gained a disposition. Smith has conflated the disposition — fragility 
— with its manifestation — shattering. He has conflated conditions Cn 
(Neptune-like conditions), required for the woodblock to shatter, with the actual 
property of being fragile.   
 
Smith anticipates the denial of his claim that the woodblock gained a disposition 
on its journey to Neptune. He thinks that in denying the woodlbock gains a 
disposition: 
“We are implying that the concept of an object’s nature is in a sense 
deeper than the notions of disposition or power...” (Smith 1977:455) 
Smith mischaracterises the implications here because he misunderstands the 
nature of a disposition. The issue is not whether or not the concept of an object’s 
nature is deeper than its dispositions or powers, rather the issue is that the 
concept of a disposition or power is deeper than its manifestation. Smith is 
unable to see this as he confuses and conflates the manifestation for the 
disposition. He confuses and conflates the manner in which we identify and pick 
out fragile — by reference to their breaking and shattering — with fragility itself.  
 
Why would Smith, or anyone else, confuse and conflate a disposition with its 
manifestation? Mumford contends that empiricist, verificationist and anti-realist 
assumptions that refuse to separate evidence from ontology are at fault (Mumford 
1998:ch3). Verificationist principles entail that a disposition just is its observable 
events, namely its manifestation. Armstrong describes this mistaken conflation as 
a propensity to: 
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“…project into the disposed things a ghostly image of the manifestation of 
the disposition, even when it is not manifested.” (Armstrong, Martin, 
Place 1996:93)  
 
In chapter three one I introduced Kripke’s distinction between fixing the 
reference of a term and giving its meaning. Kripke warns us to: 
“Bear in mind the contrast between the a priori but perhaps contingent 
properties carried by a term, given by the way its reference was fixed, and 
the analytic (and hence necessary) properties a term may carry, given by 
its meaning… the way the reference of a term is fixed should not be 
regarded as a synonym for the term.” (Kripke 1980:135) 
Smith’s argument for relational, extrinsic dispositions fails to take note of this 
distinction. Smith confuses and conflates how we identify and fix the reference of 
a disposition with the disposition itself. As noted, independence shows that a 
disposition is ontologically distinct from its manifestation. We may well use the 
manifestation of a disposition to identify a disposition, but it is not what the 
disposition is. Moreover, “fragility” does not mean “shattering”. “Shattering” is 
not a synonym for “fragility”. Smith mistakenly equates the outward, contingent 
signs of a disposition, namely its manifestation, or manifestation conditions with 
the disposition itself when he argues that dispositions are relational and extrinsic 
properties of their bearers. 
 
4.4.3. McKitrick’s arguments that dispositions are extrinsic 
properties of their bearers  
I now turn to two further arguments for extrinsic dispositions, given by Jennifer 
McKitrick (McKitrick 2003). These arguments confuse the manner in which we 
fix the reference of a dispositional term with its meaning and fail to attend to the 
difference between rigid and non-designators. Once these confusions are pointed 
out, it becomes clear that both arguments fail to establish that dispositions are 
extrinsic properties of their bearers.  
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McKitrick’s key-and-lock argument for extrinsic dispositional 
properties  
McKitrick (2003:159) uses an example from Shoemaker to argue for the 
existence of extrinsic dispositional properties: 
“A particular key on my key chain has the power of opening locks of a 
certain design. It also has the power of opening my front door. It could 
lose the former power only by undergoing what we would regard as a real 
change, for example, a change in its shape. But it could lose the latter 
without undergoing such a change; it could do so in virtue of the lock on 
my door being replaced by one of a different design. Let us say that the 
former is an intrinsic change and the latter is a mere-Cambridge power.” 
(Shoemaker 1984:221) 
McKitrick uses this example to conclude that “Shoemaker’s mere-Cambridge 
power is an extrinsic disposition” on the basis that “perfect duplicates [that is, the 
one and same key in this case] do not necessarily share the disposition to open 
door x.” (McKitrick 2003:159). 
 
In drawing this conclusion, McKitrick contends that the key possesses two 
different powers: one intrinsic — the power of opening locks of a certain design, 
and the other extrinsic — the power of opening Shoemaker’s front door. 
However, there is nothing in Shoemaker’s example that forces us to accept 
McKitrick’s conclusion. “The power of opening my front door” non-rigidly 
designates the same power that is rigidly designated by “the power of opening 
locks of a certain design”. There are not two powers at play here, just two 
different terms designating the one and the same property of the key. The 
supposed extrinsic dispositional power of the key and the intrinsic dispositional 
power of the key are just the one and same power differently described. Once we 
attend to the distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators and note how 
they function, it becomes clear that Shoemaker’s example does not force us to 
accept McKitricks’s conclusion that dispositions are extrinsic properties of their 
bearers. 
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There is nothing wrong with using a non-rigid designator to pick out the 
reference of a term. We can use the non-rigid designator “the worlds fastest 
shearer” and the rigid designator “Jackie Howe” to pick out and designate Jackie 
Howe. So too we can use the non-rigid designator “the power of opening my 
front door” to pick out and designate the same property that is rigidly designated 
by “the power of opening locks of a certain design”. But it is wrong to think, as 
McKitrick does, that just because there are two different designators there are 
two different properties. McKitrick fails to establish that the key has two different 
powers, one intrinsic and one extrinsic. Rather, she has merely shown that the 
one and the same property can be referred to in two differently ways, one rigidly 
and one non-rigidly. 
 
McKitrick’s argument that weight is an extrinsic property 
McKitrick pursues a second argument for extrinsic dispositions. She argues that 
weight is an extrinsic dispositional property (McKitrick 2003:159-60). She asks us 
to assume the following definition of weight: 
“x has weight n iff x has a disposition to depress a properly constructed 
scale so as to elicit a reading of n pounds in a gravitational field of 
strength f.” (McKitrick 2003:160) 
Using the duplicate criterion for extrinsicality, McKitrick then argues that weight 
is extrinsic on the grounds that the same person (that is, an exact duplicate) 
would have different weights in different gravitational fields: 
“A person’s weight on earth is different than her weight on the moon. 
Moving from the earth to the moon, she can remain intrinsically the 
same; however a different gravitational field becomes local, and so her 
weight changes. Alternatively, if one person were on earth and her perfect 
duplicate were on the moon, they would have different weights.” 
(McKitrick 2003:160) 
 
Modern physics uses the “gravitational” definition to define weight as the 
product of mass and gravitational acceleration. On this definition, McKitrick 
conflates a manifestation of weight — namely, depressing a scale — with weight 
itself. The gravitational definition gives us no reason to accept that weight is an 
 203 
extrinsic property of its bearer. However, an older “operational” definition from 
Newtonian physics defines weight as the force measured in weighing an object. 
This is the force an object exerts on its support. On the operational definition, 
weight looks to be an extrinsic property of its bearers.   
 
It appears that the question as to whether we should accept McKitrick’s claim 
that weight is an extrinsic dispositional property is a question about the correct 
definition of weight. It appears to be question as to whether the gravitational or 
operational definition of weight is correct. However, this is not how McKitrick 
sees the matter. According to her, the adequacy of her definition of weight is “not 
the issue”. Instead, she claims that: 
“The property referred to by the overtly dispositional locution on the 
right of the biconditional can be called weight… for short, even if these 
overtly dispositional locutions fail to capture what we, or physicists, 
ordinarily mean by ‘weight’….” (McKitrick 2003:160) 
 
McKitrick’s point here is not that calling something “weight” makes it weight. 
She is not making the clearly false claim that calling a hawk “a handsaw” makes 
it so. Rather, her point is that whatever it is that her definition of “weight” refers 
to, whatever it is that is picked out by her use of “weight”, be it weight or 
otherwise, it is nonetheless an extrinsic dispositional property. She is claiming 
that there is some property, a property that she calls “weight”, and whatever this 
property happens to be it is an extrinsic dispositional property.  
 
In making such a statement, McKitrick is making a claim about predicates and 
properties. She assumes that when a predicate applies to an object it does so in 
virtue of the object’s properties. She argues: 
“If a predicate ‘is P’ is unambiguous, and applies to an object in one 
environment but does not apply to a perfect duplicate of that object in 
another environment, then those objects differ with respect to some 
extrinsic property P.” (McKitrick 2003:167)  
In this case, it is thought, we can move from the application of her predicate “is 
weight” to the existence of some extrinsic property, even it is not actually weight. 
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However, there is good reason to believe this is not the case. As argued in chapter 
three, predicates and properties are not isomorphic. We cannot simply move 
from the fact that we truly apply a predicate to an object to the existence of a 
corresponding property. Satisfaction of a predicate is not sufficient for the 
existence of any corresponding property. 
 
The problem for McKitrick is that the application or non-application of a 
predicate to an object does not in and of itself entail anything about what 
properties that object does or does not possess. She requires a further argument, 
an argument that her predicate “is weight” corresponds to a property, be it 
weight or otherwise. Without this her argument is merely about predicates, not 
properties, and she has only shown that the predicate “is weight” is an extrinsic 
predicate. She has said nothing about the nature of properties, be they extrinsic 
or otherwise. 
 
Regardless of the adequacy of KcKitrick’s definition of weight, an argument for 
the extrinsicality of weight can be simply stated. Two duplicate objects — one on 
Earth, the other on the Moon — will possess different weights. Hence, weight is 
an extrinsic property.  
 
Alexander Bird counters such an argument by giving a reductionist account of 
weight: 
“But in this case it is clear that the property that is doing the work is the 
mass of the objects and that is identical for both.”47 (Bird 2007:125) 
Bird claims that weight, an apparently extrinsic property, is reducible to rest 
mass, which is constant across changes in gravitation and so is an intrinsic 
property.  
 
                     
47 Specifically, it is rest mass that is doing the work and it is intrinsic. As Bird notes, in special 
relativity, mass is extrinsic — the mass of an object increases with its velocity relative to an 
observer (Bird 2007:125).  
Prior, in defending her account of location of the dispositional basis, counters Ernst Mach’s 
argument that inertial mass in extrinsic (Prior 1985:53-54). Prior shows that either inertial mass is 
an intrinsic categorical property or the distinction between a disposition and its manifestation 
undercuts Mach’s argument. 
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Bird generalizes this reductionist account. He argues that all extrinsic dispositions 
are reducible to intrinsic dispositions and “fundamental potencies” (Bird 
2007:125). For Bird, the fundamental properties of physics (such as the charge, 
mass and spin of an electron) are dispositional essences or pure powers. These are 
intrinsic properties. All other powers and dispositions are extrinsic but reducible 
to these fundamental intrinsic properties.48 That is, all dispositions and powers 
are intrinsic properties or reducible to intrinsic properties. Bird’s argument for 
intrinsic powers is limited in its application, as it rests upon his dispositional 
essentialist account of powers and with it the notion that dispositions are pure 
powers.  
 
4.4.4 Molnar on Boyle’s key-and-lock argument for relational, 
extrinsic properties 
Instead of pursuing Bird’s argument, I turn to a more general argument that is 
not dependent upon the pure powers view of properties. Molnar, in taking issue 
with Robert Boyle’s contention that dispositions (and indeed all properties) are 
relational and extrinsic, adapts Leibniz’s criticism of occasionalism to argue that 
supposedly extrinsic dispositional properties are reducible to the intrinsic 
properties of their bearers. I show that Molnar fails to provide adequate reason to 
accept his claim that the openability of a lock is founded on the non-relational, 
intrinsic properties of the lock and key. 
 
Boyle’s key-and-lock argument for relational, extrinsic properties 
Boyle contends that for an object to possess a property it must stand in an actual 
relation to another body or perceiver.49 Boyle uses the example of a lock and a 
key to illustrate his relational account of properties: 
                     
48 Bird also appears to be committed to an eliminativist view of extrinsic dispositions, not merely a 
reductionist one. Bird follows Lewis and Langton (1998) in maintaining that duplicates should 
share natural properties, but need not share all non-natural properties (Bird 2007:11). If 
duplicates fail to share the same weight, as they do, then it follows that weight is not a real, 
natural property. The only real, natural properties for Bird are the intrinsic dispositional essences 
of the fundamental properties of physics.  
49 Boyle’s argument is motivated by his rejection of the Scholastic notion of “qualitates reales”, 
according to which for every quality we attribute to a body, there is some distinct entity in that 
body. On the Scholastic view, if a body gains a quality, then something intrinsic to the body must 
be added. Boyle employs the key and lock as a counterexample. The lock gains the quality of 
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“We may consider, then, that…whoever invented locks and keys…had 
made his first lock…that was only a piece of iron contrived into such a 
shape; and when afterwards when he made a key to that lock, that also in 
itself was nothing but a piece of iron of such a determinate figure. But in 
regard to these two pieces of iron might now be applied to none another 
after a certain manner, and that there was a certain congruity betwixt the 
wards of the lock and those of the key, the lock and the key did each of 
them obtain a new capacity; and it became a main part of the notion of a 
lock that it was capable of being made to lock or unlock by that other 
piece of iron we call a key, and it was looked upon as a peculiar faculty 
and power in the key that it was fitted to open and shut the lock: and yet 
by these new attributes there was not added any real or physical entity 
either to the lock or to the key, each of them remaining indeed nothing 
but the same piece of iron, just so shaped as it was before.” (Boyle 
1666:23) 
The example is supposed to show that the lock and key can acquire and lose 
properties and powers without any change in the lock (or key) itself. The central 
claim here is that “the lock and the key did each of them obtain a new capacity” 
without the addition of “any real or physical entity either to the lock or to the 
key”. The lock gains the power to open when it stands in a certain relation to the 
key. This power-bestowing relation between the lock and the key can change 
without any change to the non-relational properties of the lock or key itself. Boyle 
concludes that this “new capacity” of the lock to open is, like all properties, 
relational. 
 
Boyle’s relational dispositional properties are also extrinsic properties of their 
bearers, on both the duplicate and independence criteria. A duplicate of an 
openable lock could fail to stand in the right power-bestowing relation to the 
relevant key, or the relevant key may not even exist. As such, the lock’s power to 
open is not shared by duplicates and so openability is an extrinsic property of the 
lock for Boyle, on this criterion. The lock’s power to open is also extrinsic for 
                                                        
being openable when the key comes into being with no addition or change to the intrinsic 
properties of the lock. 
 
 207 
Boyle on the independence criterion. Boyle’s account of dispositions is overtly 
and explicitly relational. An object only possesses a power if it stands in some 
relation to another body. It follows that the lock’s openability is not independent 
of the existence or non-existence of any b that is distinct from the lock. The 
power to open is not independent of the existence of the key that is distinct from 
the lock. Quite clearly, on the independence criteria, the power to open is an 
extrinsic property of the lock. We can generalize this point. For Boyle, all 
properties and qualities are relational and so extrinsic.50  
 
Molnar adapts Leibniz’s criticism of occasionalism 
Molnar adapts Leibniz’s criticism of occasionalism to argue that Boyle’s 
supposedly extrinsic dispositions are reducible to intrinsic properties of their 
bearers.51 Occasionalism denies that things possess causal efficacy. It denies that 
bodies causally interact on other bodies or minds. Rather, God is the only cause. 
For example, during a game of billiards, I strike my cue ball with the cue tip and 
the ball moves. According to the occasionalist, my will did not move my arm, my 
arm moving did not move the billiard cue, and the billiard cue striking the ball 
did not cause the ball to move. Rather, God caused my arm to move, the billiard 
cue to move, and the ball to move.52 My will, my arm moving and the billiard 
cue striking the ball are merely occasions for God’s intervention.  
 
Leibniz charges that occasionalism renders all events miraculous in that their 
occurrence is independent of the “nature” of the things involved (and instead 
dependent upon divine acts). To avoid the charge of relying on miracles, how 
things behave must relate to the nature of those things (Leibniz 1988:205). 
Leibniz is right to note that if the way something acts is unrelated to and 
                     
50 The “mechanical affections” of size, shape, motion or rest and texture are exceptions, for 
Boyle. These mechanical affections are the only wholly intrinsic and non-relational properties of 
any composite bodies. 
51 My interest here is not historical. I am not attempting to elucidate Leibniz’s criticism of 
occasionalism. Rather, my interest is with Molnar’s argument. 
52 I have presented act occasionalism, as promoted by Nicolas Malebranche. Leibniz’s criticism 
equally applies to the rule occasionalism of Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Bayle. The existence of a 
God-given general law is not sufficient to free occasionalsim from miracles. It still needs to explain 
events in terms of the nature of things.   
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independent of how that thing is, then such acts are unexplicable and 
miraculous. With this Leibniz makes a stinging criticism of occasionalism. 
 
Having established that a thing’s behaviour must relate to its nature, we next 
need to ask: what is the nature of a thing? According to Molnar, the properties 
that constitute a thing’s identity are its nature: 
“As Locke argues, the essence, or nature, of a thing is what we are 
defining when we give the real definition of a thing. A real definition 
expresses the sum of the properties that constitute the identity of the thing 
defined.” (Molnar 2003:38) 
Leibniz’s claim that how things behave must relate to the nature of those things 
now becomes the claim that how things behaves must relate to the properties that 
constitute the thing’s identity. 
 
The next step in Molnar’s argument is to claim that a thing’s nature is intrinsic: 
“But the properties that are part of the nature of a thing are intrinsic to that 
thing.” (Molnar 2003:104)   
Molnar does not consider the possibility that these properties are extrinsic. It is 
easy to see why: both the independence and duplicate criteria define extrinsic 
properties as those properties that a thing can loose while still retaining its 
identity and nature.53 Extrinsic properties cannot be part of the nature of a thing. 
An entity can lose extrinsic properties, but cannot lose its nature, and still remain 
the same thing. This leaves Molnar to conclude: 
“Therefore any non-miraculous explanation of what happens to things must 
relate the happenings to the intrinsic properties of the things.” (Molnar 
2003:104) 
 
Let us summarise Molnar’s adapation of Leibniz’s argument against 
occasionalism: 
                     
53 On the duplicate criterion, a duplicate of a can have the same nature as a, while losing all its 
extrinsic properties. Hence, extrinsic properties are not part of the nature of a thing. On the 
independence criterion, a can retain its identity and nature independently of the existence of 
anything other than a. If extrinsic properties are relational, as Boyle claims, then the extrinsic 
properties of a cannot exist independently of the existence of anything other than a. 
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(P1) What happens should be explicable in terms of the (God-given) 
nature of things (assumption) 
(P2) The nature of a thing is given by the properties that constitute the 
thing’s identity (assumption) 
(P3) What happens should be explicable in terms of the properties that 
constitute a thing’s identity (P1, P2) 
(P4) The extrinsic properties of a thing do not constitute a thing’s identity, 
as they can be lost without changing a thing’s identity 
(P5) The properties that constitute the identity of a thing are intrinsic 
properties of their bearers (P3, P4) 
Therefore: 
(C) “Any (non-miraculous) explanation of what happens to things must 
relate the happenings to the intrinsic properties of the things.” [P3, P5] 
 
Molnar contends that if (C) is true, then dispositional properties are founded 
upon and reducible to the intrinsic properties of their bearers (Molnar 2003:105). 
In particular, if (C1) is true, then the lock’s openability is founded upon and 
reducible to intrinsic properties:  
“If the lock’s openability is an extrinsic property, it is founded on intrinsic 
properties.” (Molnar 2003:105) 
Molnar is correct. If C1 is true, then the lock’s openability is founded upon and 
reducible to intrinsic properties. The conclusion C1  makes the general claim that 
what happens to things must relate the happenings to the intrinsic properties of 
the things. Molnar’s conclusion — that dispositional behaviour must relate the 
happenings to the intrinsic properties of its bearer — is just a specific form of this 
general claim.   
 
However, Molnar is not right and C1 is not true. Leibniz’s argument, as 
presented by Molnar, is valid. It is not possible to hold P1 and P2 and yet deny 
P3. And it is not possible to hold P3 and P5 and deny C1. That is, the truth of 
the premises forces the truth of the conclusion. However, the argument is not 
sound. Premise P3 is false (and with it P1 is also false).  
 
 210 
I now show why these premises are false. A famous problem with Leibniz’s 
metaphysics, first indentified by Antoine Arnauld, is that his account of 
substances makes certain properties essential that are not essential (Leibniz 
1962:vII,30). According to Leibniz, each individual substance has a concept so 
complete that it contains all predicates true of it past, present, and future (or from 
which all its predicates are deducible). This wrongly makes every property of an 
individual substance essential to it.  
 
A similar problem arises in the argument above, but for different reasons. The 
argument makes certain properties of a thing necessary that are not necessary. 
Molnar holds that only the non-accidental intrinsic properties of a thing are part 
of its nature (Molnar 2003:104). The accidental intrinsic properties of a thing are 
not part of its nature. He also holds that “necessary” and “non-accidental” are 
equivalent terms (while “essential” and “non-accidental” are not equivalent 
terms). It follows that the properties that constitute the nature and identity of a 
thing are also necessary properties of that thing. That is, the properties that 
constitute the nature and identity of a thing are the properties it would possess in 
all possible worlds. This is a reasonable and relatively uncontroversial claim. For 
example, the number three is a prime in all possible worlds. Hence being a prime 
is a necessary property of three and part of its nature and identity. Whereas the 
property of being written in red pen on the cover of my maths book is a property 
possessed by three in this world, but not in all worlds. As such, this property does 
not constitute the nature and identity of three.  
 
While it may be reasonable to claim that the identity of a thing is given by the 
properties it would possess in all possible worlds, it is not so reasonable and 
uncontroversial to make the further claim, as premise P3 does, that what happens 
to a thing should be explicable in terms of the properties that constitute a thing’s 
identity (that is, in terms of its necessary properties). The problem is that premise 
P3 renders all causally efficacious properties of a thing as part of a thing’s nature 
and constituting its identity, and so necessary. However, this is wrong — not all 
causally efficacious properties of a thing are necessary.  
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Consider a cricket ball. It is, among other things, spherical, hard and red. Being 
red is a causally efficacious property of the cricket ball. A new and firmly struck 
cricket ball can leave a red mark (a “cherry”) on a cricket bat. A cricket ball will 
also make a red mark on a bowler’s pants from polishing the ball. The ball also 
causes a red sensation in viewers observing it. The point here is that at least some 
of the ball’s behavior is determined, in part, by its redness. However, being red is 
not a necessary property of the cricket ball (and hence not part of its nature or 
identity, on Molnar’s account). To see this, imagine a possible world in which the 
ball is painted blue or rolls through a grass fire and is singed black. It is still the 
same ball: it does not lose its identity or nature and become another, different 
cricket ball. It just changes colour. The ball’s redness is causally efficacious and so 
related to how a thing behaves (namely appearing red, leaving a cherry etc.), and 
yet being red is not a necessary property of the cricket ball.  
 
As this example demonstrates, the problem facing P3 is that the way things 
behave may be related to properties that do not constitute the identity of those 
things, and so are not necessary. Another way to state the problem is that there 
are casually efficacious properties that do not constitute the identity of the thing 
and that are not part of the nature of a thing. I argued that being red was just 
such a causally efficacious, but not necessary, property of a cricket ball. The 
property of being red does not constitute part of the cricket ball’s identity, as 
defined by Molnar. Yet being red determines in part the behaviour of the cricket 
ball. This shows that P3 is false.54  
 
It is false that what happens should be explicable in terms of the properties that 
constitute a thing’s identity, where these properties are necessary. Leibniz’s 
argument as presented by Molnar, is unsound. It gives us no reason to accept the 
conclusion C1 that “any (non-miraculous) explanation of what happens to things 
must relate the happenings to the intrinsic properties of the things”. In turn, the 
argument gives us no reason to accept Molnar’s conclusion that all dispositional 
properties are founded upon and reducible to the non-relational, intrinsic 
                     
54 P1 and P2 entail P3. That is, the argument from P1 and P2 to the conclusion P3 is valid. 
However, the conclusion P3 is false, so we know the argument is not sound. P1 is also false.  
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properties of their bearers. Molnar has failed to give us reason to accept that the 
openability of Boyle’s lock is founded on the non-relational, intrinsic properties of 
the lock and key. 
 
A better argument for intrinsic dispositional properties 
This does not mean that we should reject Molnar’s claim that all dispositional 
properties are founded on the non-relational, intrinsic properties of their bearers. 
Rather, we should just reject this particular argument for that claim. There is 
another possible argument that Molnar can make for the intrinsicality of 
dispositional properties.  
 
Molnar argues that Boyle’s disposition-bestowing relation is congruity, and that it 
is a founded relation and so reducible to the non-relational and intrinsic 
properties of its relata. That is, Molnar argues that Boyle’s supposedly extrinsic 
relational properties are reducible to the intrinsic, non-relational properties of 
their relata. 
 
Molnar draws our attention to the distinction between founded and unfounded 
relations. Some relational properties are founded upon, and so reducible to, the 
non-relational properties of their relata. That is, in some cases:  
(∃x)(∃y)R(x,y) is reducible to (∃x)(∃y)(Fx ∧ Gy). 
Comparative relations, such as being taller than and resembling, are examples of 
founded relational properties that are reducible to the non-relational properties 
of their relata. Molnar uses the metaphor of divine creation and the example of 
Mount Everest being taller than K2 to make his point: 
“After creating Mount Everest and K2, complete with all their intrinsic 
properties, God did not have to create as an additional item, the relation 
between their heights.” (Molnar 2003:51) 
Founded, reducible relations such as this are an ontological bonus in that the 
relational property of being taller than is not an addition to the ontological 
inventory over and above the non-relational properties of the heights of Mount 
Everest and K2. Once you have (∃x)(∃y)(Fx ∧ Gy), where F and G are non-
relational properties, you also have the relation (∃x)(∃y)R(x,y). The only way for 
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Mount Everest to alter its relational property of being taller than K2 is for Mount 
Everest and/or K2 to change their heights, which are non-relational properties. 
This shows the relational property of being taller than is founded upon and 
reducible to the non-relational properties of its relata. 
 
There are also relational properties that are unfounded and so not reducible to 
the non-relational properties of their relata. For example, spatio-temporal 
relations are unfounded.55 Consider the dog on the tucker box. It famously has 
the spatial relational property of being five miles from Gundagai (Yorke 1857). 
However, the dog’s location is contingent. We could move the dog on the tucker 
box three miles further down the road, and do so without altering the non-
relational properties of either the dog on the tucker box or Gundagai. If the dog 
on the tucker box can change its distance from Gundagai, that is, change it 
spatial properties, without any change in the non-relational properties of the dog 
on the tucker box or Gundagai, then it follows that spatial relations are not 
reducible to the non-relational properties of the dog on the tucker box or 
Gundagai. We may generalize this point to claim the spatial properties of objects 
are unfounded and not reducible to the non-relational properties of their relata. 
 
We are left to ask what type of relational property is Boyle’s disposition-
bestowing relation? Is it founded upon and reducible to the non-relational 
properties of its relata? Or is it like spatial relations, unfounded and not reducible 
to the non-relational properties of its relata? In exploring the nature of the 
disposition-bestowing relation, Molnar asks us to consider two locks L1 and L2: 
“Let us say that at t a key, K, is made. Let L1 be a representative member 
of the class of locks that at t become openable when they were not 
openable prior to t. Let L2 be a member of the class of locks that were not 
openable prior to t and that do not become openable at t. (Molnar 
2003:104-105)  
Why does the making of the key K bestow the disposition of being openable on 
some locks, namely (L1), but not on others, namely (L2)? Molnar asks how Boyle 
                     
55 For a defence of founded spatio-temporal relations see Campbell (1990).  
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accounts for this selective empowering. What is the disposition-bestowing relation 
that accounts for this selective empowering?  
 
According to Molnar, Boyle’s disposition-bestowing relation is “congruence” 
(Molnar 2003:105).56 Molnar’s claim finds support in the following passage from 
Boyle: 
“But in regard to these two pieces of iron might now be applied to one 
another after a certain manner, and that there was a certain congruity 
betwixt the wards of the lock and those of the key, the lock and the key 
did each of them obtain a new capacity…” (Boyle 1666:23) 
On this account, the selective empowering in Molnar’s example is explained in 
terms of congruence. K stand in the disposition-bestowing relation to L1 and not 
to L2 because K is congruent with L1 and not congruent with L2.  
 
The congruity relation is a comparative property, like being taller than, and so is 
reducible to and founded upon the non-relational properties of its relata. As 
congruity is the disposition-bestowing relation, it follows that dispositional 
properties are founded relations and so reducible to the non-relational properties 
of their relata. This means Boyle’s supposedly relational dispositional properties 
are reducible to non-relational properties. In particular, L1’s relational power to 
open is a congruent relation and so reducible to, and founded upon, the non-
relational properties of the relata — L1 and K. The property of being openable is 
reducible to, and nothing over and above, the non-relational properties of the 
lock and key.  
 
Molnar’s aim is to show that Boyle’s supposedly extrinsic dispositional properties 
are intrinsic, not merely non-relational. So the question becomes, are all non-
relational properties also intrinsic properties of their nearers? Molnar thinks we 
                     
56 Dan Kaufman (2006:175) contends that Boyle never gives an explicit account of the ontological 
status of disposition-bestowing relations. Kaufman notes that manifestation is not required for the 
existence of a quality or power. Boyle distinguishes between a quality and its manifestation. 
Spatial proximity is also not required for the relevant property-bestowing relation to obtain. Lock 
and key need not be in the same room or even on the same island. Intention is also not required 
— an “accidental” key may bestow power. However, the relata need to be contemporaries. A 
body has a quality at t only if all of the relata required for the quality exist at t. 
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can find a predicate that is a counterexample, one that is both extrinsic and non-
relational: 
“ …‘[I]s such that the Duke of Wellington is mortal’ is an extrinsic-and-
non-relational predicate when applied to anyone but the Old Duke.” 
(Molnar 2003:43) 
However, he denies that there are any properties that are non-relational and 
extrinsic: 
“I think that all the extrinsic properties of an object are relational. The 
only putative counter-examples that come to mind are of the sort that 
Sydney Shoemaker has called ‘mere Cambridge properties’, that is, not 
properties at all.” (Molnar 2003:43) 
Molnar does not explicitly state his argument for this position. However, Molnar 
holds a version of the independence criterion of intrinsicality. The non-relational 
properties of an object do not depend upon what other objects exist and so are 
intrinsic. For example, K and L1’s non-relational properties do not depend upon 
what other objects exist and so are intrinsic. Molnar has shown that the property 
of being openable is founded upon and reducible to the non-relational, intrinsic 
properties of K and L1. With this argument, Molnar shows that being openable, 
like all dispositional properties, is reducible to the intrinsic properties of it 
bearers. We must conclude that Boyle is wrong to claim that the dispositional 
properties of objects are extrinsic properties of their bearers. 
 
What underpins and motivates Boyle’s argument for relational, 
extrinsic properties? 
Boyle claims that dispositional properties are relational, and so extrinsic. The 
locks power to open involves a relational between the lock and an appropriate 
key.  Boyle’s relational account ties the disposition to the conditions required for 
its manifestation. Boyle makes the conditions required for the manifestation part 
of the dispositional ascription. The lock possesses the property of being openable 
because it stands in the right relation to the key required for the lock to manifest 
its dispositions and open.  
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However, as was noted above, the independence of a disposition and its 
manifestation show that dispositions are not relational properties. Similarly, the 
independence of a disposition and its manifestation undercuts Boyle’s claim that 
dispositional ascriptions are relational. If an object can possess a dispositional 
property independently of its manifestation, so too it can possess that disposition 
independently of the conditions required for that manifestation. Just as the 
independence of a disposition and its manifestation suggests that a sugar cube is 
soluble even when not dissolving, so too independence shows that a sugar cube is 
soluble even in the absence of the water required for it to dissolve.  
 
Independence suggests that Boyle is wrong to claim that dispositions are 
relational and therefore extrinsic properties. To claim otherwise is to take a 
verificationist, anti-realist view of dispositions and powers. It is to suggest that the 
truth value of dispositional ascriptions does not transcend our evidence for such 
truths. That confuses and conflates the disposition with the conditions required 
for its manifestation. As Heil notes: 
“Conditionals provide a defeasible, rough-and-ready way to pick out 
dispositions, not a reductive analysis.” (Heil 2003:195-96) 
Boyle confuses a “rough-and-ready” way of picking out dispositional properties, a 
way of fixing the reference the dispositional terms, with the dispositional property 
itself when he claims that dispositional properties are relational. 
 
Conclusion 
I have shown that arguments by A.D. Smith (1977), Jennifer McKitrick (2003) 
and Robert Boyle (1666) that dispositions are extrinsic properties of their bearers 
are either invalid or unsound and therefore fail to give any reason to accept that 
powers are not intrinsic. I have also shown that an argument can be constructed 
from Molnar (2003) demonstrating that even if dispositions are extrinsic 
properties, they are nonetheless founded upon and reducible to intrinsic 
properties of their bearers.  
 
Arguments that dispositions are relational, extrinsic properties of their bearers 
mistake the manner in which we identify, pick out and talk about dispositions for 
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the nature of dispositions. These arguments conflate the manifestation of a 
disposition (which may be extrinsic) with the disposition itself and so make 
unwarranted ontological claims that dispositions are extrinsic. They also fail to 
distinguish between rigid and non-rigid ways of designating dispositions. Just 
because we can use an extrinsic property term to designate a disposition it does 
not follow that dispositions are themselves extrinsic. As a result, these arguments 
fail to give us any reason to hold that dispositions are extrinsic properties of their 
bearers.  
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Dispositions — conclusion  
The central claim of this thesis is that a number of key, competing theories of 
dispositions mistake and conflate how we fix the reference of dispositional terms 
for the nature of dispositions and the meaning of dispositional terms when they 
argue that:  
i) Dispositions are extrinsic properties of their bearers (Boyle 1666)  
j) Properties are purely dispositional (Bird 2007)  
k) Properties are purely categorical (there are no dispositional properties) 
(Armstrong in AMP 1996)  
l) Dispositional and categorical properties are separate and distinct 
properties (Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982)  
 
This central claim rests upon a distinction between word making and world 
making — a distinction between how we talk about the world and designate 
objects and how the world is. Objects, like properties, can be picked out in a 
diverse range of ways. As Kripke argues, the very same object can be picked out 
with a rigid designator — a name — or non-rigidly, using descriptions. But these 
are just ways of designating and picking out entities. Neither way is 
metaphysically nor semantically revelatory (see chapter three). They do not tell us 
about the nature of dispositions and properties, nor do they disclose the meaning 
of dispositional and property terms.  
 
The lesson I draw from this is the main conclusion of my thesis — that debates 
about the nature of properties can often turn out to be debates about the 
usefulness and informativeness of different ways of picking out and designating a 
property. However, this has little to do with the metaphysics of properties. 
Different ways of picking out a property are just that — different ways of picking 
out a property. They are not ways of distilling the meaning of dispositional and 
categorical terms nor are do they reveal the nature of dispositions and properties.   
 
I show that theories that make substantial ontological claims about the nature of 
dispositions and properties mistake how we identify, designate and talk about 
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dispositions and properties for the nature of dispositions and properties. For 
example, we saw in chapter 4.2 how Bird mistakes the manner we characterise 
and pick out the reference of properties using dispositional terms for the nature of 
these properties themselves. Bird uses the fact that physicists:  
(a) employ only dispositional terms, such as “spin” and “charge”, to 
characterize the fundamental physical particles  
and 
(b) employ only dispositional methods to explore the nature of 
fundamental particles  
to argue that properties are purely dispositional. The problem is that scientific 
methodology has only one mode of characterising and exploring the properties of 
fundamental entities: the dispositional. Particle physics probes subatomic 
particles by bombarding them with other particles and observing how they act 
and interact. So the fact that science tells us that the fundamental particles are 
dispositional is not a reflection on the nature of the world. Rather it is a reflection 
on the methodology of science. Even if the fundamental entities are categorical, 
particle physics would still characterise them using dispositional terms.  
 
Armstrong’s argument that all properties are purely categorical (chapter 4.3) and 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson’s argument that there are separate and distinct 
dispositional and categorical properties (chapter 4.1) both rest upon a false 
counterfactual semantics of dispositions. The dispositional ascription: 
“x is fragile”  
is thought to entail and be analysable in terms of the conditional statement: 
“If x were dropped, then x would break”  
or the counterfactual:  
“if x had been dropped, then x would have broken”.  
However, as Lewis notes, a simple conditional analysis of dispositions is “simple 
indeed — but false” (Lewis 1997a:143). Finks, mimics, masks and antidotes show 
that a true counterfactual is neither necessary nor sufficient for the possession of a 
disposition. In particular, C.B. Martin’s (1994) electro-fink and reverse electro-
fink examples illustrate that a true conditional is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for a true dispositional ascription.  
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Attempts to save the counterfactual analysis by adjusting and strengthening the 
counterfactual fail (see chapter 2). We are led to conclude along with Heil that:  
“Conditionals provide a defeasible, rough-and-ready way to pick out 
dispositions, not a reductive analysis.” (Heil 2003:195-96) 
The predicate “soluble” and the counterfactual “If x were placed in water, then x 
would dissolve” are merely two ways of picking out and designating the same 
property. Neither way of designating, be it a rigid or non-rigid, is revelatory of 
the nature of properties.  
 
There is no reason to follow Armstrong and hold there are no dispositions, nor 
any reason to follow Prior, Pargetter and Jackson and hold there are separate and 
distinct dispositional and categorical properties. To think otherwise is to take one 
way of designating properties as revealing the nature of those properties. Their 
arguments rest upon a false semantics of dispositions and so are unsound. 
 
The counterfactual analysis also causes more trouble for accounts of dispositions 
and properties. The counterfactual analysis includes mention of a disposition’s 
manifestation (say the breaking of a fragile object) and so makes it tempting to see 
the manifestation of the disposition as part of the disposition. However, powers 
and dispositions are ontologically independent of their manifestation. A tennis 
ball is elastic even when not bouncing. The Ming vase on level two of the 
Morven Brown building is fragile right now, even when it is not shattering. 
Indeed, the vase need never shatter, yet it may still remain fragile.  
 
Mumford contends that empiricist, verificationist and anti-realist assumptions 
that refuse to separate evidence from ontology are also at fault here (Mumford 
1998:ch3). Verificationist principles entail that a disposition just is its observable 
events, namely its manifestation. We readily observe a tennis ball bouncing when 
dropped. This makes it tempting to take the manifestation (the bouncing ) for the 
disposition itself  (elasticity) as it is the most obvious and observable sign of the 
disposition. But this is, once again, to mistake how we identify and designate 
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dispositions for the disposition itself. Armstrong describes this mistaken conflation 
as a propensity to: 
“…project into the disposed things a ghostly image of the manifestation of 
the disposition, even when it is not manifested.” (Armstrong, Martin, 
Place 1996:93)  
 
There is a long history, dating back to at least Boyle in the seventeenth century, 
claiming that powers are relational and extrinsic properties of their bearers. As 
noted in chapter 4.4, Boyle claims that a key’s power to open a lock is a relational 
and extrinsic property of the key. Boyle (1666), Smith (1977), Prior (1985) and 
McKitrick (2003a) confuse and conflate the manifestation of a disposition with 
the disposition itself when they argue that dispositions are relational and extrinsic 
properties. They argue that the manifestation of a power is relational and 
extrinsic and so conclude that the power itself is relational and extrinsic. 
However, this is to mistake the manifestation, a readily observable and useful way 
of picking out a disposition, for the disposition itself. The manifestation may well 
be relational and extrinsic, but the manifestation is not the disposition, and so it 
does not follow that the disposition is relational and extrinsic. Arguments that 
dispositions and powers are extrinsic properties of their bearers are unsound and 
give us no reason to accept their conclusion. 
 
Once we are sensitive to: 
(a) the distinction between how we talk about the world and how the 
world is  
and  
(b) are aware that the manner in which we identify, discover and 
designate powers and properties does not reveal the nature of 
those properties or the meaning of dispositional and property 
terms,  
then it becomes apparent that arguments making substantive claims about the 
nature of dispositions and properties are either invalid or unsound. It becomes 
apparent that these theories provide no grounds to accept their ontological claims 
about the nature of dispositions and powers. This is a skeptical conclusion. Our 
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language provides us with ways to identifying and picking out dispositions and 
properties, but it does not tell us about the nature of these entities. In pursuing 
metaphysics, we must be wary of this distinction between how we talk about and 
identify entities and the nature of these entities.  
 
Where to from here? I think the next step in our attempts to understand the 
nature of dispositions and their role in causation, laws and modality is to develop 
a semantics of dispositions that avoids the pitfalls of the counterfactual analysis. 
To this end, John Maier (2015) argues that dispositional predicates are generally 
derived from ergative verbs, while Michael Fara (2005) sets out to analyse 
dispositions in terms of habituals.  
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